People v. Williams

  On August 7, 2018, the Court filed a Declaration of Delinquency asserting that defendant had failed to comply with the requirements of his August 22, 2017 conditional discharge sentence. On January 22, 2019, defendant moved for dismissal of the Declaration of Delinquency. On January 28, 2019, he moved for the Court’s recusal from further proceedings in this matter. As noted throughout this opinion, defendant’s motions were based in large part on misstatements of fact. Relying on the facts supported by the Record, the Court denied defendant’s motions in Court on February 11, 2019.On February 15, 2019, the Court held a hearing to set forth the evidence of defendant’s noncompliance with his sentence, to afford defendant an opportunity to respond to the evidence, and to determine whether there was a sufficient basis to conclude that defendant violated his sentence requirements. After evaluating the evidence before the Court and considering defendant’s response, the Court found that defendant failed to comply with his sentence obligations. For that reason, the Court resentenced defendant to a term of three years probation. This written Decision and Order explains the legal analysis underlying the Court’s verbal decisions.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDOn July 20, 2017, defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated to satisfy the charges then pending against him. On August 22, 2017, the Court sentenced Mr. Williams to one year conditional discharge. Among its sentence requirements, the Court ordered defendant to complete his recommended treatment, provide regular written reports from his treatment provider confirming his satisfactory participation in and ultimate completion of treatment, refrain from the consumption of alcohol, and pay the statutory minimum fine and surcharges. The Court also ordered defendant to appear in Court on a regular basis for compliance monitoring.On June 6, 2018, defendant, accompanied by his retained attorney, reported to the Court that he was engaged in treatment and doing well.¹ Consequently, the Court scheduled defendant’s next compliance appearance for August 7, 2018.On August 7, 2018, defendant appeared in Court without his attorney. In response to the Court’s inquiry, defendant stated that he did not know where his attorney was. At defendant’s request, however, the Court proceeded to discuss defendant’s sentence compliance with him despite his attorney’s absence.Defendant first stated that he had made a recent payment towards his fine and surcharges, and the Court told him that he still owed $570.00. He then gave the Court a written report from his treatment provider stating that defendant would not be permitted to complete his still on-going treatment until he satisfied his payment obligations. The Court expressed its concern, and advised defendant that because completion of treatment was a key sentence requirement, he would have to reengage with treatment immediately, either at his current provider or at a different provider. The Court also gave defendant a list of community treatment providers, and advised him that several providers in the community charged patients based on a sliding scale.The Court then adjourned the matter to September 7, 2018 for defendant to appear with his attorney, and to give defendant additional time to comply with his sentence obligations. In addition, pursuant to NY C.P.L. §410.30, the Court issued a Declaration of Delinquency based on defendant’s failure to complete his treatment or to pay his fine and surcharges within the conditional discharge period.² The Court also notified defendant’s attorney of the scheduled September 7, 2018 court date.Prior to September 7, 2018, defendant’s attorney requested, and was granted, an adjournment of defendant’s court appearance to September 17, 2018. On that date, defendant again appeared without his attorney. The Court informed defendant that it was troubled because defendant had still not reengaged with treatment and that he needed to appear with his attorney. The Court adjourned the matter to September 21, 2018 at 2:00 p.m. and notified defendant’s attorney of the court date.Although defendant’s case was not on the Court’s 9:30 a.m. docket on September 21, 2018, defendant, accompanied by an Assistant Public Defender, appeared at that time. In response to the Court’s inquiry, defendant told the Court that he had appeared that morning because his “new” lawyer had told him to do so. At defendant’s request and with the consent of the Assistant Public Defender, the Court at that time appointed the Public Defender’s Office to represent defendant and to replace his retained attorney.At that point, the Court advised defendant and his new attorney that it would order a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report [PSI] because defendant had failed to complete his treatment and still owed $570.00 towards his fine and surcharges. Because 60 days are required to prepare a PSI, the Court scheduled defendant’s next court appearance for November 20, 2018.When defendant appeared in Court on November 20, 2018, he again did not provide the Court with proof of either on-going or completed treatment. The Court then advised defendant that the 11/9/18 PSI recommended a resentence of probation “to enable the defendant to be monitored for community safety purposes and to oversee compliance with appropriate therapeutic interventions.”