MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In this action, brought pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§101 et seq., photographers Scott Boehm and Paul Spinelli (“Plaintiffs”) allege that various sports memorabilia vendors have infringed their copyrights in certain photographs by displaying the photographs and offering them for sale on the internet. See Docket No. 32 (“SAC”). Plaintiffs have settled or dismissed their claims against all Defendants save one, Signatures 4 U LLC (“Signatures”), which now moves pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. See Docket No. 147 (“Signatures Mem.”).Signatures moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that personal jurisdiction exists, see, e.g., Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010), a burden that changes as the litigation progresses: “Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction,” and “[a]t that preliminary stage, the plaintiff’s prima facie showing may be established solely by allegations.” Dorchester Fin. Secs., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Bell v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)). “After discovery, the plaintiff’s prima facie showing…must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. at 85 (quoting Bell, 902 F.2d at 197). In all cases, when evaluating whether a plaintiff has made the requisite showing in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 647 F.3d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 2011).Because this is a federal question case, Signatures resides outside of New York, and the Copyright Act “does not specifically provide for national service of process,” the Court must “apply the forum state’s personal jurisdiction rules.” Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs do not (and could not) assert that Signatures is subject to “general” personal jurisdiction in New York’s courts — that is, personal jurisdiction for purposes of “any and all claims against [it].” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Instead, they allege “specific” personal jurisdiction — that is, “case-linked” jurisdiction for purposes of these claims only. Id.; see Docket No. 165 (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), at 7-11. In particular, Plaintiffs assert jurisdiction under the first prong of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 302(a), which provides for personal jurisdiction “[a]s to…cause[s] of action arising from” a defendant’s “transact[ing] any business within the state or contract[ing] anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. §302(a)(1); see Pls.’ Opp’n 11. Per the statute’s plain terms, “jurisdiction is only proper under [Section 302(a)(1)] where the cause of action arises out of the subject matter of the business transacted.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, No. 03-CV-6585 (GEL), 2004 WL 964009, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004), aff’d, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit will be deemed to have arisen out of a party’s activities in New York if there is ‘an articulable nexus,’ or a ‘substantial relationship,’ between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.” Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 123 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, in the absence of some “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,…specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).Applying those standards here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to allege personal jurisdiction for the simple reason that they have failed to plausibly allege any New York-based acts by Signatures out of which this suit might “aris[e].” N.Y. C.P.L.R. §302(a). Notably, the Second Amended Complaint mentions Signatures only once — in a paragraph alleging that Signatures is a Florida limited liability company with a Florida address. See SAC 16. And while attachments to the Second Amended Complaint include charts matching thumbnail screenshots of the allegedly infringing conduct with the alleged infringers, see SAC Exs. 1-5, none of the charts display any infringing acts by Signatures — at least not legibly. Plaintiffs protest that they “have alleged that (i) a substantial portion of the misconduct giving rise to their claims occurred in this District, (ii) Defendant conducts substantial and ongoing business in the state of New York and in this District, and (iii) Defendant sells and markets products to residents of New York,” citing Paragraphs 33-37 of the Second Amended Complaint. See Pls.’ Opp’n 7. But those paragraphs say nothing about Signatures in particular, instead leveling only conclusory and highly general allegations about “Defendants’” conduct, in some instances “[u]pon information and belief.” SAC
