OPINION AND ORDER On June 6, 2019, plaintiff Aptive Environmental, LLC (“plaintiff” or “Aptive”) commenced this action against defendant Village of East Rockaway, New York (“defendant” or the “Village”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging, inter alia, that two (2) provisions of the East Rockaway Village Code (the “Village Code”) infringe upon their commercial speech rights in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On June 12, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, inter alia, challenging a third provision of the Village Code. Presently before the Court is plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining defendant from enforcing Sections 171-14, 171-16 and 171-18 of the Village Code. For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff’s application is granted. I. BACKGROUNDPlaintiff is a residential pest control services company with offices throughout the United States. (Amended Complaint ["Am. Compl."],9 and Ex. B,3). Plaintiff’s sales are made almost exclusively through door-to-door solicitation. (Id.). According to Pierson Baldwin (“Baldwin”), the branch manager of plaintiff’s Long Island office, plaintiff’s “unique business model is predicated upon establishing a personal and trusting relationship with its customers, getting to know their homes and their individual needs so [it] can customize its services[;]…[and] [y]ears of business experience have confirmed to [it] that other forms of less personal marketing, including phone solicitation, email campaigns, and web advertisements, are ineffective for establishing or maintaining this necessary personal relationship with its customers.” (Id., Ex. B,3).During its annual summer selling season, plaintiff typically solicits door-to-door between the daylight hours of 10:00 a.m. and dusk, (Am. Compl.,10), but most of its sales occur after 5 p.m. “because most residents have work, school, or other activities that keep them away from their homes during typical working hours.” (Id.). Accordingly, municipal ordinances that impose solicitation curfews affecting evening hours, such as Section 171-18 of the Village Code, have a direct and substantial impact on plaintiff’s business, its employees, and its sales representatives. (Id.).Plaintiff has received both positive and negative reviews on-line, and has had some complaints lodged against it with the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”).1 (See Declaration of John E. Ryan, Esq. ["Ryan Decl."],6 and Exs. C and D).In April 2019, plaintiff entered into an “Assurance of Voluntary Compliance” with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of Attorney General (the “Commonwealth”), to settle an enforcement action alleging, inter alia, that while plaintiff was engaging in door-to-door solicitation of Pennsylvania consumers, it violated Pennsylvania’s Consumer Protection Law by: (i) failing to provide consumers with a completed copy of their contracts at the time of the sale or contract, and with the required statutory notifications of their right of rescission; (ii) continuing to service, on at least three (3) occasions, consumers who notified it that they were cancelling their contracts; and (iii) engaging in door-to-door solicitation, on more than one (1) occasion, without complying with the requirements of local peddling and solicitation ordinances. https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019-04-16-Aptive-filed-AVC.pdf (last visited 7/15/19). While plaintiff denied the allegations, it, inter alia, agreed to ensure compliance with all provisions of the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law and paid restitution, civil penalties and costs.2 (Id.).The Village adopted chapter 171 of Article III of the Village Code, which regulates “Solicitors and Canvassers,” on July 27, 1959. (Am. Compl.,11). Plaintiff challenges the following provisions of chapter 171 of Article III of the Village Code: (i) Section 171-14 (the “License Requirement”), which provides, “No person shall engage in business as a solicitor or canvasser in the village without first obtaining a license thereof;”3 (ii) Section 171-16 (the “Bond Requirement”), which provides, in relevant part, “Every applicant, not a resident of the village…shall file with the Village Clerk a surety bond, running to the village in the amount of $2,500 with surety given by a recognized insurance carrier conditioned that the applicant shall comply fully with the provisions of the ordinances of the village and the laws of the State of New York regulating the business of solicitor and canvasser and guaranteeing to any resident of the village that all money paid as a down payment will be accounted for and applied according to the representations of the solicitor and that any property purchased will be delivered in compliance with the representations made by the solicitor. Such bond shall provide that action thereon may be brought by any person to whom a judgment has been awarded because of loss caused by such licensee’s fault or default[;]” and (iii) Section 171-18 (the “ Solicitation Curfew”), which provides, “It shall be unlawful for any person to enter upon private property for the purpose of peddling or soliciting before the hour of 9:00 a.m. of any day or after the hour of 5:00 p.m. of any day, except upon the invitation of