Decision and OrderAfter HearingPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Before the Court is a hearing in a matrimonial action. The parties and counsel stipulated that this Referee could hear and determine the issues raised in this hearing, and the hearing was referred to this Referee by order dated March 4, 2019 (Goodstein, J.). By decision and order dated September 28, 2018 (Lorintz, J.), the issues raised in the plaintiff’s motion for pendente lite relief and the defendant’s cross-motion for a declaratory judgment confirming the validity of the parties’ separation agreement were set down for a hearing. A hearing was held on March 4, 2019. The matter was submitted fully when post-hearing memoranda were received by the Court on April 1, 2019. The plaintiff/wife (“plaintiff”) is represented by Catherine May Co, Esq., and the defendant/husband (“defendant”) is represented by Rona Gura, Esq.The threshold issue is the validity of the parties’ separation agreement (“agreement”), which is dated July 17, 2007. The agreement addresses the issues of equitable distribution and maintenance. If the agreement is held to be valid, then the issue of pendente lite maintenance need not be addressed.FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWThe FactsThe plaintiff claims that the agreement was not signed before a notary, and thus, according to the plaintiff, is not enforceable. The plaintiff further asserts that the agreement should be set aside on the grounds that it allegedly was signed under duress and that its terms are unconscionable. The defendant claims that the agreement was signed before a notary, it was not signed under duress, and its terms are not unconscionable.At the hearing, upon consent of the parties, the defendant presented his case first. The agreement was entered into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit A. The agreement states in pertinent part,1. Wife waives forever any and all claims to Husband’s real property located in Nassau County. Wife further waives any claim to any other property or interest in such property the husband may have or have in the future.2. Husband waives forever any and all claims to any real property of the Wife., (sic) of any kind, wherever situated.(Separation Agreement, Article 11: Real Property, pp. 10-11).The agreement further states in relevant part,1. Each party has been specifically advised of the provisions of Domestic Relations Law Section 236(B)(6) relative to maintenance.2. Each party acknowledges that they are employed, and capable of being employed. Accordingly, each forever waives any and all claims of maintenance from the other party.(Separation Agreement, Article 12: Spousal Maintenance, p. 11).The first witness called by the defendant was L.L., a notary public. She testified that the parties signed and acknowledged the agreement in her presence. Ms. L. testified that her signature and notary stamp appear on the agreement. The witness recalled that it was a Tuesday in July when she notarized the agreement and that she was off from work. Ms. L. testified that the defendant called her and asked when she would been finished with her workday, and she stated that it was her day off. She testified that the defendant asked her to come over to his auto body shop to notarize something. She said that she was able to do so, and she went to the shop. The witness stated that she watched the parties sign the agreement. She testified that this took place inside the shop. She stated that the document that the parties signed was a separation agreement. On cross-examination, Ms. L. stated that she was friends with the defendant, and she had known him since the seventies. On re-direct, she testified that even though she was friends with the defendant, she would not lie under oath for him. Ms. L. further stated that she was a valid Notary on the day that she notarized the agreement. This Court found this witness to be credible. She testified without hesitation. She had a clear recollection of the circumstances. Additionally, the plaintiff failed to establish that Ms. L. would lie merely because she had a friendship with the defendant.The next witness to testify was the defendant. He testified that the parties were separated in 2006 and that they began to discuss a separation agreement in 2006. At the time of the agreement, the defendant owned an auto body business. In addition, around that time, he was also starting a new business venture. The defendant became a 20 percent owner in this new venture, which involved purchasing homes and then renting them out. The defendant’s business partner put up the equity to purchase the homes. The defendant testified that the plaintiff expressed concern about the new venture because she wanted to protect the marital residence from any claims that could possibly arise from this new venture. The defendant stated that the plaintiff particularly expressed concern about protecting the marital residence, as it was titled to the plaintiff. The defendant testified that the plaintiff had a friend who was an attorney and that she had been talking to this friend about a separation agreement. Furthermore, the defendant explained that he had been involved in a lawsuit regarding a car rental business that he previously had owned with partners. The marital residence was used as collateral so that this prior business could obtain a loan, and the lawsuit could have led to the loss of the marital residence. Ultimately, the lawsuit was settled, and the marital residence was saved; however, the defendant testified that this situation caused