MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff David Bray brings this action against Defendant Purple Eagle Entertainment, Inc. (“Purple Eagle”) and its principal, Defendant Robert Mrgdechian, asserting state and federal claims stemming from Defendants’ alleged infringement of Plaintiff’s copyrights to several songs that Plaintiff wrote while employed by Purple Eagle as a member of the band Madison Rising. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 19.) Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).1 (ECF No. 21.) In the alternative, Defendants seek to convert their motion to dismiss into one for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs copyright infringement claim pursuant to Rule 12(d). (Id.) Defendants separately move to strike certain allegations in the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f). (ECF No. 23.) Defendants also seek to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with both motions. (See ECF Nos. 21, 23.)Before this Court is Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman’s January 18, 2019 Report and Recommendation, (the “Report,” ECF No. 44), recommending that Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be granted with leave to replead, that Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment be denied, and that Defendants’ motion to strike be granted in part and denied in part. (Id. at 29.) In his Report, Magistrate Judge Pitman advised the parties that failure to file timely objections to the Report would constitute a waiver of those objections on appeal. (Id. at 30.) Plaintiff filed timely objections. (Objs., ECF No. 46.)Plaintiff’s objections are overruled, and the Report is ADOPTED in full.I. LEGAL STANDARDSA court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations” set forth within a magistrate judge’s report. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C). The court must review de novo the portions of a magistrate judge’s report to which a party properly objects. Id. Portions of a magistrate judge’s report to which no or “merely perfunctory” objections are made are reviewed for clear error. See Edwards v. Fischer, 414 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citation omitted). The clear error standard also applies when a party’s “objections are improper – because they are ‘conclusory,’ ‘general,’ or ‘simply rehash or reiterate the original briefs to the magistrate judge.’” Stone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17 Civ. 569 (RJS) (KNF), 2018 WL 1581993, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (quoting Rodriguez v. Colvin, No. 12 Civ. 3931 (RJS) (RLE), 2014 WL 5038410, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014)). Clear error is present when “upon review of the entire record, [the court is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).II. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIMMagistrate Judge Pitman correctly found that Plaintiff’s federal copyright infringement claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it does not allege any infringing conduct. (Report at 18.) As explained in the Report, the amended complaint alleges that “[t]hrough [its] conduct averred herein, Defendant Purple Eagle has infringed Plaintiff['s] copyright,” but the preceding paragraphs of the amended complaint do not allege “reproduction, distribution, public performance or preparation of derivative works.” (Id. at 19-20 (quoting Am. Compl. 129)); see also Latin Am. Music Co. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 3d 584, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting that a copyright infringement claim requires allegations of “copying,” which is “shorthand for the infringing of any of the copyright owner’s five exclusive rights…, namely, to ‘reproduce, perform publicly, display publicly, prepare derivative works of, and distribute copies of, his copyrighted work’”) (quoting Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010)).Magistrate Judge Pitman further correctly found that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, because Defendants have “failed to establish to a legal certainty that [P]laintiff’s claims do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.”2 (Report at 18; see also id. at 9 (“[T]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls, if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938)).) Nonetheless, Magistrate Judge Pitman also found that the state law claims should be dismissed because they are “based on [P]laintiff’s copyright claim” and “seek different remedies for the same alleged wrong.”3 (Report at 21-22.)Plaintiff does not object to Magistrate Judge Pitman’s findings as to jurisdiction and the dismissal of his claims for copyright infringement, declaratory relief, an accounting, or unjust enrichment. (See Objs. at 1.) However, Plaintiff does object to the dismissal of his constructive trust claim. Plaintiff asserts that his constructive trust claim is not “an ‘alternative remedy to [P]laintiff’s copyright infringement claim,’” (id. (quoting Report at 27)), because it seeks to preserve the equity interest in Purple Eagle that Mrgdechian promised Plaintiff in return for his “significant effort…to turn the band into a profitable endeavor,” which went “well beyond his songwriting and performing.