OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Vinnie Hardee brings this 42 U.S.C. §1983 action against defendants City of New Rochelle Section 8 Housing Agency and Deborah Pritchett, the agency’s housing assistance specialist, alleging plaintiff’s termination from the City of New Rochelle Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (the “Section 8 program”) violated her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, notice requirements under federal law, federal discrimination laws, and New York state law. Defendants move for dismissal or remand to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). (Doc. #19). Plaintiff, by cross-motion, moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) as to her federal claims1 and seeks an order directing defendants to hold an informal hearing as set forth in 24 C.F.R. §982.555. (Doc. #27). For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is DENIED, and plaintiff’s cross-motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. BACKGROUND For the purpose of ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint, as summarized below. Plaintiff is a 61-year-old woman who suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome and various other medical conditions. For about twenty years, she received financial housing assistance from the Section 8 program, a subsidized rent program funded by HUD and administered locally by the City of New Rochelle pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1437f(o) and 24 C.F.R. Part 982. The program is designed to help tenants who would otherwise be priced out of the rental housing market, including disabled individuals on fixed incomes, low-income households, and senior citizens. Plaintiff asserts her only income is $735 she receives in Social Security disability benefits each month. On or about May 30, 2018, plaintiff received a notice signed by defendant Pritchett terminating plaintiff’s participation in the Section 8 program because plaintiff allowed “illegal occupants” to live in her subsidized apartment in violation of 24 C.F.R. §982.551(h)(2). (Doc. #29-4). The notice stated: This office has been informed that you have or had illegal occupants living in your apartment. You are in violation of your Section 8 Family Obligations HUD CFR 982.551 and are terminated from this Section 8 program effective June 30, 2018 HUD CFR 982.552. If you do not agree with this decision you may request an Informal Hearing in writing [within] 10 days of this letter as per HUD CFR 982.555. (Id.). Plaintiff submitted a written response dated June 8, 2018, with the assistance of her case manager, which stated, in relevant part: I, Vinnie Hardee believe that I should keep my Section 8 Voucher because I have been in compliance with the rules and regulations of the program. I am accused of having individuals live with me, but it is not true. I have had visitors that come to my apartment but they were not living with me. I befriended a woman who took advantage, and allowed her son to use my address for his state ID, I was unaware that he would be using the address, and never gave them permission to do so. Although my address is listed on his state ID, he does not live with me. I am aware of the rules and regulations of the program, and have been an ideal tenant besides this incident. I always pay my rent on time, and attempt to be a good tenant. I have heart failure, and will be getting surgery shortly. I cannot imagine healing anywhere but my home, without my voucher I will not be able to pay rent on my own. I apologize for any confusion on the matter, and agree to obey all of the rules that Section 8 has put in place. If you have any questions or concerns please contact me at [this number]. Thank you! (Doc. #29-5). Defendants did not respond or schedule a hearing. Plaintiff followed up with another letter to defendants, dated July 30, 2018. That letter stated, in pertinent part: I, Vinnie Hardee am requesting an informal hearing at Section 8 to discuss the discontinuation of my subsidy. I received the letter in June stating that my subsidy will be discontinued, and I had 10 days to request a hearing, but I was under the impression that my last letter explaining why I should keep my voucher would suffice. I also did not understand that I needed to use the exact language that I am requesting an informal hearing. Please let me know if this can be arranged at your earliest convenience. (Doc. #29-6). Defendants did not respond or schedule a hearing. At some point, defendants stopped paying plaintiff’s Section 8 program rental subsidy. Plaintiff alleges she cannot afford to remain in the apartment without the subsidy. On September 25, 2018, plaintiff’s attorney sent Pritchett a letter, stating that plaintiff intended to request a hearing with the initial letter she sent, and requesting that plaintiff “be granted a Reasonable Accommodation due to her disability pursuant to the Federal Fair Housing Act 42 USC §3604(f)(3)(B).” (Doc. #29-8). Defendants did not respond. On November 14, 2018, plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court, Westchester County, seeking an Article 78 proceeding in connection with defendants’ termination of plaintiff from the Section 8 program. On December 3, 2018, defendants removed this action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). They filed an answer on December 11, 2018. Plaintiff did not move to remand, and instead chose to file an amended complaint on December 14, 2018, alleging: (i) defendants’ failure to provide plaintiff “an independent review” before her termination from the Section 8 program violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and New York state law (Doc. #8 (“Am. Compl.”) 25); (ii) defendants’ failure to inform plaintiff, in their May 30, 2018, letter, of the reason for her termination from the Section 8 program and the supporting evidence violated 24 C.F.R. §982.555 and 42 U.S.C. §1437d(k), as well as New York state law (id. 26); (iii) defendants’ refusal to provide plaintiff an informal hearing or consider her request for an accommodation violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and New York state law (id. 27); and (iv) defendant’s termination was “overly harsh and unwarranted and constitutes an abuse of discretion” in violation of New York state law (id. 28). Defendants answered the amended complaint on December 18, 2018, and filed an amended answer on February 6, 2019. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction “[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Congress.” Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). A cause of action “is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it,” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). Under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), courts are required to remand to state court a case removed to federal court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §1447(c); see also Mitskovski v. Buffalo & Fort Erie Pub. Bridge Auth., 435 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (a party may move for remand at any time on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction). B. Rule 12(c) At any time after the pleadings close and before trial commences, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Citibank, N.A. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Int’l, PLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 407, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “The standard for addressing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 520 (2d Cir. 2006). In either case, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint under the “two-pronged approach” suggested by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir.2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, “a court may consider only the complaint, any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit, any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference, and any document upon which the complaint heavily relies.” In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, both parties submitted numerous exhibits in support of their cross-motions. The Court considers only four documents upon which the amended complaint heavily relies, and the accuracy or authenticity of which are not disputed: defendant’s May 30, 2018 termination notice (Doc. #29-4), plaintiff’s June 8, 2018, response (Doc. #29-5), plaintiff’s July 30, 2018, follow-up letter (Doc. #29-6), and plaintiff’s attorney’s September 25, 2018, letter (Doc. #29-8). The Court has not considered any other document submitted with the motions. II. Motion to Remand Defendants, who previously chose to remove this case from state court, now seek to remand the case back to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), arguing this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff’s original petition did not state a federal claim. The Court disagrees. When, as here, there is no diversity of citizenship, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 is required to proceed in federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Section 1331 confers federal question jurisdiction when a plaintiff “pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-85 (1946)). “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is ‘so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)). Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, because plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim in her original petition — namely, that defendants violated her due process rights by failing to conduct a pre-termination hearing — invokes a colorable federal controversy.2 (Doc. #1