³ In response, defendant’s attorney told the Court for the first time that defendant had, in fact, satisfactorily completed his treatment obligations. He insisted, however, that the treatment agency refused to give defendant documentation of completion solely because he had not fulfilled his payment obligations.Based on defendant’s new assertion that he had actually completed his treatment, the Court adjourned the matter to December 13, 2018 to set a hearing date and to request clarification of the treatment agency’s previous report to the Court^.4 On December 13, 2018, the Court provided counsel with a November 27, 2018 report from defendant’s treatment counselor stating, inter alia, that defendant:was discharged from our program on August 8, 2018 [and] was unable to complete due to a lapse in his medical insurance.…[Defendant's discharge] status was: Left against clinical advice.…Unsuccessful discharge.Defendant’s attorney argued, however, that the November 27, 2018 report did not sufficiently demonstrate that defendant did not complete his treatment. For that reason, the Court scheduled a hearing for January 3, 2019 and asked the treatment counselor to clarify her November 27, 2018 report.For unavoidable reasons, the Court canceled the January 3, 2019 hearing and adjourned the case to January 14, 2019 to reschedule the hearing date. On January 14, 2019, the Court gave counsel a December 14, 2018 email from defendant’s counselor’s supervisor stating, inter alia, that according to his treatment notes, defendant last attended treatment on August 1, 2018 before he completed treatment, and never contacted the treatment agency again after he was advised that his insurance was no longer active. For that reason, defendant’s treatment case was closed. The supervisor’s 12/14/18 email also stated that if defendant had continued his treatment:he would have probably had to stay another thirty (30) plus days in order to be considered for successful completion due to [his 7/6/18 positive screen for alcohol and] relapse (that he shared only when testing positive in his urine screen).Nevertheless, based on defendant’s persistent assertion that he successfully completed treatment, the Court rescheduled the hearing for January 28, 2019. On January 22, 2019, prior to the hearing, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Court’s Declaration of Delinquency. On January 25, 2019, while both the Assistant District Attorney and defendant’s attorney were present in Court on other matters, the Court, on the Record, directed the Assistant District Attorney to contact defendant’s treatment counselor and her supervisor to request their presence at the January 28, 2019 hearing.On January 28, 2019, defendant did not appear in Court.⁵ Nevertheless, defendant filed a motion requesting the Court to recuse itself from further proceedings. In particular, defendant contends that the Court’s impartiality is compromised because the Court directed the Assistant District Attorney to ensure that witnesses from defendant’s treatment agency are available at the hearing and because the Court allegedly violated defendant’s constitutional rights by depriving him of his right to counsel.When defendant appeared in Court on January 29, 2019, the Court rescheduled the hearing for February 15, 2019. On February 5, 2019, the Court advanced the case to February 11, 2019 for argument of defendant’s motions. Following counsel’s arguments on February 11, 2019, the Court verbally denied defendant’s motion on the Record. The Court held a hearing regarding defendant’s alleged noncompliance with his sentence obligations on February 15, 2019.LEGAL DISCUSSIONRecusal MotionDefendant argues that the Court must recuse itself from this action because it directed the Assistant District Attorney to call defendant’s treatment counselor and her supervisor as witnesses at the hearing in this case.⁶ By doing so, defense counsel contends, the Court demonstrated a “clash in judicial roles” that requires recusal as a matter of due process. See People v. Alomar, 93 NY2d 239, 245 (1999).Defendant’s argument misapprehends the Court’s role in conducting a hearing to determine whether defendant satisfactorily complied with the Court’s sentence. When a Court, as here, receives information that defendant violated his sentence obligations, the Court may file, as it did here, a Declaration of Delinquency. See NY C.P.L. §410.30. When defendant denies, as he does here, that he violated his sentence obligations, the Court must conduct a “sufficient inquiry” to determine whether the information regarding defendant’s noncompliance is “‘reliable and accurate,’” People v. Butler, 151 AD3d 1959, 1960 (4th Dep’t), lv. denied 30 NY3d 948 (2017), and to afford defendant an opportunity to refute the information. See People v. Albergotti, 177 NY3d 748, 750 (2011).It is the Court’s responsibility, not the People’s, to conduct a “sufficient inquiry.” Unlike a pre-trial evidentiary hearing or trial in a criminal case, in which the People are obligated to prove the charges brought by the People against the defendant, the obligation to conduct a “sufficient inquiry” to determine whether there is a legitimate basis to find that a defendant failed to comply with his or her conditional discharge sentence rests with the Court. See People v. Green, 45 AD3d 780, 780-81 (2nd Dep’t 2007) (court required to conduct an inquiry sufficient to show that the information upon which court determined that defendant was discharged