Recitation as required by CPLR 2219(a) of the papers considered in the review of this Motion:Papers NumberedNotice of Motion & Affts. 1Opposition 2Reply & AffidavitsSur-ReplySupplemental AffidavitsDECISION AND ORDER Upon the foregoing cited papers and after oral argument, the Decision/Order on Steven Coward Beers’s, non-party order to show cause made on his behalf by non-party Margaret Coward Beers seeking to restore the case to the calendar for trial on a day certain and/or granting such other and further relief as may be just is as follows:Petitioner, CHARLES CHANG MOON, (hereinafter “MOON” or “petitioner”) is the owner of the mixed-use premises located at 120-13 Liberty Avenue, South Richmond Hill, New York 11419 (hereinafter “subject premises”). Respondent SEAN D. INC. (hereinafter “Sean Dean”) and CHRISTINE PERSAUD (hereinafter “Persaud”) (collectively hereinafter “respondents”) were the commercial tenants of the subject premises under a triple net lease. Respondents “JOHN DOE” and “XYZ CORPORATION” were the undertenants of respondents.Margaret Coward-Beers (hereinafter “Ms. Beers”) is a non-party who is the purported mother of Steven Coward Beers (hereinafter “Mr. Beers”), an alleged occupant and also a non-party to this proceeding.Relevant Procedural HistoryOn March 9, 2018, this Court issued an order, which granted petitioner a judgment of possession and a warrant of eviction to issue forthwith without stay of execution. A money judgment was also awarded to petitioner against respondents in the amount of $36,500.00, the amount respondents had been ordered to pay in a prior order of this Court, but with which they failed to comply.After respondents attempted to bring on 3 orders to show cause to stay eviction, all of which were declined as defective, Persaud submitted a 4th order to show cause on July 11, 2018. This order to show cause was submitted on the same date as the marshal’s notice of the petitioner and was returnable on August 10, 2018. The application by order to show cause was denied at that time.On August 29, 2018, after having been served with the 2nd notice of eviction, respondents then moved in the Appellate Term for a stay pending appeal of the August 10, 2018 order of this Court. Respondents’ motion was denied by the Appellate Term by order entered January 10, 2019.Once again, there being no legal impediment, the petitioner served its 3rd notice of eviction on January 25, 2019. Respondents’ then made a 2nd application to the Appellate Term for a stay pending appeal of the August 10, 2018 order of this Court. The Appellate Term denied respondents’ 2nd stay request by order dated March 25, 2019.Due to respondents’ obstructionist maneuvering, petitioner was compelled to serve its 4th notice of eviction on April 4, 2019. Once again, an order to show cause was submitted to the civil court. Only this time, because the respondents had been denied at every turn, Ms. Beers on behalf of her adult son, both of whom are new non-party strangers to the litigation, is now attempting to obtain the same relief the respondents could not obtain.DiscussionThe affidavit in support of the instant order to show cause was submitted by Ms. Beers. She purported to be submitting the application on behalf of her disabled adult son, Mr. Beers. However, Ms. Beers furnished no documentation demonstrating that she is the legal guardian of her alleged son. Setting aside this obvious infirmity with the instant application, the Court will address the merits of it.Ms. Beers now asserts her alleged son is “John Doe” in the instant proceeding. Although it is unclear who she is referencing in her statement, Ms. Beers asserts that she and/or her son was unaware of any of the proceedings herein until after the 4th and most recent notice of eviction was served.She also states that her son is residing in some unidentified area of this mixed-use building. At no time, from the commencement of this proceeding until now has anyone, other than Persaud, made such an allegation. Until now Persaud has claimed that she and her 5 children were residing in the 2nd floor. No mention was ever made about anyone other than Persaud’s immediate family occupying any portion of the subject premises. This alone makes Ms. Beers’s statements suspect. Moreover, Ms. Beers failed to substantiate any of her allegations with any objective documentary evidence whatsoever.Ms. Beers is seeking additional time to locate another place for her son to reside. This is the same ploy utilized by Persaud as early as July 2018. Only now, instead of simply claiming children will be displaced, the claim is that a disabled child will be. Yet, there has been no indication that Persaud ever vacated the subject premises or any demonstration that Mr. Beers is in fact in occupancy. Persaud has had more than a year in which she engaged in chicanery with this Court, which she could have sought a place to relocate.Petitioner’s daughter and agent, Seiyeun Marie Fahs, submitted an affidavit in opposition to the instant application. This is an affidavit of someone with actual knowledge of the circumstances of this proceeding. Ms. Fah’s attested to the type of business Persaud ran on the first floor of the subject premises, i.e. a training school for home care attendants. Persaud always maintained that she occupied the 2nd floor of the subject premises with her children.From the outset through the pendency of this proceeding, in which the respondents were never out of possession, arrears accrued to the amount of $283,712.86 through the end of this month. This figure