DECISION AND ORDER AFTER HEARING PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 22, 2016, the Petitioner Father SEAN R. (hereinafter referred to as “the Father”) filed a petition against the Respondent Mother CEILEEN T. (hereinafter referred to as “the Mother”) requesting visitation and custody of the subject child MADISON R. (DOB March 3, XXXX) (hereinafter referred to as “the subject child”). The Court dismissed the petition without prejudice as paternity had not been established. On December 15, 2016, the Father filed a second petition for custody and visitation, while a paternity case was pending in the same court. An order of filiation was entered on January 19, 2017 declaring the Petitioner the legal father of the subject child. On January 23, 2017, the Father filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus requesting the return of the subject child to New York, after the Mother relocated to Georgia with the child without the Father’s consent. The parties along with their counsel appeared on February 1, 2017 before Judge Mildred Negron. Judge Negron granted the Father’s relief and ordered the Mother to return the subject child to this court’s jurisdiction pending further court order. The matter was referred to the Referee on February 1, 2017 for further proceedings. The parties executed a Stipulation of Reference, along with their attorneys, for this Referee to hear and make determinations concerning this matter. The Father was represented by Lydia C. Agu, Esq. and the Mother was first represented initially by Fenicia Williams, Esq. then by Joseph Rotkowitz, Esq. Upon arguments by counsel, the court permitted the subject child to temporarily reside in Georgia and visit her Father in New York on weekends. That visitation schedule proved cost prohibitive and very physically draining on the child. The Mother filed a petition for custody and to relocate on April 25, 2017. Thereafter, the court issued an order requiring the child to spend alternating two-week periods with each parent in both New York and Georgia. That remained the parenting time arrangement until this order. The parties were unable to reach a resolution, fact finding commenced November 2, 2017 and continued through May 9, 2019. As the fact finding continued, the Court became aware that the recording device in the courtroom (“FTR” system) was not working properly and the testimony was inaudible when a transcript was ordered. Rather than conduct a reconstruction hearing of all of the parties’ testimony, the parties and their counsel stipulated that the Referee’s trial notes (which was provided to counsel to review) together with the audible portions of the transcripts for November 2, 2017, April 16, 2018 and April 17, 2018 were a true representation of the testimony presented at the trial. The Court issued an order reflecting that stipulation. On July 26, 2018, after the Mother’s counsel completed his direct examination, Counsel Rotkowitz objected to being barred from calling any witnesses or presenting any documentary evidence. The Court upon a review of its prior orders determined it inadvertently and mistakenly precluded witnesses and testimony based on the attorney’s failure to comply with a pre -trial order regarding discovery. After further review it was determined that a “trial ready statement” (unique to Queens Family Court) was directed to be completed, to allow the matter to be transferred to a trial part, rather than a pre-trial order the permits preclusion for non-compliance. Upon realizing this inadvertent mistake, the parties and counsel were permitted to reopen their direct cases to call further relevant witnesses and submit documentary evidence. Counsel Agu agreed to call additional witnesses, but later reconsidered. Counsel Rotkowitz objected and requested a mistrial be declared and that the Referee recuse herself so the case could be expedited in a “trial part”. The court denied that request finding neither party was aggrieved or prejudiced by the mistake and permitted extra time for counsel to prepare (eight months). The matter was thereafter adjourned. Eight months later, on March 11, 2019, counsel determined that they would rest on the record before the court and not present any additional witnesses or documentary evidence. On March 11, 2019, both parties rested, and written summations were ordered for submission on the final trial date of May 9, 2019. Decision was thereafter reserved. The court determined that it was not necessary to conduct an In-Camera Lincoln hearing of the subject child who is currently three (3) years old. Since the child was less than one years old when the matter began, the court used its discretion and did not appoint an Attorney for the child. The court can substitute judgement for this young child in determining what is in her best interest. FINDINGS OF FACT During the fact finding hearing the Father and the Mother testified. There were no other witnesses or documentary, or physical evidence submitted to the court for consideration by either party. The court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of all the witnesses, to hear their testimony, and to assess their credibility. The following findings of fact are made based on the material, credible, and relevant testimony and evidence presented during the fact-finding hearing. Testimony of the Father, SEAN R. The Father testified that he and the mother dated for 5 to 6 years and resided together as a couple for 8 months in 2016. The subject child was planned, and the parties were happy for her arrival. The subject child was born