unsuccessfully from treatment was reliable and accurate); People v. Rivera, 32 AD3d 446 (2nd Dep’t 2006).Further, unlike an evidentiary hearing or criminal trial, “[t]he nature and extent of the inquiry — whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair means — is within the court’s discretion.” People v. Outley, 80 NY2d 702, 713 (1993). See People v. Kocher, 116 AD3d 1301, 1302 (3rd Dep’t 2014) (so long as the court conducts “an inquiry of sufficient depth to assure itself that the information upon which it bases its sentence is reliable and accurate,” a full evidentiary hearing is not required); People v. Jenkins, 29 AD3d 1177, 1178 (3rd Dep’t 2006), lv. denied 9 NY3d 991 (2007) (“While the nature and extent of the [the Court's] inquiry is discretionary, it ‘must be of sufficient depth…that the court can be satisfied…of the existence of a legitimate basis’” for defendant’s alleged noncompliance with his sentence); People v. Semple, 23 AD3d 1058, 1059-60 (4th Dep’t 2005), lv. denied 6 NY3d 852 (2006) (nature and extent of the inquiry is within the court’s discretion).⁷In this case, the Court’s sentence required defendant to successfully complete his treatment and to provide written proof of completion to the Court. When defendant provided a report to the Court on August 7, 2018 stating that he had not completed treatment, the Court filed a Declaration of Delinquency and gave defendant an additional opportunity to return to Court with proof that he had reengaged with treatment. When defendant failed to do so on September 21, 2018, the Court ordered a PSI, in part to obtain clarification of the status of defendant’s treatment.Defendant returned to Court on November 20, 2018 and contended for the first time, without proof, that he had, in fact, completed treatment. As a result, following that appearance, the Court appropriately contacted defendant’s treatment provider to clarify the information the provider had previously provided to the Court, especially in light of defendant’s new contention. Moreover, when it scheduled its inquiry hearing, the Court appropriately directed the Assistant District Attorney to ensure that defendant’s treatment providers, who were in the best position to clarify defendant’s treatment status, were present.Stampfler v. Snow, 290 AD2d 595, 596 (3rd Dep’t 2002), on which defendant relies, is inapposite to support his position that due process compels the Court’s recusal under these circumstances. The Stampfler Court held that recusal was required where the Family Court initiated an independent criminal contempt action alleging criminal contempt under NY Judiciary Law §753(A)(3) against a party in a previously resolved custody action, sought subpoenas duces tecum, and presided over the independent criminal contempt action, and questioned the witness, thereby demonstrating a “clash in judicial roles.” Stampfler, 299 AD2d at 596.Unlike the Family Court in Stampfler, this Court has continued to have jurisdiction over defendant to monitor his sentence compliance. Unlike the Family Court in Stampfler, this Court filed a Declaration of Delinquency against defendant in compliance with statutory procedures for a Court to monitor a defendant’s sentence compliance. Unlike the Family Court in Stampfler, this Court did not initiate an independent judicial action against defendant charging him with criminal contempt for violating the Court’s sentencing orders. Unlike the Family Court in Stampfler, this Court is authorized by statutory procedures, after filing its Declaration of Delinquency, to determine whether a defendant violated the conditions of his or her sentence. Unlike the Family Court in Stampfler, the Court has the discretion to circumscribe “the nature and extent of the inquiry” in this case. People v. Outley, 80 NY2d at 713.Accordingly, the Stampfler Court’s holding that the Family Court’s recusal was required to avoid a clash of judicial roles has no bearing in this case. See, e.g., People v. Alomar, 93 NY2d at 246-47 (no clash of judicial roles where criminal trial judges later presided over and participated in the trials’ reconstruction hearings); People v. Saunders, 301 AD2d 869, 871 (3rd Dep’t), lv. denied 100 NY2d 542 (2003) (no clash of judicial roles requiring recusal where judge, who had testified against defendant in the People’s criminal trial, presided over defendant’s subsequent motions to vacate his conviction and sentence under NY C.P.L §§440.10, 440.20); People v. Smith, 272 AD2d 679, 681-82 (3rd Dep’t), lv. denied 95 NY2d 938 (2000) (no clash in judicial roles where criminal trial court previously presided over Family Court proceedings involving the same incident). To the contrary, under all the circumstances, the Court’s procedures for conducting an inquiry of sufficient depth to satisfy itself whether defendant failed to comply with the conditions of his sentence are both reasonable and appropriate. See People v. Green, 45 AD3d at 780-81; People v. Jenkins, 29 AD3d at 1178; People v. Rivera, 32 AD3d at 446. Therefore, there is no “clash in judicial roles” that requires the Court’s recusal in this matter.⁸Defendant also moves for the Court’s recusal on the ground that the Court violated his constitutional right to an attorney. According to defendant, the Court required him to appear in Court without a lawyer and failed to advise him of his right to counsel for seven months. See defendant’s 1/22/19 Motion, pp. 2, 6, 7, 10, 11: defendant’s 1/28/19 Motion,