DECISION AND ORDERINTRODUCTION Plaintiff Michael Hallmark (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, on October 6, 2011, alleging that Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP and Midland Funding LLC d/b/a Midland Funding of Delaware, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) sought to collect a debt from Plaintiff and others in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”). (Dkt. 1). On September 16, 2013, United States District Judge William M. Skretny granted Plaintiff’s motion for class certification and appointed Brian Bromberg Law Office, P.C. and the Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, PLLC as class counsel. (Dkt. 110). This action then proceeded through many years of discovery and additional motion practice.On August 14, 2017, while discovery was still pending, this Court referred this action to a mediation session during the Court’s concentrated “Settlement Week.” (Dkt. 352). The mediation session was held on November 8, 2017, at which time Class Counsel and Defendants’ counsel negotiated a possible resolution of the matter with the assistance of an experienced federal mediator. (Dkt. 365). As a result, the parties were able to reach a settlement in principal. (Dkt. 366).On May 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed a consent motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement. (Dkt. 373). The Court held a preliminary fairness hearing on May 24, 2018, and preliminarily approved the class action settlement. (Dkt. 375; Dkt. 376). The Court subsequently held a final fairness hearing on November 27, 2018. (Dkt. 384). On November 30, 2018, the Court issued a Decision and Order approving the class action settlement, but reserving decision on Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs until further briefing was filed. (Dkt. 385; see also Dkt. 386 (Supplemental Order of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement)). On January 11, 2019, Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP filed a letter indicating that they “will not be submitting any affirmative opposition to the motion at this time and will defer to the Court’s review and determination with respect to the request for attorney’s fees and costs, subject to the negotiated cap of $400,000.” (Dkt. 387 at 1). No opposition has in fact been filed against Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.The Court has reviewed Class Counsel’s papers in support of their request for attorneys’ fees and expenses. For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Class Counsel’s unopposed request for $400,000.00 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.DISCUSSIONI. Reasonableness of the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs“Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3), counsel for a prevailing party in an FDCPA action is entitled to ‘the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorneys’ fee as determined by the court.’” Gonzalez v. Healthcare Recovery Mgmt. Inc., No. 13-CV-1002, 2013 WL 4851709, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013). “Courts may award attorneys’ fees…under either the ‘lodestar’ method or the ‘percentage of the fund’ method. The lodestar method multiplies hours reasonably expended against a reasonable hourly rate.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).“In awarding attorneys’ fees, especially in the context of a class action, a court must ‘ensure that the interests of the class members are not subordinated to the interests of…class counsel.’” Dial Corp. v. News Corp., 317 F.R.D. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995)). The Second Circuit has emphasized “the importance of the district court’s duty ‘to act as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.’” McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1977)); see Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that a court should perform a “searching assessment” of requested attorneys’ fees in each case).A. Reasonable Hourly Rate“A reasonable hourly rate is ‘the rate a paying client would be willing to pay,’ ‘bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.’” McLaughlin v. IDT Energy, No. 14 CV 4107 (ENV)(RML), 2018 WL 3642627, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008)). “To determine reasonable hourly rates, the Court considers this Circuit’s adherence to the forum rule, which states that a district court should generally use the prevailing hourly rates in the district where it sits.” Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union-N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund v. D&A Bus Co., 270 F. Supp. 3d 593, 617-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2009)); see Carbin v. N. Resolution Grp., LLC, No. 12-CV-1108JTC, 2013 WL 4779231, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013) (“There is a presumption in favor of the hourly rates employed in the district in which the case is litigated.”).However, courts need not strictly adhere to the forum rule in all cases. Instead, reasonable attorney fee rates may vary “depending on the type of case, the nature of the litigation, the size of the firm, and the expertise of its attorneys.” Kindle v. Dejana, 308 F. Supp. 3d 698, 704 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation marks omitted); see Carbin, 2013 WL 4779231, at *3 (“In determining a reasonable fee, district courts should set a reasonable hourly rate, bearing in mind case-specific variables… .”).Class Counsel requests a total award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $400,000.00. (Dkt. 382 at 15). Although Class Counsel’s calculated attorneys’ fees and costs amount to $396,672.50 and $22,187.41, respectively, this total value exceeds the “agreed-upon amount of $400,000″ (Dkt. 382-1 at
47-48), and thus, only $400,000.00 is sought on this motion (Dkt. 382 at 26 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys agreed to cap their fees and costs to facilitate settlement and guarantee a meaningful recovery for the class members.”)). Class Counsel’s calculations utilize certain hourly fee rates that are greater than those usually applied by courts in this District when determining the reasonableness of a fee award in an FDCPA case. For example, Mr. Brian L. Bromberg, Esq., of the Bromberg Law Office, P.C., requests that this Court apply a $375 per hour rate to his billable hours. (Dkt. 382-1 at 34). Mr. Bromberg also requests that the Court apply a $300 per hour rate to the billable hours accrued by Mr. Michael N. Litrownik, Esq., and Mr. Jonathan R. Miller, Esq., while they worked on this case as associate attorneys with his law office. (Id. at
