MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER On May 30, 2018, Plaintiffs Star Asia International, Inc. and Star Asia Customs, Trade & Security, Inc. brought this breach of contract case against Defendants Old Dominion Footwear Inc. (“Old Dominion”), Malcom K. Sydnor, and Barry L. Guthrie. Docket No. 1,
29-37. On June 7, 2018, Sydnor’s wife properly accepted service on his behalf. See Docket No. 14; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B).1 Pursuant to Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Sydnor then had twenty-one days — that is, until June 28, 2018 — to file a response. He failed to do so. See Docket No. 14. On July 3, 2018, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file any motion for entry of default judgment by July 17, 2018, and ordered Defendants — including Sydnor — to file any opposition by July 24, 2018. See Docket No. 18. Defendants were also ordered to appear before the Court on August 15, 2018, to show cause why default judgment should not be entered against them. See id. On July 16, 2018, Plaintiffs moved for entry of default judgment against Old Dominion and Sydnor. See Docket Nos. 22-23. Eight days later, Sydnor’s counsel filed a notice of appearance. See Docket No. 24. Nevertheless, Sydnor failed to file any opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion and failed to attend the August 15th hearing. On August 16, 2018, therefore, the Court entered default judgment against Sydnor. See Docket No. 25. Sydnor now moves to vacate the default judgment entered against him. See Docket No. 27.2The relevant standards are undisputed. Default judgments are disfavored. See, e.g., Prosperity Partners, Inc. v. Bonilla, 249 F. App’x 910, 912 (2d Cir. 2007); Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). But “courts have an interest in expediting litigation [and] abuses of process may be prevented by enforcing those defaults that arise from egregious or deliberate conduct.” Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996). The question of whether to vacate a default judgment, once entered, is committed to the discretion of the Court. See New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). In undertaking the relevant inquiry, courts consider four factors: “(1) whether the default was willful, (2) whether the defendant demonstrates the existence of a meritorious defense, and (3) whether and to what extent, vacating the default will cause the non-defaulting party prejudice.” State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Among these four factors, willfulness — which requires “something more than mere negligence,” such as “egregious or deliberate conduct,” Green, 420 F.3d at 108 — “carries the most weight.” De Curtis v. Ferrandina, 529 F. App’x 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2013). Indeed, in general, courts should not set aside a default that is found to be willful. SEC v. Risman, 7 F. App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Brien v. Kullman Indus., Inc., 71 F.3d 1073, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995)).Applying these standards here, the Court finds that Sydnor’s default was willful and that vacatur would therefore be inappropriate. Notably, Sydnor does not contest that he received and failed to respond to the Complaint. See Docket No. 30,
