The following papers numbered 1 to 5 were read on this motion (Seq. No. 2) for SUMMARY JUDGMENT_noticed on_September 6, 2018_.Notice of Motion — Order to Show Cause — Exhibits and Affidavits Annexed No(s). 1, 2Answering Affidavit and Exhibits (Correspondence from Plaintiff Counsel) No(s). 3, 4Replying Affidavit and Exhibits No(s). 5 Upon the foregoing papers, the defendants Murray Berkowitz & Sons Inc. and Richard E. Bond (“Defendants”) move for an order granting them summary judgment, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff Kevin Oriach (“Plaintiff’) on the grounds that he has failed to satisfy the “serious injury” threshold as defined by New York Insurance Laws §5102(d). Plaintiff opposes the motion. When a defendant seeks summary judgment alleging that a plaintiff does not meet the “serious injury” threshold required to maintain a lawsuit, the burden is on the defendant to establish through competent evidence that the plaintiff has no cause of action (Franchini v. Plameri, 1 N.Y.3d 536 [2003]). “Such evidence includes ‘affidavits or affirmations of medical experts who examined the plaintiff and conclude that no objective medical findings support the plaintiff’s claim’” (Spencer v. Golden Eagle, Inc., 82 A.D.3d 589, 590 [1st Dept. 2011] [internal quotations omitted]). A defendant may also meet his or her summary judgment burden with sufficient medical evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff’s injuries are not causally related to the accident (see Farrington v. Go On Time Car Service, 76 A.D.3d 818 [1st Dept. 2010], citing Pommels v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 572 [2005]). Once this initial threshold is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a material issue of fact using objective, admissible medical proof (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 350 [2002]).In this case, Defendants carried their initial burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff’s claimed lumbar spine injury did not constitute a “permanent consequential” or “significant” limitation. Defendants’ orthopedist Dr. Jay William Eneman performed a physical examination and found full range-of-motion, and negative clinical diagnostic tests (see Blocker v. Yun Baek Sung, 135 A.D.3d 494 [1st Dept. 2016]). He diagnosed Plaintiff with a “resolved” lumbar spine sprain and found no evidence of orthopedic disability. Defendants also point to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein he admitted that he was involved in a prior motor vehicle accident in New Jersey, and he treated with a chiropractor and brought a lawsuit as a result (see Brewster v. FTM Servo, Corp., 44 A.D.3d 351 [1st Dept. 2007]). Plaintiff testified that he had MRIs performed as a result of that accident, although he did not remember if it was his “upper back” that was examined. Defendants also note that Plaintiff conceded that he only received about four months of treatment following the accident, which required an explanation (see Vila v. Foxglove Taxi Corp., 159 A.D.3d 431 [1st Dept. 2018]).Plaintiff initially contends in opposition that the motion should be denied because he is not a “covered person” within the meaning of Insurance Law §5102(j). “Covered person” is defined in relevant part as “any owner, operator, or occupant of, a motor vehicle which has in effect the financial security required by article six…of the vehicle and traffic law” (Insurance Law §5102[j]). The Appellate Division has determined that “‘covered persons’ include individuals who have liability coverage in excess of the minimum coverage required by Vehicle and Traffic Law §311 (4) (a), issued by an insurer authorized to do business in New York” (Hunter v. OOIDA Risk Retention Group, Inc., 79 A.D.3d 1, 11 [2nd Dept. 2010] [internal citations omitted]). “Vehicle and Traffic Law §311 provides, in relevant part, that ‘proof of financial security’ consists of an ‘owner’s policy of liability insurance,’ which (1) affords minimum coverage to any one person in the sum of $25,000 where injury is sustained, and the sum of $50,000 where death results, and coverage to two or more people in the sum of $50,000 for injury, and $100,000 for death; and (2) in the case of a vehicle registered in another state, is either issued by an insurer authorized to issue policies in New York, or by an unauthorized insurer who has, among other things, filed a statement with the New York State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles consenting to service of process and indicating that its policies may be deemed to be varied so as to comply with the requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law article six” (id., quoting Vehicle and Traffic Law §311[3], 311[4][a], 311[4][c]; and 11 NYCRR 60-1.1).Plaintiff argues that he is not a “covered person” because at the time of the accident Plaintiff’s vehicle, registered in New Jersey, was not covered by Workers’ Compensation, and his auto insurance carrier “Plymouth Rock/Palisades,” did not afford no-fault coverage for the accident due to the fact that Plaintiff’s vehicle was “used for business.” However, as noted above, an individual is a “covered person” if they have liability insurance coverage in excess of that required by Vehicle and Traffic Law §311(4)(a), and if the vehicle is registered out of state, the insurer is authorized to issue policies in New York (id., see also Aetna Lift & Cas. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 207 A.D.2d 984 [4th Dept. 1994]). Plaintiff did not disclose his liability insurance policy limits, and in reply, Defendants have provided evidence that Plaintiff’s insurer is a licensed insurer in New York. On this record, accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is not a “covered person” within the meaning of Insurance Law and the motion will not be denied on that ground.After review of Plaintiff’s medical submissions, the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised an issue of fact as to whether he sustained a “significant limitation” to his lumbar spine as a result of this accident. Plaintiff submits affidavit from his treating chiropractor, Dr. Kieran Collins, who states that Plaintiff first presented for treatment on May 21, 2012, about one month after the accident, with complaints of lower back pain following a motor vehicle collision. Dr. Collins notes that Plaintiff was involved in prior collisions in 2000 and 2003, and he treated Plaintiff for those injuries. However, Dr. Collins asserts that those injuries had resolved prior to this April 20, 2012 accident. At Plaintiff’s initial examination, using an inclinometer, Dr. Collins measured restricted range of motion in the lumbar spine upon flexion, extension, right lateral and left lateral flexion. At a follow up visit (marked “final”) in December 2012, or about eight months after the accident, Plaintiff presented with normal range of motion upon extension and right lateral extension, but continuing limitations upon flexion (80 degrees, 105 degrees normal, or approximately 23.8 percent loss of range), and left lateral flexion (20 degrees, 25 normal, or 20 percent loss of range) with pain. Dr. Collins reviewed a lumbar spine MRI taken on September 22, 2012, and found a left paracentral/neural disc herniation at L4-L5 and a central disc herniation at L5-S1 with mild narrowing of the spinal canal. Annexed to the opposition papers is an affirmation from Dr. Arkady Finkel who affirms the contents of the lumbar spine MRI report showing, among other things, those herniations. Dr. Collins goes on to state that Plaintiff treated for these injuries and achieved maximum medical improvement as of his discharge date of December 13, 2012, and he thereafter received a lumbar epidural steroid injection at the L4-L5 level. Plaintiff provides a sworn report from Dr. Arden Kaisman, who performed that injection on May 9, 2013, noted range-of-motion restrictions, and opined that Plaintiff sustained disc herniations that were causally-related to this accident. Dr. Collins similarly opines that to a reasonable degree of chiropractic probability, there is a probable causal relationship between Plaintiff’s disc herniations and the motor vehicle accident.Plaintiff’s submissions as a whole are sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether his lumbar spine injuries injuries are causally-related to this accident and not the prior accidents, as Dr. Collins affirms that he himself treated Plaintiff for prior injuries which had resolved (see, e.g., Nelson v. Tamara Taxi Inc., 112 A.D.3d 547, 548 [1st Dept. 2013]). Contrary to Defendants’ contentions, an affidavit from a chiropractor is competent evidence to raise an issue of fact as to an injury’s significance and causation (see, e.g., De La Cruz v. Hernandez, 84 A.D.3d 652, 652 [1st Dept. 2011]). The reports and submissions from Plaintiff’s treating medical providers raise a fact issue as to whether his claimed lumbar spine injury constitutes a “significant limitation of use,” as Plaintiff demonstrated limitations that persisted for approximately eight months after the accident (see, Echevarria v. Ocasio, 135 A.D.3d 661, 662 [1st Dept. 2016]), and the limitations found as of December 2012 were sufficiently “significant” within the meaning of Insurance Law (see Garner v. Tong, 27 A.D.3d 401 [1st Dept. 2006]; Long v. Taida Orchids, Inc., 117 A.D.3d 624 [1st Dept. 2014). The different "normal" range values assigned by Dr. Collins and Dr. Kaisman go to the issue of their credibility and does not negate their respective findings. Plaintiff also sufficiently explained his cessation of treatment, as Dr. Collins states that as of December 2012 Plaintiff had "reached maximum medical improvement in reference to chiropractic care" (see Barhak v. Almanzar-Cespedes, 101 A.D.3d 564, 565 [1st Dept. 2012]; Wenegieme v. Harriott, 157 A.D.3d 412, 412-13 [1st Dept. 2018]).However, Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to the existence of a “permanent consequential” limitations. Although Dr. Collins measured significant range-of-motion limitations at an October 2018 examination, Plaintiff’s limitations had greatly improved and were near-normal as of December 2012, and Dr. Collins failed to explain Plaintiff’s subsequent declines in motion (id., see also Booth v. Milstein, 146 A.D.3d 652, 653 [1st Dept. 2017]).Defendants also established that Plaintiff has no viable “90/180 day” injury claim by submitting Plaintiff’s bill of particulars wherein he admitted that he was only confined to his bed for one day, confined to his home for one week after the accident, and he only missed five days of work. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he missed only two weeks from work before returning “full time” (Pl. EBT at 15-16), thus defeating his “90/180 day” injury claim (see Stevens v. Bolton, 135 A.D.3d 647 [1st Dept. 2016]). Finally, there is no evidence on this record that Plaintiff sustained a “permanent loss of use” of any body part — which requires a “total” loss of use — therefore that claim is also dismissed (Swift v. New York City Transit Authority, 115 A.D.3d 507, 509 [1st Dept. 2014]).Accordingly, it is herebyORDERED, that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent of dismissing Plaintiff’s claim that he sustained a “permanent consequential limitation,” a “permanent loss of use,” or a “90/180 day” injury as a result of this accident, and it is further,ORDERED, that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is otherwise denied.This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.Dated: 6/24/191. CHECK ONE CASE DISPOSED IN ITS ENTIRETY X CASE STILL ACTIVE2. MOTION IS GRANTED DENIED X GRANTED IN PART OTHER3. 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