OPINION AND ORDER This a motion for a new trial by defendant Marko Stasiv following his conviction at trial of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, substantive wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. No challenge is made to the sufficiency of the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the evidentiary rulings, or the jury instructions. The motion is premised upon a juror’s post-trial statements to members of the defense team that she “caved” to intimidation by other jurors. In the course of recounting the events surrounding the deliberations, the juror disclosed that jurors found a receipt issued to Stasiv inside a backpack that had been received into evidence. The receipt related to a deposit made into a commissary account at Rikers Island in 2014 (the “commissary receipt”). The trial evidence convincingly demonstrated that Stasiv participated in a scheme to defraud banks and check cashing stores. The scheme participants created a seemingly legitimate (but in reality a sham) business in a designated location, posed as employees of the business, created bank accounts associated with the business, and cashed payroll checks at cash checking stores in ever-increasing amounts over the span of many weeks to build credibility with the stores. These checks would be drawn on the bank accounts associated with the sham employers and would always clear until the final week of the scheme (the “bomb week”). During the bomb week, scheme participants would present larger checks at the check cashing stores, which the stores would cash and which would then bounce when deposited through the banking clearing system. The participants would split the profits, move on to the next designated location, and repeat the scheme with new victims. While executing the scheme, participants would stay in hotel rooms obtained by using the hotel rewards points of unsuspecting rewards program members without authorization. Stasiv was one of two team leaders who organized and directed other members of his team in the process of opening bank accounts and cashing checks at check cashing stores. Until about one month before trial, Stasiv was represented by CJA counsel and, with the permission of the Court, a second associate counsel. The month before trial, Stasiv expressed a desire and intent to represent himself. After conducting a hearing consistent with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Court concluded that his decision to forgo counsel and to represent himself was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. His CJA counsel and associate counsel were continued as standby counsel and were present throughout the trial. The trial began on May 6, 2019 and after five days of testimony, summations, and charge, the jury retired to deliberate. The next day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. When the jury returned its verdict, the Court polled the jurors and each juror individually confirmed that the verdict read aloud was his or her verdict. JUROR 10 EXPRESSES REGRET After the jury was discharged, Stasiv’s two standby attorneys exited the courtroom and encountered Juror 10 in the hallway. (Stabile Decl. 6). The juror appeared distraught and “indicated that she regretted her verdict and had ‘caved’ during deliberations after she fought the other eleven jurors all day.” (Id. 7). The associate counsel gave Juror 10 her business card. (Id. 8). On May 17, two days after the verdict was returned, associate counsel received an email from Juror 10 that read in part: I feel that I have made a terrible mistake in caving to juror and court pressure, despite my doubts pertaining to the prosecution, the way the jury approached deliberation, the disconnect between the judge’s instructions and the verdict sheet, and in not knowing fully my rights, without repercussion (?) to vote Not Guilty as a juror regardless of the court instructions provided. (Id., Ex. A). The next day, Juror 10 met with both lead and associate counsel at lead counsel’s office. (Id.
