OPINION AND ORDER Petitioner Aferdita Collaku, a former employee of Respondent Temco Service Industries, Inc. (“Temco”), brought this petition in New York state court under Section 7511 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, seeking to vacate an arbitrator’s decision issued pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Dkt. 5 ex. 2 (Verified Pet.). Temco removed the petition to this Court, asserting that although Petitioner’s claim is styled as one arising under state law, it is actually a federal cause of action “over which this Court has jurisdiction under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (‘LMRA’)” and is thus removable to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1441 and 1446. Dkt. 5 (Am. Notice of Removal) at 2-3. Petitioner’s motion to remand the case to New York Supreme Court, Dkts. 11-12, is DENIED. Consistent with this Court’s order, see Dkt. 10, the parties’ briefing on the remand motion also addressed whether Respondent defaulted on this petition while the case was in state court and, if so, whether Respondent must formally move to vacate the default under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b) to further litigate this case. For the reasons that follow, the Court holds that Respondent did not default while in state court and that any motion to vacate is unnecessary.BACKGROUNDAlthough the parties dispute the veracity of Petitioner’s underlying grievances against Respondent, the procedural history of this case is generally undisputed.Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a cleaner, supervisor, and foreperson between 2004 and 2014. Dkt. 5 ex. 2 (Verified Pet.)11. In November 2014, Petitioner sued Respondent in New York Supreme Court alleging that Respondent had violated her rights under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). See Dkt. 5 ex. 5 (Summons & Compl.). Respondent moved to compel arbitration of Petitioner’s claims, asserting (1) that Petitioner was subject to a CBA between a labor union representing Petitioner and a multi-employer bargaining group of which Respondent was a member, and (2) that Petitioner’s NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims were subject to the mandatory-arbitration clause contained in the CBA. See App. A (State Court Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss) at 2-3, 6-8.1 The parties then stipulated to submit Petitioner’s claims to arbitration pursuant to the CBA and to stay Petitioner’s lawsuit pending the outcome of arbitration.2 See Dkt. 13 ex. A (stipulation).Arbitration proceedings took place on two of Petitioner’s NYCHRL claims only.3 See Dkt. 12 (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand) at 2. After taking evidence, the arbitrator decided that Respondent had not violated the NYCHRL and dismissed Petitioner’s claims. See Dkt. 5 ex. 4 (Op. & Order). The arbitrator’s reasoning is irrelevant to resolving Petitioner’s motion to remand, so the Court will not recount it here.On April 6, 2018, Petitioner filed this action in New York Supreme Court, requesting that the arbitrator’s decision be vacated under N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 7511(b)(1). Dkt. 5 ex. 2 (Verified Pet.). Petitioner’s notice of the petition purported to set a deadline of April 30, 2018, for Respondent to respond, see id. ex. 1 (Notice of Pet.) at 1, but Respondent did not appear or file any responsive papers by that date, see Dkt. 5 (Am. Notice of Removal)8; Dkt. 14 (Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Remand) at 9. Instead, on May 6, 2018, Respondent filed a notice of removal. See Dkt. 1 (Notice of Removal). Respondent’s amended removal notice contends that this Court has federal-question jurisdiction because Petitioner’s Section 7511 claim challenges an arbitral award issued pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in a CBA and is, therefore, completely preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. See Dkt. 5 (Am. Notice of Removal)
4- 7.After an initial pre-trial conference, Petitioner filed this motion to remand, contending that Section 301 does not completely preempt her N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 7511(b)(1) petition and that this Court therefore lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 12 (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand). Petitioner does not contest the timeliness of the removal or Respondent’s compliance with the procedures laid out in 28 U.S.C. §§1441 and 1446.DISCUSSION“The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction,” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), and must do so before reaching the merits, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998). The Court therefore addresses first whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this petition and thus whether Respondent properly removed it from state court. It will then turn to whether Respondent defaulted in state court and, if so, whether Respondent must move to vacate that default in order to contest Collaku’s petition in this Court.A. Subject-Matter JurisdictionBecause Respondent removed this case from state court, it “bears the burden of proving that the case is properly in federal court.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. CenterMark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994). The Court concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this petition under Section 301 of the LMRA and thus that Respondent properly removed the action from state court to this Court under 28 U.S.C §1441.For an action properly to be removed to federal court, the action must be one that “could have been originally filed in federal court” — that is, one over which a federal court could have exercised original federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 116 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. §1441(a)). In this case, because Respondent has not demonstrated any basis for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332, removal was proper only if the case presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. §1331.Ordinarily, of course, the “presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “Thus, a plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading only state law claims, even where federal claims are also available, and even if there is a federal defense.” Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 479, 486 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392-93). A defendant is, in any case, free to assert that the plaintiff’s state-law claims are preempted by federal law, but the availability of that defense does not by itself give rise to federal-question jurisdiction. Cooper Union Fed’n of Coll. Teachers, Local 2163 v. Cooper Union for the Advancement of Sci. & Art, No. 18-CV-5891, 2019 WL 121000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019).“There is an exception, however, to the general rule that the plaintiff is ‘master of the claim.’” Whitehurst v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 18-CV-1090, 2018 WL 2744710, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2018) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392). Under the “artful-pleading doctrine,” “a plaintiff cannot avoid removal…by framing in terms of state law a complaint the ‘real nature of which is federal, regardless of plaintiff’s characterization[,]‘ or ‘by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hosp., 844 F.2d 22, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1988)).“The artful-pleading doctrine includes within it the doctrine of complete preemption,” Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005), under which a federal statute’s preemptive force is “so extraordinary” that it “converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule,” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if a plaintiff “raises…a completely preempted state-law claim in his complaint, a court is obligated to construe the complaint as raising a federal claim and therefore ‘arising under’ federal law.” Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272. Section 301 of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. §185) is one of only three statutes that the U.S. Supreme Court has held possesses “the requisite extraordinary preemptive force to support complete preemption,” id., and the only such statute that could possibly apply to this action. Thus, for this Court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over this petition, the state-law cause of action the petition asserts must be completely preempted by Section 301(a) of the LMRA.4A state-law claim is completely preempted by Section 301(a) of the LMRA if the claim is either (1) “founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” or (2) “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted); Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2003). Consistent with this principle, a plaintiff covered by a CBA may bring a claim “assert[ing] legal rights independent of that [CBA], including state-law contract rights,” without triggering complete preemption under Section 301, “so long as the contract” underlying the claim “is not a [CBA].” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 396 (emphasis and citation omitted). Section 301, in other words, does not “preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985). Likewise, “the need merely to ‘consult’ or ‘refer’ to the CBA does not trigger preemption.” Cooper Union Fed’n, 2019 WL 121000, at *2 (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994)). In contrast, however, “state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private agreements” and “as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties” are completely preempted by Section 301. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added).Resolving the parties’ jurisdictional dispute requires properly characterizing the nature of the right Petitioner seeks to vindicate. Petitioner asserts that “[a]t no point during the arbitration or [this] proceeding has [she] alleged she was terminated in violation of rights conferred pursuant to a CBA.” Dkt. 12 (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand) at 4-5. Rather, Petitioner says, she “alleges violations of her rights pursuant to the [NY]CHRL — rights that are not conferred to her by a contract and do not require an interpretation of any contract.” Id. at 5. The CBA is thus “entirely irrelevant” to this petition, Petitioner asserts, and Section 301 therefore does not preempt it. Dkt. 15 (Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Remand) at 1. Respondent takes a different view, pointing out that Petitioner’s action “seeks to vacate an arbitration award rendered pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement” and asserting that “[a]ssessment of an award rendered pursuant to procedures and powers outlined in the CBA requires interpretation of the CBA, and thus invokes jurisdiction under §301.” Dkt. 14 (Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Remand) at 4. Although the Court disagrees with Respondent’s analysis, it agrees with Respondent’s ultimate conclusion.Petitioner’s argument elides a critical distinction between her underlying grievance and this action. Petitioner’s November 2014 complaint in state court asserted several claims arising under the NYCHRL and the NYSHRL. See Dkt. 5 ex. 5 (Summons & Compl.) at 11-21. It nowhere asserted any claim concerning a violation of the CBA or any other contract to which Petitioner may have been subject. Id. In contrast, her April 2018 petition to vacate the arbitrator’s award — the petition now before this Court — contends that the arbitrator’s decision on Petitioner’s NYCHRL claims was “irrational,” “not based in evidence or reason,” and “not supported by the record.” Dkt. 5 ex. 2 (Verified Pet.)
