By: Shulman, P.J., Ling-Cohan, Edmead, JJ.19-038. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, pet-res, v. DEBORAH GANDRON, res-app — Order (Leticia M. Ramirez, J.), entered March 23, 2018, reversed, without costs, petition denied and the award of the master arbitrator is reinstated.Civil Court erred in vacating the master arbitrator’s award on the ground of misconduct (see CPLR 7511[b][1]). The master arbitrator’s measured response to the self-represented respondent-appellant’s apparently unsolicited communication, wherein the master arbitrator, inter alia, directed appellant to serve a copy of her communication upon petitioner Allstate, and indicated that respondent “would be well advised to retain an attorney to advise you of what your rights and chances are,” did not rise to the level of misconduct so as to warrant vacatur of the arbitration award (see Matter of Travelers Ins. Co. v. Job, 239 AD2d 289, 289 — 90 [1997]; cf. Matter of Goldfinger v. Lisker, 68 NY2d 225, 227-228 [1986] ["private communication between the arbitrator and one party-litigant, which related to the credibility of the party-litigant and the validity of the amount in dispute, and occurred without the knowledge or consent of the other party-litigant, constitutes misconduct sufficient to warrant vacating the arbitration award"]).Nor did the master arbitrator exceed his authority, and his determination that there were factual issues concerning whether Allstate complied with the relevant no-fault regulations (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 131 AD3d 840 [2015]; 11 NYCRR §65-3.6[b]) and whether respondent’s nonappearance for a scheduled independent medical examination was excusable (cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 18 [App Term, 2d Dept 2004] affd 35 AD3d 720 [2006]), was not irrational.THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 17, 2019
By: Ling-Cohan, J.P., Gonzalez, Cooper, JJ.14-107. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. DELORES GRAHAM, def-app — Appeal from judgment (Alexander M. Tisch, J. at plea; Tamiko A. Amaker, J. at sentencing), rendered September 13, 2012, held in abeyance, motion by assigned counsel to be relieved denied without prejudice to renewal, and counsel directed to communicate with defendant forthwith concerning her willingness or unwillingness to seek vacatur of her plea and the possible consequences of pursuing an appeal, and advising her that she has 60 days from the date of this order to file a pro se supplemental brief.Assigned counsel filed an Anders-Saunders brief (see Anders v. California, 386 US 738 [1967]; People v. Saunders, 52 AD2d 833 [1976]) in which she indicated that, although it “might be possible to argue on appeal” that the court did not properly inform defendant “of all the trial rights she was giving up,” defendant “has not confirmed” that she accepted the risks “associated with plea withdrawal” and “therefore, we cannot raise that issue on her behalf.” Attached to the brief was counsel’s letter to defendant informing her, contrarily, that since the “conviction…does not present any legal issues…there are no viable arguments we can make on appeal.” Given the conflict between counsel’s brief and the accompanying letter, and in the absence of any representation by counsel regarding any prior discussion(s) or communique(s) she may have had with or sent to defendant, it is unclear whether counsel effectively communicated to defendant the substance of the brief, the nature of the potentially viable issue referenced therein, or the risks involved in pursuing this issue on appeal. The uncertainty thus created “raises ambiguities failing to meet the requirements” of the Anders rule (see People v. Calderon, 107 AD3d 470 [2013]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 17, 2019
