Papers Submitted: Defendant’s Order to Show Cause dated March 12, 2019, Affirmation in Support X Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross Motion dated March 25, 2019 Affirmation in Support and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion X Defendant’s Affirmation in Reply and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross Motion X Plaintiff’s Reply Affirmation in Further Support of Cross Motion X Decision & Order Defendant/Husband moved by Order to Show Cause dated March 12, 2019, for an Order granting the following relief: 1. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant; 2. Amending the May 4, 2018 Court Order (Lorintz, J.S.C.) so as to: a. vacate the finding therein that Plaintiff and Defendant are married; b. deny an award of pendente lite temporary maintenance in the amount of $532.22 per month payable retroactively starting from February 26, 2018; and c. deny the $10,000.00 counsel fees award. 3. Amending the December 6, 2017 Court order (Lorintz, J.S.C.) so as to: a. Decrease the awarded child support to $100.00 per month; b. Vacate the order that Defendant pay the costs of the marital home; and c. Vacate the order prohibiting the sale of the marital home. 4. Payment by Plaintiff to Defendant of not less than $10,000.00 for his litigation costs; 5. Payment by Plaintiff to Defendant of $2,000.00 representing the amount which she illegally withdrew from his account. 6. Payment of rent by Plaintiff to Defendant for her occupying his house (starting from the date this action ends but with the costs of utilities covered by Defendant). Plaintiff/Wife moves, by Notice of Cross Motion dated April 10, 2019 for an order granting the following relief: 1. Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §245, Judiciary Law §756 and FCA §454[3][a] holding Defendant in contempt of Court for his willful refusal to comply with the pendente lite order dated December 6, 2017, and to pay Plaintiff child support in the amount of $1,600.00 per month by the first of each month, and appropriately punishing the Defendant therefore, including but not limited to fine and imprisonment; 2. Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §245, Judiciary Law §756 and FCA §454[3][a] holding Defendant in contempt of Court for his willful refusal to comply with the pendente lite order dated May 4, 2018, and to pay Plaintiff spousal support in the amount of $785.22 per month and appropriately punishing Defendant therefor, including but not limited to fine and imprisonment; 3. Issuing a money judgment against Defendant for the moneys owed pursuant to said Court orders, in the amount of $12,622.64 plus interest; 4. Directing that all payments of pendente lite child support, in the sum of 1,600 per month pursuant to this Court’s December 6, 2017 Order, and pendente lite maintenance in the sum of $785.22 per month pursuant to this Court’s May 4, 2018 Order be paid through the Support Collections Unit; 5. Awarding Plaintiff legal fees in the amount of $3,604.00 which amount represents the costs incurred by Plaintiff for the preparation of the instant opposition to Defendant’s request for relief and the instant cross motion; and 6. Granting Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. BACKGROUND The parties were married on April 13, 2012 in Ukraine and they have one (1) child born later that same year. In May 2014, the parties came to the United States, initially living together with a friend before renting an apartment. Defendant purchased a house located in Nassau County, New York in October 2014, and the parties moved into the home in December 2014. Shortly after Plaintiff made allegations of domestic abuse against Defendant, the instant action for divorce was commenced by the filing of a Summons with Notice on August 18, 2015. Defendant thereafter moved out of the Valley Stream residence. An Order of Protection was issued on December 9, 2015, which included a requirement that Defendant stay away from the Valley Stream residence except for parenting time in accordance with a So-Ordered Stipulation. In February 2016, Defendant moved to dismiss the instant action, alleging that there was already an existing Judgment of Divorce from Ukraine dated October 28, 2013. Plaintiff argued that she had no knowledge of the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce, that Defendant fraudulently copied her signature onto the Ukrainian divorce documents, and that the parties lived as a married couple in the United States subsequent to the alleged Judgment of Divorce. On June 20, 2016, by Decision and Order this Court (Gianelli, J.S.C.) found the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce to be valid and granted Defendant’s motion “only as to the cause of action for a divorce,” ruling that “the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s Summons with Notice for child custody, child support, maintenance and equitable distribution of marital property held outside of Ukraine, if any, shall continue.” The Court further ordered Plaintiff to file a verified complaint and scheduled a preliminary conference. On or about July 18, 2016, Plaintiff served and filed with the Court a verified complaint alleging that the actions of Defendant created a constructive trust as to the property purchased after the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce, including the Valley Stream residence and a joint bank account maintained at Citibank. Defendant subsequently filed a petition in the Landlord/Tenant Part of the Nassau County District Court to evict Plaintiff from the Valley Stream residence. The Plaintiff moved to dismiss the petition. By Order dated November 16, 2016 (Darcy, J.), the Court dismissed the petition, finding that “there is no landlord-tenant relationship between petitioner-husband and respondent-wife, who are going through a divorce wherein ownership of the subject residence has not yet been