the plaintiff to express concern. The defendant testified that the plaintiff had the parties’ agreement prepared, and the plaintiff brought it to the shop, so the parties could sign it. He assumed that it was prepared by the plaintiff’s friend, B.E., who is a lawyer. The defendant testified that the plaintiff stated that the defendant should “sign it so it covered her [the plaintiff] just in case of anything was happening or if anything did happen to me [the defendant] at the time” (Tr. at 17, lines16-18). The defendant stated that the plaintiff brought the agreement to the shop. He stated that while they were inside the shop, they reviewed the agreement together, crossed out certain provisions and made changes. He testified that the parties made changes to the agreement, initialed all changes and initialed every page. He testified that the parties signed the agreement in the presence of the Notary.Pursuant to the agreement, the parties agreed that the wife would keep the marital residence and any other real property she had, and the husband would keep all property he had in Nassau County. As to all personal property, the parties agreed that it already had been divided and it would remain the personal property of the party in possession of, or with title to, such property. The agreement contains a waiver of maintenance; however, the parties do not dispute that the defendant continued to support the plaintiff and the child until the child graduated from college. The child graduated from a private university in May of 2018. The defendant supported the plaintiff and the child for a period of eleven years since the parties entered the agreement. He paid for food, utilities, the mortgage on the marital residence, cars, insurance, other living expenses, and the child’s college tuition. The child is emancipated, works in the advertising field, and lives with the plaintiff.The next witness called by the defendant was the plaintiff. She admitted that her signature was on the agreement and testified that she knew she was signing a separation agreement. Admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit B was the plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition and reply regarding the cross-motion. In the affidavit, the plaintiff admits that she had knowledge of a then pending lawsuit regarding the defendant’s auto business (Defendant’s Exhibit B, 27). She testified that the parties did not sign the agreement in the shop, but in her car, which was parked outside the shop. She did not recall which day of the week the agreement was signed. The plaintiff stated that there was no notary present. Admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit C is the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of order to show cause for pendent lite relief. In this affidavit, the plaintiff admits that she has been living separately from the defendant since 2007 and that he had been providing the sole financial support for the family until around June of 2018. (Defendant’s Exhibit C, 11). Two portions of the financial aid application regarding the child’s college also were admitted into evidence. The pertinent pages (one dated 2014 and the other dated 2015) show that the plaintiff received child support in the amount of $36,000 per year.The plaintiff was the first witness to be called on the plaintiff’s case. The plaintiff testified that the defendant left the marital residence in 2007, and she did not discuss the parties’ separation with anyone. She stated that sometime in 2007, she learned that the defendant was involved in a lawsuit, regarding his auto collision business. The plaintiff stated that she was driving in the car with him when she overheard a phone conversation about the lawsuit and then questioned him about it. The plaintiff further stated that several months later, the defendant called her and told her that he had a separation agreement for her to sign in order to protect the marital residence. She testified that she thought the marital residence was protected because it was in her name only, so she did not think a separation agreement was necessary. She did not remember the defendant’s exact words during the phone call. The plaintiff testified that when she told the defendant that it was not necessary for the parties to sign an agreement, they began arguing. The plaintiff stated that the defendant then threatened her financially. She testified that she was not working at the time and had not worked in five years. The plaintiff further stated that the defendant was in charge of all the finances. She testified that the defendant threatened that if she did not sign the agreement, then he would no longer support her. She stated that she then made arrangements with him to sign the agreement. The plaintiff testified that she did not speak to anyone about the separation agreement. She testified that on the day of the phone call, or the next day, she signed the agreement, and she did not read it before signing it. She also stated that she never saw the agreement again until this litigation. She testified that at the time she signed it, she did not know the document was meant to be a separation agreement, which contradicted her earlier testimony, during which she admitted that she knew it was a separation agreement. The plaintiff further testified that she physically paid the household bills with money provided by the defendant. On cross-examination, she additionally testified that she was “worried” about losing the house, which also contradicted her earlier testimony.The plaintiff also called as a witness