on March 2, 2016. The Father stated he attended the Mother’s pre-natal medical appointments and was responsible for paying for and planning the baby shower. He was present at the birth of his daughter and testified that he helped to pay for the Mother’s rent, gave money toward the child’s daily needs and paid for some of the child-care costs for the subject child. The Father testified that the relationship ended in August 2016 and he moved out of the home. The Mother stopped communicating with the father and his family between August 2016 and mid-October 2016 when she left and relocated the subject child to Georgia without his knowledge or permission. The Father found out the Mother was living in Georgia when she stated her address in court during a paternity and child support proceeding in November 2016. The Father stated that he was very involved with the child and spent a lot of time with her, which contradicted the Mother’s testimony. He testified that both parents worked for the United States Postal Service. When the Mother worked at night, he was home and when he worked in the day, she was home. They later both worked in the daytime. On those occasions when they both worked at the same time the maternal aunt watched the child. He stated he also helped provide care for the Mother’s other child Jayden, who called him “Dad” and who he treated like a son, though he was not biologically or legally related to him. The Father testified that the parties did speak about Georgia and the hospitals there for the Mother’s son, but that conversation occurred before the subject child was born, and there were no definite plans, only hypothetical discussions. The Father stated he lives in a one-bedroom apartment with his mother, the paternal grandmother who also provided child-care for not only the subject child but also the child’s half- sibling. The Father nor the child have their own space, but rather the Father sleeps in the living room area and the child sleeps in the paternal grandmother’s room. The child does have her own bed there. The Father stated he is actively looking for a better apartment for him and the subject child. When the court split the time each month equally between the parties, the Father stated he found the medical providers for the child in New York and takes her to any required appointments. He also enrolled the subject child in day care in New York. He stated the Mother, once she moved to Georgia did not provide him with any information about the subject child’s day care providers or medical providers. The Mother alleged the Father didn’t provide the information to her either. The Father further testified that the Mother has family in New York to help: her sister, her aunt and her father (the maternal grandfather) live in Queens. She also had the support of paternal relatives including the paternal grandmother who took care of not only the subject child but the Mother’s son Jayden as well. The court found the other arguments made by the Father to be of minimal to no probative value in determining the best interest of the child. Testimony of the Mother CEILEEN T. The Mother’s testimony contradicted the Father’s. The Mother testified that since October 8, 2016, she relocated the subject child to Georgia. Prior to that time the Mother said the parties dated approximately three-and one-half years but never lived together. The Mother testified that in August 2014 she requested a transfer to a Post Office in Georgia, because her station in Flushing was closing (it is still open today). She stated she told the Father she wanted to move because of her son’s special medical needs and constant hospitalizations. The Mother stated that she has many family members in Georgia that are a support system for her and her children: aunts, uncles, cousins, maternal grandmother and maternal step- grandfather. She admitted she had not visited Georgia during the time the parties were together as a couple and admitted that in 35 years she visited Georgia twice, and her family visited New York once per year from Georgia. She admitted she has family in New York who helped to care for her children including her sister, her aunt and her father, as well as the paternal grandmother, who not only cared for the subject child, but for the Mother’s son Jayden as well. The Mother completely denied the Father’s involvement in the subject child’s life. She stated he did not provide for anything for the child when she was born. She stated the Father refused to help her pay her rent and she was evicted from her residences because of that. The Mother also denies that the Father ever lived in her home, but instead would visit her home and lived with his mother (though she admitted he had a key and came to the home often late at night). She stated the Father only attended one medical appointment for the child. She admitted that the subject child was planned, that they were happy about the pregnancy and the arrival of the subject child, and that the Father attended her pre-natal appointments. Upon cross examination, the Mother later admitted that the Father gave money toward her rent while they were together but stopped paying when they broke up. She also admitted that the Father planned and paid for her baby shower for the subject child and did buy things for the baby. He also helped to pay her aunt for child-care for the subject child. Additionally, the Father gave the Mother his bank account information and he paid her car insurance. The Mother testified that the Father agreed with her transfer to Georgia until the baby was born, then they “hadn’t