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff made a substantially similar argument before Magistrate Judge Pitman. (See Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 28, at 13) (“Plaintiff’s constructive trust cause of action…is based on the fact that…Mr. Mrgdechian offered Plaintiff a partnership in Purple Eagle” and “Plaintiff put a tremendous amount of effort into making Purple Eagle successful.”) Thus, this Court need only review Magistrate Judge Pitman’s finding for clear error. Stone, 2018 WL 1581993, at *3. However, even upon de novo review, Plaintiff’s objection is without merit.Plaintiff’s constructive trust claim alleges that “[i]n addition to his creative and branding contributions, Plaintiff also filled a vital public relations/damage control role.” (Am. Compl. 149.) But this allegation does not meaningfully distinguish his constructive trust claim from his copyright claim, because Plaintiff has not alleged that the band had any means of deriving value from its public relations other than by performing and selling recordings of the material that he claims is subject to copyright. Similarly, although Plaintiff alleges that a constructive trust is necessary to protect his interest in “the company, the band” and “goodwill and customers” in addition to “intellectual property,” Plaintiff does not allege that the company or band had any assets other than the alleged copyrighted material. (Id. 151.) Nor does Plaintiff allege that the company or band had any means of deriving value from goodwill and relations with customers other than making use of the alleged copyrighted material. Thus, because Plaintiff’s constructive trust claim would, in effect, serve to compensate him for the use of the same material that is the subject of his copyright claim (and his other state law claims), it is dismissed as duplicative.III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIEDAs an alternative to their motion to dismiss, Defendants request that this Court convert their motion to one for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d) by considering a Band Member Agreement that is outside of the pleadings.4 (See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22, at 23 (citing id., Ex. B, ECF No. 22-2 (Band Member Agreement).) Magistrate Judge Pitman correctly found that Defendants’ motion should be denied because material issues of fact will remain even if the Band Member Agreement is considered. (Report at 22.) As further discussed in the Report, there are issues of fact as to when the works were created and as to whether those works were created while the Band Member Agreement was in effect. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff does not object to Magistrate Judge Pitman’s denial of Defendant’s partial summary judgment motion.IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE IS GRANTED IN PARTDefendants move to strike several allegations from the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f).5 (See ECF No. 23.) Under that rule, “[a]negations may be stricken where they have no bearing on the parties’ claims or defenses, will likely be prejudicial, or where they have criminal overtones.” Hunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, No. 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Eaton v. Am. Media Operations, No. 96 Civ. 6158 (MBM), 1997 WL 7670, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1997) (“Arguably relevant material may…be stricken…where it might prejudice the moving party.”). Accordingly, as the Report notes, “[c]ourts in this district have stricken various categories of allegations based on their irrelevance and prejudicial effect.” (Report at 16) (collecting cases).Here, Magistrate Judge Pitman found that Defendant’s motion to strike should be granted as to the entirety of paragraphs 27-29, 72-88 and 91 and as to portions of paragraphs 4, 26, 30, 31, 35, 44, 50, and 63 and denied in all other respects.6 (Report at 25-26.) While Plaintiff does not identify any specific language that he believes should not be stricken, he objects generally that “the sections which the Magistrate has recommended to be stricken describe how Plaintiff had to put in significant time and effort to combat Defendant Mrgdechian’s actions and behaviors, which threatened to destroy the profitability of the band” and “outline Plaintiff’s time and effort expended to turn the band from a politically divisive tool into a patriotic and popular product.” (Id.) Plaintiff raised a substantially similar argument before Magistrate Judge Pitman. (Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 29, at 5-6 (asserting that the challenged paragraphs “outline[] much of the efforts that Mr. Bray undertook…to turn the band into a profitable enterprise,” which included “protecting the band from being damaged by Mr. Mgrdechian’s activities”).) Accordingly, this Court need only review this aspect of the Report for clear error. Stone, 2018 WL 1581993, at *3. But even on de novo review, Plaintiff’s objection has no merit.As to the allegations concerning Mrgdechian’s political beliefs, the three paragraphs that Magistrate Judge Pitman found should be stricken in their entirety describe books authored by Mrgdechian and do not mention Plaintiff. (See Am. Compl.
27-29.) Likewise, the portions of several paragraphs that Magistrate Judge Pitman found should be partially stricken are those that use “terms like ‘divisive,’ ‘hateful,’ ‘alt-right,’ ‘extremist,’ and similar language to refer to Mrgdechian and his political beliefs.” (Report at 25 (citing Am. Compl.
