Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:Papers NumberedNotice of motion and affidavits annexed 1Order to Show Cause and affidavits annexedAnswering affidavits 2Replying affidavits 3ExhibitsStipulationsOtherDECISION/ORDER In this longstanding 2016 summary nonpayment proceeding, during the pendency of which it became apparent that respondent had been under reporting the household income for many years, on August 3, 2018, the parties settled the matter with the respondent agreeing to pay the outstanding rent and to move to a two bedroom apartment within 30 days once same became available. Respondent was found by HUD to be “overhoused”, meaning she was residing in an apartment (with three bedrooms) which she no longer needed as one of her daughters (whose substantial income had not been reported) had moved out thus she no longer needed three bedrooms as only two people were still residing in the apartment. In return for respondent agreeing to move to the next available two bedroom apartment, the petitioner agreed to not pursue the rent increases retroactively that it would have been entitled to based upon the under reported income, which could easily have been many thousands of dollars that respondent would have been responsible to pay. Respondent also kept her HUD subsidized status in the agreement, which would likely have been lost had the matter proceeded to trial, and didn’t risk losing her apartment completely. Petitioner notified respondent of the availability of a two bedroom apartment in October, 2018, but respondent decided that she didn’t want to move and instead wanted to keep her three bedroom apartment and would pay the market rent therefore claiming she had that option under the HUD regulations. Upon her refusal to relocate to the two bedroom apartment, petitioner, in accordance with the stipulation of August 3, 2018, brought the within motion for entry of a judgment and a warrant for respondent’s eviction based upon her violation of the terms of the agreement. The Court notes that respondent has been represented by counsel in this proceeding since the second court appearance on February 2, 2017. The Court further notes that respondent has a project based HUD §8 voucher.Respondent opposes the motion and argues that she never intended to waive any rights she had under the HUD regulations, that the stipulation is ambiguous and thus subject to interpretation by the Court, and that it should be strictly construed against the petitioner as the drawer of the stipulation. The Court disagrees with respondent on all of these issues and grants petitioner’s motion for the reasons set forth below.Stipulations of settlement are “highly favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside” (Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y. 2d 230 (1984)), they may be vacated upon a showing of good cause such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, In re Frutiger’s Estate, 29 N.Y.2d 143 (1971). The court may vacate a judgment and warrant if it “appears that either party has inadvertently, unadvisably or improvidently entered into an agreement which will take the case out of the due and ordinary course of proceeding in the action, and in so doing work to his prejudice.” In re Frutiger, supra, citing Van Nuys v. Titsworth, 57 Hun. 5. “It is well settled that the court has power to relieve a party from a stipulation in a situation which is unjust or harsh even when fully understood and authorized.” Solack Estates v. Goodman, 102 Misc. 2d 504, 425 N.Y.S. 2d 906 (App. Term 1st Dept, 1979). The only mistake here is respondent’s belief that she has the option to remain in her current apartment. Clark v. Clark, 33 A.D.3d 836, 827 N.Y.S.2d 159, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 07686 (AD 2nd Dept), “A settlement agreement in a [court] action is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation. Where such an agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from the four corners of the instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence. Whether a writing is ambiguous is a matter of law for the court. The proper inquiry when determining whether an agreement is ambiguous is ‘whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation’. Also, in deciding whether an agreement is ambiguous, the court ‘should examine the entire contract and consider the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which it was executed’.” (at 837-838, citations omitted.) This Court finds the agreement of August 3, 2018, to be susceptible of only one interpretation, that being that respondent, for good, and very valuable, consideration, agreed to move to the next two bedroom apartment to become available. Respondent was not coerced into signing the agreement, she was represented by counsel through every step of this proceeding and is deemed to have understood the agreement and its terms.Further, the agreement was not drawn by the petitioner, it was an arms length negotiation between parties represented by counsel throughout and should, and shall, be construed against both sides equally. If respondent intended to reserve her rights under the HUD regulations she should have done so explicitly in the agreement, and failing to do so, she has waived any rights she might have otherwise had. She made an agreement for which she received good consideration in an arms length negotiation. Greenfield v. Philles Records, 98 N.Y.2d 562, 780 N.E.2d 166, 750 N.Y.S.2d 565, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 07324 (CANY), “The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent. ‘The best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing‘. Thus, a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.”“Extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent may be considered only if the agreement is ambiguous, which is an issue of law for the courts to decide. A contract is unambiguous if the language it uses has ‘a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [agreement] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion’. Thus, if the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of only one meaning, a court is not free to alter the contract to reflect its personal notions of fairness and equity.”(At 569-570-emphasis added, citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent is in violation of, and has breached the clear terms of, the agreement of August 3, 2018, and grants petitioner’s motion to the extent of entering a judgment of possession as against respondent for such breach. The warrant of eviction may issue forthwith and execute after service of the requisite Notice of Eviction.This is the decision and order of the Court. Copies are being mailed to both sides.Dated: June 6, 2019Bronx, New York