discussed or agreed upon what would happen once the baby was born”. She stated the Father voiced no opposition to her moving before or after the subject child was born. She admitted she never told the Father or paternal grandmother the exact day she planned to leave for Georgia and just left. The Mother stated the Father was a “good father” and admitted “it is important for the child to live in the same state as her Father, but she left because she needs help [with both children].” When questioned on cross examination, the mother admitted she did not research extracurricular activities in New York, did minimal research on schools in New York for her son or her daughter, and did not research housing in neighboring areas in New York, nor sought to transfer to another Post Office within New York, when she learned hers was closing (however it never closed). The Mother testified that her son Jayden’s severe medical condition is the reason she needed to leave New York. The child suffers from Sickle Cell Anemia and is often hospitalized and requires blood transfusions. She testified that within the first year of living in Georgia her son had to be admitted to the intensive care unit (“ICU”) three times — the doctors there changed his medical regime to medication as opposed to transfusions. She did admit that receiving the blood transfusions in New York kept the child out of the ICU. The Mother alleged that the Father failed to show any concern when the subject child had to have surgery on her ears alleged to have been caused by the constant airplane travel to and from New York. (No medical documentation or evidence was presented to the court to corroborate the Mother’s statements) The Mother stated the Father did not speak to the doctors nor appear at the hospital for the surgery (the Father alleged the Mother failed to provide the information to him). The Mother testified that during the trial, the Father visited Georgia on vacation but saw the subject child minimally and stayed in a hotel far away. She stated he should have gone to the child’s doctors and saw the schools there and could have stayed in her home. She did admit that she has never contacted the child’s doctors in New York, nor visited the day care where the child attends in New York, despite being in New York every two weeks for the visitation exchange. The court found the other arguments made by the Mother to be of minimal to no probative value in determining the best interest of the child. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CUSTODY “The only absolute in the law governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes… In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent.” See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d at 93 (1982). “Any court in considering questions of child custody must make every effort to determine what is for the best interest of the child, and what will best promote the child’s welfare and happiness”. See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 171 (1982); Matter of Laura A.K v. Timothy M., 204 AD2d 325 (2d Dept 1994); Matter of Supangkat v. Torres, 101 AD3d 889, 889-890 (2d Dept 2012); Matter of McDonald v. Thomas, 154 AD3d 763, 764 (2d Dept 2017). It is well established that in all child custody determinations, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration of the Court. See Alanna M. v. Duncan M, 204 AD2d 409 (2d Dept 1994); Prete v. Prete, 193AD 2d 804 (2d Dept 1993). In Eschbach, the court considered several factors in determining the best interest of the child for custody purposes. There must be an analysis of a “totality of the circumstances” or a weighing of factors. Some of these factors include (1) “the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child.” Id. at 172; (2) “the ability of each of the parents to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development.” Id. The Court of Appeals has held that other factors to be considered in determining custody are the “length of time of the existing custody arrangement; the parents past performance and relative fitness; … and the need for stability in the child’s life”. See Matter of Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 NY2d 242 (1977); Matter of Dana A. v. Martin B, 72 AD2d 1136 (3d Dept 2010). Additional factors to be considered in ascertaining the child’s best interests are: (1) the demonstrated parenting ability and relative fitness of the parties; (2) the love, affection and nurturing given by each party to the child, the emotional bond between the child and each party, and the willingness and the ability of each party to put the child’s needs ahead of his/her own; (3) the length of time the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment, the desirability of maintaining the current custodial residence, and the stability of the proposed custodial residence; (4) the ability of each party to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development; (5) the financial resources available to each party and the ability of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, housing and medical care; (6) the individual needs and expressed desires of the child and the degree to which the custodial determination would either continue or interrupt the various elements of the child’s day-to-day life; (7) the willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and optimum relationship between the child and the other parent. Eschbach at 56 NY2d 167(1982). Here, although the mother’s relocation to Georgia precipitated the commencement of these proceedings, the matter concerns