the wife’s friend, B.E., who is a lawyer. She is the lawyer who the defendant believed prepared the agreement, but Ms. E. denied drafting the agreement. Ms. E. is a real estate attorney. She testified that she has seen separation agreements, but never has drafted one. Ms. E. stated that she has known the plaintiff for about thirty years. Ms. E. further testified that she met the plaintiff when the plaintiff was a receptionist for the management company where Ms. E. worked and continues to work. Ms. E. has kept in touch with the plaintiff over the years. Ms. E. testified that she did not provide any legal counseling to the plaintiff, but she did discuss marital discord with her. She testified, “I don’t want to say counsel but it was topics that were discussed. I’m quite a bit older than [the plaintiff]. So, obviously, there were conversations about, as any friends would be about marital discord of any kind” (Tr. at 66, lines 3-7). This Court found Ms. E. to be credible. She answered questions directly and without hesitation.On the defendant’s rebuttal case, the defendant further explained the circumstances regarding the marital residence being used as collateral for a business loan. He testified that the parties’ understanding of the agreement was that at the time of the agreement the plaintiff’s “employment” was being a homemaker; however, she was “capable of being employed” outside of the home. Although the defendant voluntarily supported the plaintiff, he also told her that he would no longer support her once the child graduated from college.CredibilityOverall, this Court finds that the defendant is more credible than the plaintiff. The defendant testified that it was the plaintiff who expressed concern when she learned of the lawsuit against his business, months before the agreement was signed. This testimony is believable given the parties’ history. The marital residence almost was lost because it was used as collateral for a business loan. The plaintiff was the party who had more incentive to have a separation agreement prepared. The marital residence was titled to the wife, she believed it was her asset, so she was the party who had a stronger reason to be concerned about protecting it. Also, she resided in the marital residence. The defendant’s testimony that it was the plaintiff who had the agreement prepared is believable, as it clearly was to her benefit to have the marital residence protected. The plaintiff’s testimony that she did not discuss the parties’ separation or the lawsuit against the husband’s business with anyone is not credible, particularly in light of Ms. E.’s testimony that she and the plaintiff discussed marital discord. In addition, she was not truthful about the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement. Contrary to the testimony of the plaintiff, the Notary testified that the parties signed the agreement in the Notary’s presence. Moreover, the changes made in the agreement were initialed by both parties, which supports the inference that the agreement was read by both parties. Furthermore, the plaintiff went to the defendant’s shop to sign the agreement, which indicates that she was the party who was anxious to have the agreement signed. If the plaintiff did not want to sign the agreement, she could have delayed the signing by not going to the defendant’s shop. The plaintiff had the opportunity to discuss the agreement with her friend, Ms. E., or with another attorney. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant threatened to stop supporting her if she did not sign the agreement. It is not credible that the wife would take this alleged threat seriously. It is not believable that she would be unaware that a spouse is entitled to seek support, particularly since she had a friend who is an attorney and with whom she had discussed marital issues. There were inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s testimony. She vacillated regarding whether she was worried when she learned of the second lawsuit regarding the husband’s business. When pressed, however, she admitted that she was worried about it. It is clear that she did not want to admit she was worried because this would lend support to the defendant’s position (that upon learning of the lawsuit, she had the agreement prepared to protect the marital residence). She was also inconsistent about whether she knew that the document she signed was a separation agreement. At one point she testified that she did not know it was a separation agreement, but she later admitted that she knew it was a separation agreement.The Applicable LawA stipulation of settlement in a matrimonial action is an enforceable contract between the parties (Petrovich v. Obradovic, 40 AD3d 1063, 1065 [2d Dept 2007]). “Parties are free to enter into agreements that not only bind [ ] them, but which the courts are bound to enforce” (Etzion v. Etzion, 84 AD3d 1015, 1016 [2d Dept 2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). “Marital contracts are ‘subject to principles of contract [construction and] interpretation” (Id. quoting Rainbow v. Swisher, 72 NY2d 106, 109 [1988] and citing Matter of Meccico v. Meccico, 76 NY2d 822, 823-824 [1990] and Girardin v. Girardin, 281 AD2d 457, 457 [2d Dept 2001] [bracketed language in original]).