determined.” The Court further ruled that the Supreme Court is the court with subject matter jurisdiction to determine what property is marital and what property is separate. Thereafter, Defendant moved for an order dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In a Decision and Order dated June 8, 2017 (Lorintz, J.S.C.), the Court ruled, in part, that Plaintiff’s complaint contained a cognizable legal theory that the Defendant’s actions created a constructive trust, with respect to the house. The June 8, 2017 Decision and Order also granted the branch of Plaintiff’s cross-motion seeking an order granting her exclusive use and occupancy of the house during the pendency of this action. On or about October 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed an appeal of the parties’ Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce. On or about December 12, 2017, the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal annulled the parties’ Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved (mot. seq. 012) for an order, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR §2221[e], granting Plaintiff renewal of the portion of the June 20, 2016 order (Gianelli, J.S.C.), which recognized the validity of the parties’ foreign divorce, and upon granting renewal, vacating that portion of the June 20, 2016 order which recognized the validity of the parties’ foreign divorce. The Court determined that Plaintiff’s motion was more properly a motion to relieve Plaintiff from the June 20, 2016 order pursuant to CPLR §5015[a][5], and accordingly treated it as same. By order dated May 4, 2018 (Lorintz, J.S.C.), the Court granted the branch of the Plaintiff’s application seeking to relieve the Plaintiff from the portion of the Court’s June 20, 2016 order finding the Ukrainian Judgment to be valid, and vacated so much of that previous order, and found that the parties were still legally married. In its May 4, 2018 order, the Court also vacated Plaintiff’s complaint which had been served and filed on or about July 18, 2016 in compliance with the June 20, 2016 order, and directed Plaintiff to file and serve an amended verified complaint for divorce, and directed Defendant to file an answer and any counterclaims. Defendant’s counsel, in his affirmations, states that an amended verified complaint was filed on or about May 17, 2018, and that an answer to the amended verified complaint was filed on or about May 30, 2018.to be invalid. Accordinglyto be invalid. Accordingly On or about January 8, 2018, Defendant filed an appeal of the December 12, 2017 Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal decision. On or about June 20, 2018, a Cassation Civil Court Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine reversed the Court of Appeal Decision, and reinstated the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce dated October 28, 2013. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaint with the Supreme Council of Justice of Ukraine, claiming that five Ukrainian Supreme Court justices violated rules of ethics in rendering their decision. On or about November 7, 2018, the grievance complaint was dismissed, with a finding that the essence of the complaint was “disagreement with the court decision only”. Defendant’s Motion Defendant seeks to vacate and/or modify the pendente lite orders of this Court, and summary judgment on various claims. Defendant’s counsel argues, in essence, that based on the “valid final order” of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, dated June 20, 2018, upholding the Ukrainian divorce decree between the parties dated October 28, 2013, the parties are divorced as of that date. Defendant contends that the previous pendente lite orders issued by this Court, regarding temporary maintenance, child support, interim counsel fees and exclusive use and occupancy of the Valley Stream home, were all based upon the premise that the parties were not yet divorced. Accordingly, Defendant argues that “the [pendente lite] awards granted shall be vacated and/or modified.” Defendant states (through counsel) that he does not object to much of the “relief requested by Plaintiff”, listing several items of such relief. With regard to equitable distribution, Defendant’s counsel asserts that there is no joint marital property to be distributed. Defendant also contends that there is “no evidence and/or theory” that Plaintiff possesses any interest in the “marital residence”, since it was purchased by Defendant on October 29, 2014, after the Ukrainian divorce. In support of his motion, Defendant submits only his counsel’s affirmation, together with copies of various documents, including prior orders issued by this Court, as well as orders issued by the courts in Ukraine, together with translations thereof. Counsel further argues that there is no basis for interim counsel fees because the parties were already divorced. He further contends that “it is clear that Defendant’s income is less that Plaintiff’s income” and provides a 2018 federal tax return. According to the tax return, Defendant had gross income of $2,900.00. Defendant asks the Court to vacate the award of counsel fees to Plaintiff and to instead award him interim counsel fees in the amount of at least $10,000.00. Similarly, Defendant argues that he does not make enough money to cover pendente lite child support ordered by the Court, and has had to borrow funds to make payments. He asks that a permanent order of child support be issued based on his real income. Defendant states that he lost his business and real property in Donetsk, Ukraine after Russian troops occupied the region. He now works “mostly as a per diem attorney in Ukraine for minimum payments”. Defendant further states that the Valley Stream house was purchased with borrowed money, and attached a promissory note made to a private lender, dated September 10, 2014, in the amount of $570,000.00, with