an initial custody determination, and, therefore, the strict application of the factors relevant to relocation petitions (See Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 (1996) ) is not required (See Matter of Wood v. Rago, 135 AD3d 949, 950 (2d Dept 2016); Matter of Wright v. Stewart, 131 AD3d 1256, 1257 (2d Dept 2015) ; Matter of Sims v. Boykin, 130 AD3d 835, 836 (2d Dept 2015). The mother’s relocation was one factor for the hearing court to consider in determining what was in the child’s best interests (See Matter of Santano v. Cezair, 106 AD3d 1097, 1098 (2d Dept 2013); Matter of McDonald v. Thomas, 154 AD3d 763, 764 (2d Dept 2017)). LEGAL ANALYSIS OF RELOCATION Relocation cases must be looked at on a case by case basis. There is no exact rule for when relocation should be granted or denied by the Court. Instead the Courts have adopted the legal standard for relocation determinations as set forth in the New York Court of Appeals decision Matter of Tropea vs. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 (1996). In Tropea, the Court held that “each relocation request must be considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is likely to serve the best interests of the child.” Id at 739. The Tropea Court also noted that while the respective rights of the custodial and noncustodial parents are unquestionably significant factors that must be considered, it is the rights and needs of the children that must be accorded the greatest weight.” Id.; See also Matter of Alaire K.G. v. Anthony P.G, 86 AD3d at 219 (1st Dept 2011); Matter of Melissa Marie G v. John Christopher W., 73 AD3d at 658 (1st Dept 2010); McBryde v. Bodden, 91 AD3d 781 (2d Dept 2012); Retamozzo v. Retamozzo, 91 AD3d 957 (2d Dept 2012). The Tropea court mentioned several other important factors to be considered by the court in a relocation matter: “the good faith of the parents in requesting or opposing the move, the child’s respective attachments to the custodial and noncustodial parents, the possibility of devising a visitation schedule that will enable the noncustodial parent to maintain a meaningful parent-child relationship, the quality of the life-style that the child would have if the proposed move were permitted or denied; the negative impact if any from continued and exacerbated hostility between the custodial and noncustodial parents; and the effect that the move may have on any extended family relationships.” Id at 740. See Ritz v. Ritz, 36 AD3d 437 (1st Dept 2007) where the court denied the relocation of the children to Israel with their mother, holding that “there is no indication how the children would adjust to such a drastic change in their lives, or that any benefits from the contemplated move would outweigh the importance of preserving the children’s relationship with their father.” In the Matter of Alaire K.G. v. Anthony P.G., the court granted the mother permission to relocate with the child to the state of California. The Court used the Tropea factors to analyze the facts in that case. The court considered “(1) each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move; (2) the quality of the child’s relationship with each parent; (3) the impact of the move on the child’s future contact with the noncustodial parent; (4) the degree to which the move may enhance the custodial parents and the child’s life economically, emotionally, and educationally; and (5) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements.” Id. 86 AD3d at 219; Tropea v. Tropea, supra at 740-741. Courts have used an economic analysis to help determine a basis for relocation. See Miller v. Pipia, 297 AD2d at 366 (2d Dept 2002), where the child was permitted to relocate to Florida with his mother. In that case, the court held in part that “economic necessity may present a particularly persuasive ground for permitting the proposed move”. See also Aziz v. Aziz, 8 AD3d 596 (2d Dept 2004) where the court held that “if a proposed relocation will provide economic, emotional, and educational benefits for the child, the custodial parent’s request for permission to relocate should be granted.” See Bruno v. Bruno, 47 AD3d 606 (2d Dept 2008). Relocation has been denied in cases where the effect on the noncustodial parent and child relationship is severely detrimental. See Streid v. Streid, 46 AD3d 1155 (3d Dept 2007), where the court held that “a parent’s decision to reside in a distant locale is a very important factor among the constellation of factors to be considered in arriving at a best interest determination, particularly where there is evidence that it would detrimentally affect the other parent’s relationship with the children.” Id at 1156. In Streid, the Court denied the mother’s application to relocate to Georgia with the child. See also Friedman v. Rome, 46 AD3d 682 (2d Dept 2007); The Court has also held that a parent may not be deprived of his or her right to reasonable and meaningful access to the children “unless exceptional circumstances have been presented to the court. The term ‘exceptional circumstances’ or ‘exceptional reasons’ is invariably associated with a situation where either the exercise of such right is inimical to the welfare of the children or the parent has in some manner forfeited his or her right to such access”. See Strahl v. Strahl, 66 AD2d at 574 (2d Dept 1979). (Court denied the Mother’s request to relocate to Florida).Where the purported benefits of the proposed relocation do not justify the drastic reduction in visitation with the other parent, which would occur, the court has held that the proposed relocation