“Where such an agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face, the parties’ intent must be construed within the four corners of the agreement and not from extrinsic evidence” Khorshad v. Khorshad, 121 AD3d 857, 858 [2d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). It is well established that “[s]tipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside” (Sontag v. Sontag, 114 AD2d 892, 893 [2d Dept 1985] quoting Matter of Galasso, 35 NY2d 319, 321 [1974]; Cohen v. Cohen, — AD3d-, 2019 NY Slip Op 02059 *1 [2d Dept 2019] [citations omitted]). “‘Only where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation’” (Sontag at 893 quoting Hallock v. State of New York, 64 NY2d 224, 230 [1984] [internal citation omitted]). In marital agreements, a spouse can set aside an agreement “where it is shown to be the product of fraud, duress, overreaching resulting in manifest unfairness, or other inequitable conduct” (Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 138 AD3d 30, 36 [1st Dept 2016] citing Christian v. Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 72 [1977]; Cohen at *1 [citations omitted]). The Appellate Division, First Department further stated,In the absence of such inequitable conduct, however, courts should not redesign the bargain reached by the parties merely because in retrospect the provisions might be viewed as improvident or one-sided…Rather, judicial review should be ‘exercised circumspectly, sparingly and with a persisting view to the encouragement of parties settling their own differences in connection with the negotiation of property settlement provisions’(Gottlieb at 36-37 quoting Christian at 71-72 [internal citation omitted]).A recent example of the application of the well-settled principle that parties should be encouraged to resolve their own differences is the Cohen case, in which The Appellate Division, Second Department, stated, “‘[a] stipulation…will not be vacated simply because a party, after the fact, believes that the agreement was improvident in some respect or that it constituted a bad bargain’” Cohen at *1 quoting Turk v. Turk, 276 AD2d 953, 955 [3d Dept 2000] [citation omitted] [ellipsis in original]). In Cohen, the trial court’s denial of the wife’s motion to vacate provisions of the stipulation of settlement was affirmed.As to the burden of proof, the party seeking to set aside an agreement has the burden of establishing the grounds for invalidating the agreement (Gottleib at 37 citing Anonymous v. Anonymous, 123 AD3d 581, 582 [1st Dept 2014]). “[C]onclusory statements…do not warrant vacatur of the settlement” (Sontag at 893). In Valsamos, The Appellate Division, Second Department stated, “[t]he defendant’s conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions that certain terms of the stipulation were either unconscionable or against public policy were insufficient to warrant setting aside the stipulation of settlement” (Valsamos v. Valsamos, 136 AD3d 625, 626 [2d Dept 2016] [citations omitted]).“A contract is voidable on the ground of duress when it is established that the party making the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat precluding the exercise of his free will” (Shah v. Mitra, — AD3d-, 2019 NY Slip Op 02739 *4 [2d Dept 2019][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Alleged threats by a party to pursue legal remedies do not constitute duress (see O’Hanlon v. O’Hanlon,114 AD3d 915, 916 [2d Dept 2014] ["defendant failed to establish that he entered into the stipulation of partial settlement due to duress or coercion based upon the plaintiff's and her counsel's purported threats to proceed to trial"]).Moreover, a party seeking to invalidate a stipulation allegedly entered into under duress must act promptly or such party will be deemed to have ratified that contact (Cosh v. Cosh, 45 AD3d 798, 800 [2d Dept 2007] [citations omitted]); Sabowitz v. Sabowitz, 123 AD3d 794, 795 [2d Dept 2014] [citations omitted] [holding that "the defendant established that the plaintiff ratified the Stipulation and waived his claim to set aside the stipulation by accepting the benefits of the Stipulation for a significant period of time"]).Another ground for setting aside a marital agreement is if its terms are found to be unconscionable. “An unconscionable agreement is “‘one such as no person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any person of common sense’” (Shah at *5 quoting Christian at 71 [citations omitted]). However, “[b]ecause of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, postnuptial agreements ‘are closely scrutinized by the courts, and such agreements are more readily set aside in equity under circumstances that would be insufficient to nullify an ordinary contract’” Shah at *5 quoting Levine v. Levine, 56 NY2d 42, 47 [1982] [citation omitted]). A marital agreement will be set aside if it is “‘manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the because of the other’s overreaching’” (Shah at *5 quoting Christian at 72 [citations omitted]). “Although courts may examine the terms of the agreement as well as the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether there has been overreaching, the general rule is that [if] the execution of the agreement…be fair, no further inquiry will be made” (Shah at *5 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] [brackets and ellipsis in original]). “‘Manifest unfairness’ involves a two-pronged inquiry into the execution and substance of the agreement. First, the contestant must show that the other party overreached in the execution of the agreement (Gottlieb at 73-74 [Feinman, J. dissenting]). “This first prong is essentially a procedural inquiry” (Gottlieb at 74). “The procedural element of unconscionability concerns the contract formation process and the alleged lack of meaningful choice” (Mizrahi v. Mizrahi,-Ad3d-at 3 [2d Dept, Decided