includes a credit for the single payment respondents made many months ago. Meanwhile, according to Ms. Fahs, her elderly father has had to deplete his savings and also depend on his children to pay various items of what would be the responsibility of respondents, such as real estate taxes, water and sewer charges.At oral argument, petitioner’s counsel theorized that Persaud, whose business involves training home health aides, has ready access to disabled individuals and perhaps installed Ms. Beers’ son to try to thwart off the impending eviction. In essence, in a thinly veiled scheme, respondents have coopted Ms. Beers into using her son as a prop to try to pull at this Court’s heart strings. If this is so, it is one of the worst forms of exploitation this Court has seen. When counsel raised the possibility of this scenario and mentioned Persaud’s checkered past, Ms. Beers came to Persaud’s defense. Ms. Beers said that Persaud had been involved with some unscrupulous characters in her past. At that point, Ms. Beers may have thought she was retorting to the allegation, but rather she uttered an admission of being in league with Persaud. “She didn’t find us. We found her”.In any event, it is clear Ms. Beers’ son did not occupy any portion of the subject premises before the commencement of the proceeding. He also did not occupy the subject premises before the issuance of the warrant of eviction. By her own admission, Ms. Beers stated her son did not occupy the subject premises at any point before the service of the 4th notice of eviction. Obviously, the only possible scenario being put forth by Ms. Beers is that Persaud gave permission to Mr. Beers to occupy the subject premises (if in fact he is in occupancy) after the warrant of eviction had been issued, in or about early July 2018.Pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, §749(1), when a judgment of possession is entered in favor of the landlord, the landlord is thereby granted full possession of the premises. Additionally, the mere issuance of a warrant of eviction terminates the landlord-tenant relationship. Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, §749(3); lltit Assoc. v. Sterner, 63 A.D.2d 600, 405 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1st Dept 1978). At that point, the landlord tenant relationship is a nullity Emray Realty Corp. v. Lloyd, 5 Misc.2d 938, 158 N.Y.S.2d 852 (AT 1 1956)Although the Civil Court may grant relief in appropriate circumstances from its own judgment or orders, no such circumstances appear in the case at bar. See Third City Corp. v. Lee, 41 AD2d 611, 340 NYS2d 654 (1st Dept. 1973).An interloper who is inserted into a summary eviction proceeding after the commencement of the proceeding, or in this instance after the termination of the tenancy by the issuance of the warrant of eviction is not a necessary party to the proceeding. They also are someone who may appropriately be removed under the warrant issued against the respondents. Fraydun Enterprises v. Lopez, NYLJ April 7, 1986, 14 HCR 124A (AT 1 1986). To find otherwise and taken to its logical conclusion, such a finding would issue an open invitation to a revolving door of occupants who could not be evicted.In Fraydun Enterprises, supra, the individual took occupancy after the commencement of the summary eviction proceeding, but before the warrant of eviction was issued. Under those circumstances, the appellate court determined the occupant was not a necessary party to the proceeding. In the case at bar, Mr. Beers allegedly commenced his occupancy not only after the proceeding commenced and the warrant of eviction was issued, but after the 4th notice of eviction was served, many months after the warrant was issued.Findings of Fact and Conclusions of LawIf he is truly in occupancy, Mr. Beers is merely an interloper. Ms. Beers, the woman who submitted the instant order to show cause on his behalf, lacks standing to maintain this application.Persaud, if she did in fact give permission to Mr. Beers to occupy the subject premises, did so at a point in time when she no longer had authority to give anyone permission to do so. The landlord tenant relationship had already been annulled. It is apparent that if in fact Mr. Beers commenced his occupancy at all, it was after the commencement of the instant proceeding. Either he or his mother made arrangements with Persaud unbeknownst to the petitioner during a temporary stay period issued by the Appellate Term, which was ultimately terminated. In this context, Mr. Beers is not a necessary party to the proceeding or someone who may not appropriately be removed under the warrant issued against the respondents.The belated and bare-bones assertions of the non-party alleged occupant’s mother are insufficient to demonstrate “good cause” to support any stay of the warrant of eviction. In brief, there is a beginning and an end to everything. The end to this falderal has now come to pass. In the event that there are any further attempts by respondents, or those in league with them, to stall, hinder and delay the impending eviction by further meritless motions, this Court will seriously consider issuing monetary sanctions against the person or entity engaging in such frivolous conduct.The instant order to show cause is denied. The stay issued April 12, 2019 is vacated. The warrant of eviction may be executed forthwith, without any further marshal’s notice. The marshal shall contact NYC APS prior to conducting his eviction.This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.April 25, 2019