is not in the best interests of the child. See Rubio v. Rubio, 71 AD3d 862 (2d Dept 2010); Martino v. Ramos, 64 AD3d 657 (2d Dept 2009); Feury v. Feury, 168 AD3d 729 (2d Dept 2019); Matter of Browner v. Kenward, 213 AD2d 400 (2d Dept 1995): See also Coniglio v. Coniglio, 170 AD2d 477, 478 (2d Dept 1991) (Court held that a parent will not be permitted to relocate to a “distant domicile which would effectively deprive the non-custodial parent of regular access to his or her children absent a showing of exceptional circumstances”.) In the end of each case requesting relocation, after carefully analyzing the relevant factors, it is ultimately “For the court to determine based on all the proof, whether it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence that a proposed relocation would serve the child’s best interests.” Tropea, Supra at 741. In the present matter, the most critical considerations are Petitioner’s reason for and need for the move; the impact of the move on the children’s relationship with her father; the difficulty of maintaining the central role he has played in their life; and the absence of any showing that the children’s life would be enhanced by the move. See Monroe v. Monroe, 1164 AD3d 675 (2d Dept 2018); Dante v. Dante, 170 AD3d 829 (2d Dept 2019); Matter of Lyons v. Sepe, 163AD3d 567 (2d Dept 2018). In contrast where the relocating parent has failed to show that relocation of the child is in the child’s best interest, the Court has denied such relocation. See Salichs v. James, 268 AD2d 168 (1st Dept 2000). (Court held that the Mother relocating to Puerto Rico with the child was not in the child’s best interest though the mother was the primary economic provider for the child she was unable to show that in remaining in New York she would be unable to continue to provide adequately for her child and family) The Court found that “the most critical considerations are plaintiff’s reason for and need for the move, the impact of the move on the child’s relationship with the father, the difficulty of maintaining the central role he has played in her life, and the absence of any showing that the child’s life would be enhanced by the move.” Id.; See also Mascola v. Mascola, 251 AD2d 414,415 (2d Dept 1998). The Court has denied relocation, where a parent fails to establish an overall educational, economic or emotional benefit to the child sufficient to outweigh the detrimental impact on the quality of the child’s relationship with their other parent and other extended family that would necessarily result from a move to another state. See Salena S. v. Ahmad G. 152 AD3d 162 (1st Dept 2017); Matter of Lyons v. Sepe, 163 AD3d 567 (2d Dept 2018) DECISION This case involves not only an initial determination of custody but also a request by one parent to relocate the subject child to the state of Georgia. The court had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and body language of the parties as they testified. The court found the testimony of the Father, though self-serving at times, to be credible, truthful and honest. His testimony exhibited a true love for his child and a desire to be actively involved in her life. The Mother’s testimony was also self- serving, but additionally non-credible at times. The Mother contradicted herself numerous times during her testimony. Any uncorroborated statements and opinion testimony were given no weight by the court. The Mother and Father were represented by counsel and had ample opportunity to submit evidence and additional witnesses to support their claims, however they chose not to do so. Applying the best interest principles to this case, the court finds that the parties have similar ability to financially care for the subject child and to ensure that the she has appropriate food, clothing and housing, and ensure that all her needs are being met. The parents spend an equal amount of time with the child each month (parenting time alternates every two weeks). Both parents stated that they work full-time for the United States Post Office, though no proof or evidence of their employment or income was provided to the court. According to the Mother, the housing situation at the mother’s residence seems “more comfortable” for the child as the child has her own space and a big yard to play in Georgia. The Father lives in a one-bedroom apartment with the paternal grandmother and the child does not have her own space but rather shares a bedroom with her grandmother and the Father sleeps in the living room area. Based on the testimony of the parents, the subject child does have her own separate bed in each home. The home situation, though considered, was not the deciding factor in the court’s decision. Additionally, other than the testimony of the parties there was no additional evidence submitted to the court in furtherance of the Mother’s contention or to corroborate her statement that her home was “better” for the child. Based on the orders of this court, absent the first year of the child’s life (parent’s testimony contradicts each other), the subject child has primarily resided with both parents. From the subject child’s birth in March 2016 to October 2016 when the Mother relocated the child to Georgia, the court is unable to determine who the child primarily resided with as the parents testimony grossly contradicts each other. The Father testified he lived with the Mother during her pregnancy and after the subject child was born and the Mother denies that statement. What the parents do agree is that there were maternal and paternal family members who actively assisted