April 24, 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). An inquiry into overreaching examines “the entire duration of the negotiations” and considers “bargaining abuses, such as shrewd manipulations…threats, intimidation, unfair surprises, exploitation of trust, and deceit” (Gottlieb at 74 [Feinman, J. dissenting] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). If the first prong is not met, there is no further inquiry (Id.). The second prong is the substantive prong; “the substantive element looks to the content of the contract, per se” to determine if the content is manifestly unfair (Mizrahi at 3 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Gottlieb at 73-74 [Feinman, J. dissenting]). “A reviewing court examining a challenge to a separation agreement will view the agreement in its entirety and under the totality of circumstances” surrounding its execution (Mizrahi at 3 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).AnalysisManifest UnfairnessAs to the plaintiff’s claim that the agreement is unconscionable and/or manifestly unfair, that claim is without merit. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the defendant forever waived any and all claims to any real property of the plaintiff (the evidence demonstrated that the marital residence was titled to the plaintiff). The plaintiff waived all claims to the defendant’s real property located in Nassau County and any claim to any other property or interest the defendant may have or have in the future (the evidence demonstrated that the defendant had a 20 percent interest in an LLC [a company involved in the business of purchasing and renting out homes]) and an interest in portion of an auto body business. At the time that the agreement was signed, the auto body business was the target of litigation. The parties further agreed to waive spousal support. Additionally, the parties agreed that as to all personal property, whether tangible or intangible, such property had already been divided and that such property would remain the separate property of the party who had actual or constructive possession of the property. In the case of intangible property, such as accounts or investment devices, if there were to be a conflict between possession and title, the concept of title would control.Regarding the first prong of manifest unfairness, the procedural circumstances of the signing of the agreement do not indicate overreaching. The evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff was the party who wanted the written separation agreement because she was concerned about retaining the marital residence. This Court infers that the plaintiff was fearful about the potential of losing the marital residence in light of what had occurred in the past. The plaintiff was aware that the marital residence almost was lost when it was put up for collateral several years prior to the time that the parties signed the separation agreement. The litigation was settled, and the marital residence was saved, but it is reasonable to infer that the plaintiff was concerned about losing the marital residence when she learned, several months before signing the agreement, that the defendant’s auto body business was facing another lawsuit. In her testimony at the hearing, she ultimately admitted to being worried when she learned of this second litigation involving the defendant’s auto business. Moreover, she resided and continues to reside in the marital residence. The plaintiff was the party who had the motivation to have a separation agreement prepared in order to protect the parties’ major and most secure asset, the marital residence.Furthermore, the plaintiff’s assertion that she did not discuss the business lawsuit and the potential to lose the marital residence is not credible. The plaintiff’s friend, Ms. E., an attorney, testified that she and the plaintiff discussed marital discord. According to the plaintiff, the defendant left the marital residence in April of 2007, about three months before the agreement was signed. It simply is not credible that, in light of the parties’ physical separation, the plaintiff would not discuss how to protect a major asset, the marital residence, with Ms. E. The parties’ separation and the potential loss of the marital residence are significant events involving marital discord. The plaintiff testified that Ms. E. was “like a sister to her,” so this Court makes the inference that the plaintiff would have spoken to her regarding these issues. Although Ms. E. did not draft the separation agreement, this Court infers that the plaintiff, who admittedly was worried about protecting the marital residence, was the party who had someone draft the agreement and who then presented it to the defendant for signature.Additionally, the defendant testified that the parties had discussed the potential for a separation agreement since the time they physically separated, which, according to the defendant, was in 2006. The defendant further testified that they had discussed the essential terms of the agreement; the plaintiff would retain the marital residence and the defendant would retain the property he owned in Nassau County. Therefore, the terms of the agreement were discussed for months. There was no surprise in the negotiating process. The plaintiff had ample opportunity to investigate the defendant’s assets. Furthermore, the plaintiff was in a position to know the value of the marital residence because she was the titled owner and the mortgage was in her name. She was the party who physically made the mortgage payments each month. She