DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT The defendant has submitted an omnibus motion seeking: (1) inspection of the grand jury minutes; (2) dismissal of the indictment or, in the alternative, reduction of the counts therein; (3) suppression of evidence; (4) a bill of particulars and discovery; and (5) preclusion of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions or bad acts. The defendant subsequently filed a supplemental motion to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction under CPL §20.20, and the People submitted a response in opposition.The defendant’s motion to inspect the grand jury minutes is granted to the extent that the Court has inspected the grand jury minutes. The defendant’s motion for release of the grand jury minutes is denied since the defendant has failed to demonstrate any compelling need for such action, and the Court is able to determine the motion without assistance (see CPL §210.30[3]).At the outset, the Court finds that New York has territorial jurisdiction over prosecution of all but two counts charged in the instant indictment. Even where none of the conduct constituting an offense defined by the New York State Penal Law occurred within New York, CPL §20.20 nevertheless states that a person may be prosecuted in New York under certain circumstances, including where the offense committed was a “result offense,” i.e., where a specific consequence is an element of the offense (CPL §20.10[3]), and the result occurred within New York (CPL §20.20[2][a]). CPL §20.20 also states that New York has jurisdiction over the prosecution of an offense where “[t]he statute defining the offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a particular effect in this state and the conduct constituting the offense committed was performed with intent that it would have such effect herein” (CPL §20.20[2][b]). In defining the term “particular effect,” CPL §20.10(4) provides that conduct constituting an offense have a particular effect upon New York when such conduct “produces consequences which, though not necessarily amounting to a result or element of such offense, have a materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a particular jurisdiction, or result in the defrauding of persons in such jurisdiction[.]“Here, while defendant’s conduct occurred in New Jersey, New York nevertheless has territorial jurisdiction over the Third through Ninth counts of the indictment under CPL §20.20(2)(a) and (b). Specifically, the Fifth count of the indictment charges Identity Theft in the First Degree pursuant to Penal Law §190.80(2), which is a result offense. Moreover, the evidence presented to the grand jury sufficiently established that the specific consequence of the defendant’s conduct which is an element of the crime, i.e., the financial loss to a person in an aggregate amount exceeding $2,000, occurred within New York (see CPL §20.20[2][a] & 20.10[3]).Additionally, pursuant to CPL §20.20(2)(b), New York has jurisdiction over the prosecution of the Third through Ninth counts of the indictment as the Penal Law sections defining those crimes are designed specifically to prevent the defrauding of persons, as evidenced by their requirement, as an element of each of those offenses, of the actor’s intent to defraud another, and their proscription of the very conduct constituting the means and methods by which one could accomplish the defrauding of persons — e.g., by assuming the identity of another or acting as another (see Penal Law §§190.79, 190.80 & 190.25), or by making or altering a written instrument that can evidence, create, transfer, terminate or affect, among other things, a legal right or interest (see Penal Law §170.10[1]). Moreover, the evidence before the grand jury demonstrated the defendant’s knowledge of the complainant’s residence in Queens, New York, and the grand jury found, upon legally sufficient evidence, that the defendant’s actions constituting these crimes were carried out with the intent to defraud.However, the First and Second counts of the indictment charging Grand Larceny in the Third Degree (Penal Law §155.35[1]) and Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law §155.30[1]), respectively, are ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under CPL §20.20. Unlike and in contrast to the aforementioned offenses, the Penal Law section defining these crimes proscribes the stealing of property, generally, regardless of whether the actor possessed the intent to defraud, and is not designed to prevent the defrauding of persons in New York (see CPL §§20.20[2][b] & 20.10[4]. Compare Penal Law, Title J [defining offenses involving theft] with Penal Law, Title K [defining offenses involving fraud]).Further, upon inspection of the grand jury minutes, the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL §§210.20(1)(b) and 210.30 is granted to the extent that the Third and Eighth counts of the indictment charging Forgery in the Second Degree (Penal Law §170.10[1]) are ordered dismissed as the grand jury was not properly instructed on the law with respect to such charges. Leave to re-present these dismissed charges is granted.As to the remaining counts of the indictment, the defendant’s motion to dismiss or reduce is denied since the evidence adduced before the grand jury was legally sufficient to sustain the indictment. Moreover, the District Attorney properly instructed the grand jury on the relevant law (see People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d 389 [1980]). Additionally, the presentation of the case to the grand jury was not defective as a matter of law. The record reflects that a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the submission of evidence and at the time that the District Attorney instructed the grand jury on the law. No unauthorized person within the meaning of CPL §190.25 was present at any time during the proceedings (see People v. Sayavong, 83 NY2d 702 [1994]). No irregularity that would impair the integrity of the grand jury occurred (see People v. Adessa, 89 NY2d 677 [1997]; People v. Huston, 88 NY2d 400 [1996]).The defendant’s motion to suppress statement evidence is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing is ordered.The defendant’s motion seeking a bill of particulars is granted to the extent authorized by CPL §200.95 and not previously provided by the People.The defendant’s motion seeking discovery is granted to the extent authorized by CPL §240.20 and not previously provided by the People.The defendant’s motion to preclude evidence in the event that the People do not respond to the request for a bill of particulars and demand for discovery is denied at this time as premature.The defendant’s motion to preclude the People from using his prior convictions or bad acts on their direct case or upon cross-examination of the defendant at trial is respectfully reserved for the trial court.The defendant’s motion seeking the right to make further motions is granted to the extent authorized by CPL §255.20(3).This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.Dated: July 18, 2019