with the care of the subject child and her half-brother who has special medical needs, when the subject child resided in Queens. There was no testimony from either party that the court found in any way credible, that this child was mistreated by either parent in any way. In fact, the Mother testified that the Father was a “good father”. Though the parent’s relationship with each other may have been tumultuous at times, it is undisputed that these parents truly love their child and that the Father has even loved(loves) the Mother’s son who called the Petitioner Father “Dad”, and often spent quality time with him, which the Mother did corroborate with her testimony. Based on the testimony before the court, I find that there is nothing in this record to warrant the substantial interference with the Father’s rights to have meaningful access to his child. Though the Mother has some personal reasons to relocate, like a genuine desire to make a better life for herself and her children (especially her son who has special medical needs) with the help of her family (that she had not regularly visited in 35 years or more), as well as her inadmissible opinion that Georgia provided a “better” life for her children than New York. However, there was no evidence submitted to support that assertion. These reasons do not outweigh the Father’s right to have regular meaningful access to his child. Though the court understands the Mother’s desire to leave Queens, New York and better herself financially, there was no evidence or testimony of efforts she made to secure similar employment in New York or evidence to show a promotion or an increased salary in Georgia. There was also no evidence of efforts made to find suitable and appropriate housing within New York or even nearby to New York. The Mother testified that her income was insufficient to regularly transport the child for regular visitation with her Father between Georgia and New York and repeatedly requested the court remove the requirement for her to pay to transport the subject child for parenting time every two weeks. Being financially unable to transport the child regularly would thereby severely deprive the Father of his rights to meaningful access. An argument can be made that by ordering the subject child to remain in New York the Mother is being deprived of her rights to meaningful access to her child. In response, the Mother has voluntarily chosen to relocate several states away from New York requiring an air fare or an extended drive, train ride or bus ride to Georgia. Based on the distance, the most feasible form of transportation between states would be by airplane. Based on their testimony, neither parent’s income is such that they would be able to solely pay for multiple trips monthly for this young child to travel between states by airplane. Additionally, she must be accompanied by an adult adding an additional airfare. By the Mother’s actions, she has created an undue financial burden and hardship on herself to transport the child for visitation. In weighing these factors, the court does not find that the Mother has met her burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that her move to Georgia is in the child’s best interest. Based upon the totality of the circumstances and upon consideration of all the relevant factors, the Court finds that it would be in the best interest of the subject child for her to return to the State of New York, Queens County and grant an order of physical custody to the Father and joint legal custody to the Mother and Father, with final decision making to the Mother regarding the medical decisions of the child and final decision-making authority for the Father as to educational decisions. Should the Mother return to reside in New York with the subject child, and reside no more than 10 miles from the Father’s current residence, so that the subject child can live with her half-sibling, the Mother shall have joint physical and joint legal custody of the subject child with the spheres of influence over final decision making remaining the same. The Father may have been waiting for the outcome of the case to find new housing for he and the child, so it is hereby ordered that the Father find a new housing arrangement for he and the child forthwith. The court grants the Father four months from the date of this order to move into a new residence. Failure to comply shall constitute a change of circumstances warranting reconsideration of a possible change of physical custody and possible consent to relocation. Should the Mother return to reside in New York with the child, the parties shall determine a school together for the subject child to attend, when she becomes mandatory school age (Kindergarten), with the Father having final decision-making authority if the parties after full consultation are unable to reach a decision together. This shall also apply for enrollment in Pre-Kindergarten. Additionally, should the Mother remain in Georgia, she shall have an order of parenting time in the State of Georgia and liberally arranged in the State of New York, which shall include school breaks and most of the summer except for one week after school ends (June/July) and the two weeks in the month of August prior to the start of school. The cost to transport the child roundtrip during each of the school breaks and summer vacation shall be born solely by the Mother including any unaccompanied minor fees to travel. The parties shall alternate the Christmas holiday break with even years to the Mother and odd years to the Father. The Court does not make