was aware of the family finances and the marital standard of living because she was the party who physically paid the bills each month. There was no credible evidence demonstrating concealment of assets. Furthermore, the plaintiff was the party who made more of an effort to have the agreement signed. She drove to the defendant’s shop in order to have it signed. If she was not anxious for the parties to sign the agreement, she instead would have waited for defendant to come to the marital residence. Her testimony that she did not read the agreement before signing it was not credible. She initialed changes throughout the agreement and initialed every page. She admitted that she signed the agreement. Also, the Notary credibly testified that she witnessed the parties signing the agreement. Furthermore, neither party was represented, formally, by an attorney, in the negotiation and execution of the agreement, so neither party had an unfair advantage.Moreover, the parties acknowledged, in the agreement, that they read it and understood it (Separation Agreement, Article 28: Understanding the Agreement, p. 16). The parties further acknowledged that it was not signed under duress and that each party made “independent inquiry into the financial circumstances of the other” (Separation Agreement, Article 17: Full Disclosure, p. 13).As there was no overreaching, this Court need not address the substantive terms of the agreement; however, assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was overreaching, this Court finds that the substantive terms of the agreement were not manifestly unfair. There was no evidence that there was a great disparity in value of the property that each party received pursuant to the agreement. The defendant had only a 20 percent interest in an LLC, which owned several residential properties with modest values (the values of three of the five properties were listed on the plaintiff’s affidavit, in evidence, and the values were $232,500, $252,500, and $170,000). The plaintiff did not present any evidence at the hearing to indicate that this was an asset with substantial value. There was no evidence to indicate a great disparity in the respective assets of the parties (cf. Petracca v. Petracca, 101 AD3d 695, 696 [2d Dept 2012] ["the net worth contained in the agreement was inaccurate at the time it was made in that is was undervalued by at least $11 million"]). In fact, the plaintiff may have had an advantage in terms of the distribution of the assets. As was demonstrated at the hearing, the defendant’s business interest (the auto body business) was the subject of litigation at the time of the agreement, thus this Court infers his business interest was not secure, which likely would diminish its value. Moreover, the defendant was a minority shareholder in the LLC, so he had no control of the assets owned by that company. Furthermore, the plaintiff has acquired property since the agreement was signed. She acquired one-half of a cooperative apartment in the Bronx (the other half is owned by the defendant’s brother). Since the time of the agreement, the defendant has had to sell his share of the auto body shop due to extensive loans from his brother, which he could not afford to repay. The LLC has acquired some additional properties since the time of the agreement, but the defendant is a minority shareholder, so he does not have control of these business assets. Additionally, based upon the information presented in the plaintiff’s affidavit, these new acquisitions have a relatively moderate value. The plaintiff has benefitted from the terms of the agreement. The plaintiff owns the marital residence. She received the benefit of not having to be concerned that she would lose the primary marital asset due to litigation regarding the defendant’s business.As to the waiver of maintenance, the agreement states, “[e]ach party acknowledges that they are employed, and capable of being employed. Accordingly, each forever waives any and all claims of maintenance from the other party” (Separation Agreement, Article 12: Spousal Maintenance, p. 11). The plaintiff therefore acknowledged that she was capable of being employed at the time she signed the agreement, and the evidence demonstrated that she was in fact capable of being employed at that time. The evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff did work outside the home during the marriage until about 5 years prior to signing the agreement. The child was 10 years of age at the time of the agreement. The wife had work experience, and she was the party who physically paid the household bills, so she had skills which could be used in the workforce. The parties did not dispute at trial that, at the time of the agreement, the wife’s job was to take care of the child and the home; however, this does not mean that she was not capable of employment outside the home at the time she signed the agreement. The defendant voluntarily supported the plaintiff and the child for years; however, he repeatedly advised the plaintiff that she would have to obtain paid employment once the child graduated from college. She received fair notice that she would have to prepare to re-enter the workforce. She had years to do so. There was no evidence presented to establish that the child had special needs that would have prevented the plaintiff from obtaining employment outside the home. In view of the foregoing, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the agreement was manifestly unfair in either a procedural or substantive manner.DuressThe plaintiff claimed that she