OPINION & ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Marc Jacobs International, LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, to sever Plaintiffs Laser Kitten, LLC, Katie Thierjung, and Wildflower + Co., Inc.’s (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) claims from each other. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is denied.I. BackgroundA. Factual BackgroundThe Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case. See Laser Kitten, LLC v. Marc Jacobs Int’l, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 8613, 2018 WL 4830091 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). To briefly summarize, Plaintiffs are independent artists who create enamel pins and patches featuring their original artwork. They allege that Defendant, a fashion brand, took their designs and, without Plaintiffs’ consent or permission, used them in products it then marketed and sold.B. Procedural HistoryOn November 7, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Defendant had (1) committed copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§106 and 501 and (2) provided false copyright management information (“CMI”) in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202 (a). On February 6, 2018, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the second claim which the Court granted. See id.On May 3, 2018, Defendant filed the instant motion to sever Plaintiffs’ claims into three separate cases, one for each Plaintiff. On May 30, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on this motion.II. Legal Standards“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. In seeking severance, “the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that ‘severance is required to avoid prejudice or confusion and to promote the ends of justice.’” N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 312 F.R.D. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Agnesini, 275 F.R.D. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). While a court has “broad discretion under Rule 21 to sever parties or claims from the action…’severance [i]s a procedural device to be employed only in exceptional circumstances.’” Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Laureano v. Goord, No. 06 Civ. 7845 (SHS) (RLE), 2007 WL 2826649, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007)).III. DiscussionAlthough the Second Circuit “has not set forth specific criteria governing severance, courts in this District generally employ the following factors on a motion to sever: (1) whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims present some common questions of law or fact; (3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy would be facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted; and (5) whether different witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims.” Erausquin v. Notz, Stucki Mgmt. (Bermuda) Ltd., 806 F. Supp. 2d 712, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 152, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also Whalen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 13 Civ. 3784 (LGS) (HBP), 2016 WL 4787337, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2016); N. Jersey Media, 312 F.R.D. at 114. Although courts within this circuit have held that severance only requires the presence of one of these conditions, the same courts have generally only granted severance where more than one condition was met. N. Jersey, 312 F.R.D. at 119 (granting severance only after finding all five factors favored it); Cestone v. General Cigar Holdings, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 3686 (RCC), 2002 WL 424654, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2002) (same); Ricciuti v. New York City Tr. Auth., 796 F. Supp. 8, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Convenience and judicial economy alone dictate bifurcation. But defendants make another argument that compels this result, asserting that separate trials are necessary to avoid prejudice.”).As an initial matter, the Court notes that the analysis that a court must run in deciding the first two factors of a Rule 21 motion and a motion for joinder under Rule 20 (a) are essentially identical. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (Persons may join in one action if (1) they assert or have asserted against them any right to relief “jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and (2) “any question of law or fact common to all [plaintiffs or defendants] will arise in the action.”) For that reason, in deciding a Rule 21 motion, some courts in this circuit have first decided whether this case was properly joined under Rule 20. See Raymond A. Semente, D.C., P.C. v. Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., 14-cv-5823 (DRH) (SIL), 2018 WL 4954096 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2018); Lyons v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, No. 1:13-CV-513 (ALC) (GWG), 2014 WL 5039458 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014); Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F. Supp. 2d 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Notably, this approach seems to be most commonly used where the moving party based their Rule 21 motion on their opponents alleged violation of Rule 20. See Lyons, 2014 WL 5039458, at *2-3; Deskovic, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 159. Others, however, have considered each Rule 21 factor in turn, but applied Rule 20 case law where relevant. See N. Jersey, 312 F.R.D. 111; Agnesini, 275 F.R.D. 456. The result is doubtless the same under either approach. Accordingly, as (1) the Defendant has not premised their Rule 21 motion on a Rule 20 violation and (2) both parties have structured their arguments around the Rule 21 factors, the Court will consider each Rule 21 factor in turn, but use Rule 20 holdings to inform its analysis where relevant.1. The Claims Arise Out of the Same Transaction or OccurrenceThere appears to be “no rigid rule as to what constitutes the same series of transactions or occurrences.” N. Jersey Media, 312 F.R.D. at 115. Courts in this circuit, however, have repeatedly “interpreted the phrase ‘same transaction’ to encompass ‘all logically related claims.’” Id. (citations omitted) (collecting cases); see also Lyons, 2014 WL 5039458, at *3 (collecting cases). Even where there are factual differences in plaintiffs’ respective claims, however, courts will still deny severance where plaintiffs allege that defendant’s wrongdoing occurred as part of a policy or practice. Costello v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (D. Conn. 2012) (collecting cases); Lewis v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., No. 97 Civ. 0607 (PKL), 2000 WL 423517, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000).Defendant argues that this factor favors severance because Plaintiffs are making independent allegations about the sale of different products which allegedly infringe on works that are independently copyrighted by each Plaintiff. (Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 6, ECF No. 36 (filed May 3, 2018) [hereinafter "Supp."]; Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3, ECF No. 38 (filed May 3, 2018).) Their claims, therefore, do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Id. Plaintiffs respond their claims do arise from the same “transaction or occurrence” namely the design, manufacture, distribution and sale of the Defendant’s Resort 2017 and Spring 2017 collections. (Pls.’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ECF No. 37 (filed May 3, 2018) [hereinafter "Opp."].)Here, Plaintiffs have pled that Defendant’s allegedly infringing products were produced during the same general time period, for the same collections, and were sold through the same avenues. (Compl.
3-6, 20-28.) Further, Defendant’s “Shrunken Denim Jacket with Pink Embellishments” appears to include copies of both Plaintiff Thierjung’s “Margarita Pin” and Plaintiff Laser Kitten’s “LK City Pink Cop Car Pin,” and Defendant’s “Shrunken Denim Jacket” appears to have copies of both Plaintiff Wildflower’s “Rose Champagne Patch” and Plaintiff Thierjung’s “Highball Pin.” (Id.