this decision lightly. The court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and body language of the parties as they testified. I found the Mother’s testimony to be dishonest and self-serving. She contradicted herself consistently, causing the court confusion and disbelief in her testimony. Though her intentions to relocate may have been positive, the way that she did it was deceitful and unacceptable and cannot be rewarded by the court. The Father’s testimony was truthful, and he remained consistent in his testimony when challenged. The Mother however, failed to produce sufficient evidence and witnesses to meet her burden of proof to permit relocation even though it will severely sever the relationship between the Father and the child, particularly once the child becomes school age. The current parenting time schedule is no longer feasible or practical. The Mother’s petition under docket V-XXXXX/XX is dismissed with prejudice. The Mother failed to meet her burden of proof in demonstrating that the relocation of the subject child to Georgia is in the child’s best interest. All other petitions under supplemental petitions A and B are dismissed with prejudice and deemed moot. The following shall be the Order of the Court: It is HEREBY ORDERED THAT: The subject child shall be returned to the state of New York on or before August 18, 2019 at 6:00pm to reside with her Father. (Unless the Mother relocates back to New York by that time) The parents shall share joint legal custody of the subject child. Any changes in the child’s schools or medical providers must be discussed between the parents. If after full discussion the parents are unable to reach a decision together, the Mother shall have final decision-making authority regarding matters concerning the medical needs of the child and the Father shall have final decision-making authority concerning the educational needs of the child. The Father shall have physical custody of the subject child in the State of New York. The Father shall secure new housing accommodations for he and the child within four months from the date of this decision and order. (under no circumstance later than November 23, 2019) the Father shall not move more than 10 miles from his current residence absent the express written consent of the Mother or by court order. The following parenting time schedule with the subject child shall be in effect should the Mother remain in Georgia: The Mother shall have up to FIVE (5) consecutive weeks of vacation time in the summer months with the subject child. The Father shall always have the first week after school ends and the last two weeks in August before school starts in September. The Mother shall have the following school breaks with the child: mid-winter recess (February) and Spring break. The mother shall have any additional time in New York with the child upon two weeks written notice by text messaging or email to the Father. Father shall not unreasonably prevent that visitation. For the Christmas holiday break, the mother shall have the entire break including Christmas Eve and New Year’s Day in EVEN years. The Father shall have that holiday break in ODD years. In ODD years the mother shall have Thanksgiving from the Wednesday before Thanksgiving after school until the Sunday evening after Thanksgiving. In EVEN years the Father follows that parenting time schedule for Thanksgiving. When the subject child is with the Father (or other paternal relative), the Mother shall have daily “web-based video conferencing” (SKYPE or FACETIME) with the subject child. When the child is with the Mother (or other maternal relative), Father shall have daily video conferencing access to the child. Parties to arrange the best time for that contact between themselves. The Mother shall solely incur all expenses associated with transporting the child back and forth from Georgia to New York for visitation during the Mid-Winter (February), holiday break, Spring break and summer vacation. Should the Mother return to live in New York (not more than 10 miles from the Father’s current residence unless the Father consents in writing to the move or by court order) the parties shall have joint physical custody alternating weeks with the parents exchanging the subject child Sundays at 6:00pm. The Father shall not move more than 10 miles from his current residence (with the paternal grandmother) either absent a court order. The holiday schedule supersedes the week to week schedule. The parties will also alternate any federal holidays when the school is closed for the subject child, with the first holiday Labor Day going to the Mother. In the summer the parents shall alternate every two weeks with each parent exchanging the child on Sunday at 6:00pm, with the first two weeks going to the Father in EVEN years and to the Mother is ODD years The Parties may modify this order upon mutual electronic consent (via text messaging or email) SO ORDERED Dated: Jamaica, New York July 23, 2019 PURSUANT TO SECTION 11130F THE FAMILY COURT ACT, AN APPEAL FROM THIS ORDER MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER BY APPELLANT IN COURT, 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING OF THE ORDER TO APPELLANT BY THE CLERK OF COURT, OR 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE BY A PARTYOR THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD UPON THE APPELLANT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIEST. Check applicable box: Order mailed on [specify date(s) and to whom mailed] ____ Order received in court on [specify date(s) and to whom given]:____