signed the agreement under duress. The plaintiff testified that a few months after she learned about the lawsuit against the defendant’s business, she received a call from the defendant asking her to come to the shop to sign a separation agreement. She stated that during that phone call the defendant stated that “if [the plaintiff] didn’t sign the agreement, he wasn’t going to be giving [the plaintiff] any more money” (Tr. at 101, lines 17-18). She testified that after this phone call, on the same day or the next day, she went to the auto body shop to sign the agreement. This Court finds that the defendant did not make this financial threat. The defendant denied making it, and his testimony was credible. However, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the defendant did make this alleged financial threat, it did not constitute duress. The plaintiff certainly had time to contact someone, if she was concerned about signing the agreement. The plaintiff had access to a close friend who was an attorney, with whom she could have discussed this alleged “threat” before signing the agreement. She testified that Ms. E. was “like a sister” to her (Tr. at 97, line 2). The defendant did not appear at her door; she was the one who drove to his shop. Moreover, this alleged financial threat did not rise to the level that would preclude her exercise of free will. Furthermore, to constitute duress, the threat made must be unlawful. Here, there was nothing unlawful about what the defendant allegedly stated. As stated above, at the time of the agreement, the plaintiff was capable of being employed. The defendant was certainly within his legal rights to claim, in any potential matrimonial action, that the plaintiff was self-supporting and that she was not entitled to spousal maintenance. It does not constitute duress if a party asserts his or her legal rights.Overall, the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff was the party who desired the written separation agreement, as she was concerned about retaining the marital residence. She drove to the defendant’s shop, which indicates that she was the party who was anxious to have the agreement signed. The evidence does not support the inference that the defendant pressured the plaintiff into signing the agreement. Accordingly, this Court finds that the agreement was not signed under duress.RatificationMoreover, even if it were assumed, for argument’s sake, that the plaintiff signed this agreement under duress, the plaintiff ratified the agreement by living under its terms, without challenging it, until she filed this action for divorce in 2018, approximately eleven years after the agreement was signed. The plaintiff benefitted from retaining the marital residence. She also benefitted by acquiring additional property since the time of the agreement. Moreover, the defendant voluntarily supported the plaintiff and the child, in conformity with the marital standard of living, from July 17, 2007, the date of the agreement, until June of 2018, one month after the child graduated from college. He made all mortgage/equity loan payments on the marital residence, and he paid carrying charges, credit card bills, car payments, car insurance, food expenses, clothing expenses, and all other living expenses. He also paid for four years of tuition for the child at a private university.Additionally, the plaintiff cannot claim harm as a result of her waiver of maintenance in the agreement. She did in fact receive maintenance for a period of about eleven years since the time of separation. This is about one year less than the period of time that the parties lived together as husband and wife. It would not be equitable if this Court were to permit the plaintiff to accept the benefits of the agreement, to receive maintenance for years, and then to file for divorce in order to seek additional years of maintenance.ConclusionThe plaintiff failed to meet her burden in that she failed to demonstrate that there are grounds to set aside the parties’ agreement. In view of the foregoing, this Court determines that the parties’ separation agreement, dated July 17, 2007, is a valid separation agreement; therefore, the parties’ separation agreement, dated July 17, 2007, shall remain in full force and effect.Ordered ParagraphsAccordingly, it isORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, as all issues of spousal support and equitable distribution were settled by the parties in the separation agreement, the relief requested in plaintiff’s motion sequence number 001 (branches A, B, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M) is DENIED in its entirety; and it is furtherORDERED AND ADJUDGED that as to branch C of motion sequence 001, there was insufficient evidence put forth at the hearing to establish that the plaintiff is entitled to an order of protection; therefore, branch C of plaintiff’s motion sequence number 001 is DENIED in its entirety; and it is furtherORDERED AND ADJUDGED that as to the defendant’s cross-motion sequence number 002, branch 1, this branch is GRANTED to the extent that this Court determines that the separation agreement entered into between the parties on July 17, 2007 is valid, and thus, shall remain in full force and effect; and it is furtherORDERED AND ADJUDGED that as to defendant’s cross-motion 002, branch 2, that branch is DENIED as moot, and branch 3 is also DENIED to the extent not GRANTED herein.Any relief requested herein, and not GRANTED, is hereby DENIED.This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.Dated: May 21, 2019Mineola, New York
