Defendant is charged with Reckless Driving in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1212. By Notice of Motion and Affirmation dated April 16, 2019, defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency or suppression of any statement made by the defendant, or in the alternative requesting a Huntley Hearing. By Affirmation in Opposition and Memorandum of Law dated May 14, 2019, the People oppose dismissal and the suppression of statements made by the defendant to police.The charge of reckless driving is lodged against the defendant by way of simplified traffic information, accompanied by the supporting depositions of Mount Vernon Police Officer Iannelli, both subscribed and attested to on April 12, 2019, which alleges, in pertinent part, that on February 15, 2019, at approximately 11:59 p.m., defendant did commit the offense of reckless driving by intentionally and in a reckless manner at a high rate of speed drive his vehicle into a sign and rock after mounting the sidewalk in the direction of another individual. Officer Iannelli further stated that the defendant informed him that he intentionally drove into the sign after a domestic incident with his girlfriend.To be facially sufficient, an accusatory instrument must (1) allege non-hearsay facts that would give the court reasonable cause to believe that a defendant committed the offenses(s) charged and (2) establish, if true, every element of any such offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof (see CPL §100.40(1); People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]; People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 137 [1987]). The facts in an accusatory instrument must “establish a prima facie case,” supported by legally sufficient evidence to “establish that the defendant committed the crime.” (Alejandro 70 NY2d at 138).When reviewing accusatory instruments for facial insufficiency, courts should give the accusatory instrument “a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading…[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.” (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).In this case, the defendant alleges that the accusatory instrument with supporting depositions are not based upon the deponent’s personal knowledge, but is instead based solely upon his investigation. Defendant further argues that the deponent’s assertions in the supporting depositions do not establish every element of the charge of reckless driving.The People, in opposition, argue that the factual allegations provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged. The People further argue that the supporting depositions contain non-hearsay allegations which establish every element of the offense charged and defendant’s commission thereof.Vehicle and Traffic Law §1212 provides, in pertinent part, “Reckless driving shall mean driving…in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway. Reckless driving is prohibited.” “Reckless driving, therefore, standing by itself means the running or operation of an automobile under such circumstances as to show a reckless disregard of the consequences.” (People v. Grogan, 260 NY 138, 144 [1932].) “Although ‘unreasonableness’ is a necessary constituent of the crime,…sufficient facts from which the characterization may be inferred that defendant’s operation of this automobile ‘unreasonably’ interfered with the free and proper use of the highway, and ‘unreasonably’ endangered users thereof” will sustain the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument. (People v. Armlin, 6 NY2d 231, 232 [1959].)The Court of Appeals, in interpreting the predecessor statute to VTL §1212, indicated that in order to be facially sufficient, an accusatory instrument charging reckless driving must show more than the defendant’s involvement in a motor vehicle accident (People v. Grogan, 260 NY 138 [1932]). Rather, it must demonstrate that the defendant’s manner of operation “interferes with or endangers the user of the highway through the failure to exercise reasonable care, reasonable caution or the reasonable foresight of a reasonably prudent and careful person” (Id. At 149). Reckless driving involves the presence of additional aggravating acts or circumstances beyond a single violation of a rule of the road (People v. Goldblatt, 98 AD3d 817 [3d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 932 [2012]).In this case, the deponent in the accusatory instrument and supporting depositions states that based on his investigation the defendant intentionally and in a reckless manner did, at a high rate of speed drive his vehicle into a sign and rock after mounting the sidewalk in the direction of another individual. Officer Iannelli also alleged that the defendant stated to him that he intentionally drove into the sign after a domestic incident with his girlfriend.As set forth in the supporting depositions, the accusatory instrument fails to contain sufficient nonhearsay factual allegations that the defendant unreasonably interfered with the free and proper use of the highway, or unreasonably endangered users thereof (see VTL 1212). The facts alleged in the accusatory instrument rely solely on the deponent police officer who attests to facts based upon his investigation of the defendant’s automobile accident.Accordingly, it is hereby:ORDERED, that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information charging him with Reckless Driving is granted, with leave to the People to file an information, unless proscribed by CPL §30.30[1].This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.Dated: May 16, 2019Mount Vernon, New York