the householder or occupant.” (See Am. Compl., Ex. A). Except as can be inferred from the Bond Requirement, the Village Code offers no justification and identifies no state interests ostensibly advanced by the challenged provisions. (See Id.,11 and Ex. A).Plaintiff claims, inter alia, that during its active selling season in the late spring and summer months of March through September, the Solicitation Curfew prohibits between three (3) to four (4) hours of daylight solicitation after 5:00 p.m. each day, and all during the most productive time of day when most people have returned home from work. (Am. Compl.,13). According to Baldwin, the Solicitation Curfew prohibits plaintiff from soliciting in the Village during the time that more than half of its sales take place, i.e. between 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., and plaintiff “loses thousands of dollars in revenue” for each day it is prohibited from soliciting in the Village during that time period. (Id., Ex. B,11).By letter to the Village’s counsel, John Ryan, Esq. (“Ryan”), dated May 20, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel, Jeremy A. Fielding, Esq. (“Fielding”), inter alia, identified the Solicitation Curfew and Bond Requirement as constitutionally infirm and demanded, under threat of litigation, that the Village: (i) cease and desist enforcement of, and repeal or amend, those provisions; and (ii) provide written assurances, within one (1) week of the date of the letter, “that the Village has complied, or is taking immediate steps to fully comply, with [plaintiff's] request.” (Am. Compl.,15 and Ex. C).On June 4, 2019, after the Village failed to “agree[] to amend its ordinance or suspend its enforcement through an interim agreement,” Jon Kelley, Esq. (“Kelley”), co-counsel for plaintiff, sent Ryan, among others, an email indicating, inter alia, that plaintiff intended to file a lawsuit and application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction against the Village on June 6, 2019 unless it received written confirmation by noon the next day that the Village would immediately suspend enforcement of the Solicitation Curfew, the Bond Requirement and “its unconstitutional licensing process.” (Am. Comp., Ex. F). Later that same date, Fielding also sent an email to Ryan emphasizing that plaintiff wanted to avoid litigation but needs “the ability to solicit in the town [sic] free from the[] unconstitutional provisions” of the Village Code; and indicating that “a stand down/suspension agreement accomplishes this goal and ensures the parties won’t waste attorneys [sic] fees on litigation.” (Id., Ex. G).Ryan responded by email sent the following day, June 5, 2019 at 7:24 a.m., indicating, inter alia, “If such an ill-advised lawsuit is filed, the Village will seek sanctions.” (Am. Compl., Ex. H). Several more emails were exchanged between plaintiff’s counsel and the Village’s counsel over the next couple of days, with plaintiff’s counsel, inter alia, seeking “a compromise solution” and a resolution “through collaboration and settlement,” and urging plaintiff to choose collaboration over conflict, (Docket Entry ["DE"] 7, Ex. A at 3, 5 and 7); and the Village’s counsel, inter alia, accusing plaintiff’s counsel of “continu[ing] to engage in [a] civil extortion scheme” in order to get attorney’s fees and of engaging in shameful and sanctionable conduct. (Id. at 4, 6-7).On June 6, 2019, plaintiff commenced this action against the Village pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983″), alleging, inter alia, that the Solicitation Curfew and Bond Requirement infringe upon its First Amendment commercial speech rights. That same date, plaintiff made an application to this Court for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the Village’s enforcement of those provisions. On June 6, 2019, at 3:45 p.m., the Court issued an order to show cause, inter alia, granting plaintiff’s application for a TRO enjoining the Village’s enforcement of the Solicitation Curfew and Bond Requirement pending the hearing and determination of plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction.4On or about June 10, 2019, the Village Board of Trustees adopted a resolution, as a result of this lawsuit, establishing a moratorium “with respect to the issuance of any permits under chapter 171 of the [Village] Code,” effective immediately and until December 31, 2019, “unless further extended by Resolution if [sic] the Board of Trustees.” (Am. Compl., Ex. L).On June 12, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, inter alia, to add a claim challenging the License Requirement in light of the moratorium imposed by the aforementioned resolution. Baldwin avers, inter alia, (i) that twenty-eight (28) Aptive representatives intend to solicit in the Village, (Am. Compl., Ex. J,3); (ii) that he brought a check for payment of the Village’s licensing fee for each of those representatives to the Village Clerk, Connie Petrucci, on June 11, 2019, (id., Ex. J,4); (iii) that Petrucci informed him that the Village would not accept plaintiff’s license fee payment, (id.,5); and (iv) that when he asked how plaintiff could receive required solicitation licenses from the Village, he “was informed that no licensing process existed[,]…[and] was told to contact the Village’s counsel, Mr. John Ryan.” (Id.,