a maturity date of October 1, 2016. Defendant claims that he is in default on the note, and that he is in desperate need to sell the Valley Stream house to pay it off. Defendant, through counsel, asserts that the fair market value rent for the Valley Stream house is $4,500.00 per month, and that Plaintiff has been unjustly enriched in the amount of $198,000.00 (44 months at the rate of $4,500.00 per month). He also states that Defendant paid for utilities and house maintenance in the total amount of $2,330.78 and asks the Court to award Defendant a payment in the amount of $200,330.78 (for lost rent, and cost of maintenance and utilities). In addition, counsel avers that on July 19, 2015 Plaintiff used Defendant’s debit card to withdraw $2,000.00, without authorization or permission. This was reported to the police as a theft. Defendant asks the Court for judgment awarding him $2,000.00. Plaintiff’s Cross Motion and Opposition In support of Plaintiff’s cross motion, and in opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff submits only her counsel’s affirmation. In opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff argues that the Ukrainian judgment of divorce is not subject to recognition under the doctrine of comity, because the proceedings in Ukraine lacked due process. She asserts that the Cassation Appeal Judgment of the Supreme Court of Ukraine which reversed the Court of Appeal Decision (the “Cassation Appeal Judgment”), thereby declaring the Ukrainian divorce valid, was based on appeal proceedings by Defendant “without notification of parties involved” (quoting from a translation of the Cassation Appeal Judgment”). Therefore, she argues, Plaintiff had no notice of Defendant’s appeal and had no opportunity to appear or to be heard, resulting in a gross violation of her due process rights. Plaintiff further argues that the Cassation Appeal Judgment is “utterly arbitrary” further undermining integral due process considerations. She asserts that the Cassation Panel acted beyond the bounds of its scope of review on a cassation appeal. According to counsel, the Cassation Appeal Judgment on its face declares that the grounds for a cassation appeal are only a violation or misinterpretation of substantive or procedural law, and that the panel will not “re-examine any factual findings”. Counsel argues that the findings by the Cassation Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in the Cassation Appeal Judgment “are highly questionable and in contravention not only to our principles of due process, but to Ukrainian legal principles as well.” Counsel further asserts that “it is very likely that Defendant, a well-established and well-connected lawyer in Ukraine, fraudulently procured the Cassation Judgment by utilizing his connections, rather than on the merits.” Plaintiff alleges that the Ukrainian grievance body’s dismissal of her grievance complaint “further highlights the arbitrariness of the judicial process of the higher court in Ukraine.” Plaintiff therefore requests this Court deny all relief requested by Defendant premised on the validity of the Ukranian Supreme Court’s decision and the parties’ October 2013 Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce. Plaintiff further asserts that, in the event this Court were to recognize the validity of the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce, there would still be issues to be resolved, specifically the ancillary financial issues not addressed in the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce — determination and distribution of marital assets, exclusive use and occupancy, and determination of final awards of maintenance and child support. Plaintiff also contends that, in the event this Court were to recognize the validity of the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce, then Plaintiff would be entitled to amend her complaint once again to seek distribution of the Valley Stream home on a constructive trust theory. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s request to modify or vacate the prior orders granting Plaintiff pendente lite relief should be denied on the merits, and also on the ground that the request is procedurally defective. She also asserts that Defendant’s request for counsel fees is unsupported factually, and is procedurally defective because no copies of a retainer agreement or sufficient billing documentation has been provided. In her cross motion, Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, an order holding Defendant in contempt for failure to pay temporary child support and maintenance as directed by the Court’s prior orders, granting her a judgment for those arrears, and an award of counsel fees. Plaintiff asserts, through counsel, that Defendant has never paid any temporary maintenance as directed by the Court’s May 4, 2018 order (Lorintz, J.S.C.), and that he is in arrears in the amount of $9,422.64. In regard to temporary child support, Plaintiff asserts, through counsel, that Defendant in arrears in the amount of $3,200.00. Plaintiff also seeks interim counsel fees, in connection with defending against Defendant’s “meritless and confusing motion” and preparing Plaintiff’s cross motion. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant had filed an almost identical motion in August, 2018, but withdrew same a month later. Plaintiff’s counsel claims that she had to work on reviewing and preparing opposition to the same motion and preparing the cross motion twice, incurring legal fees in the amount of $3,604.00. Defendant’s Reply and Opposition to Cross Motion In reply, Defendant’s counsel repeats his arguments. He further certifies that he holds a bachelor’s degree in Ukrainian Law. He asserts that Plaintiff’s due process argument is based on a misinterpretation and/or misunderstanding of Ukrainian procedural law. Counsel asserts that the statement in the Cassation Appeal Judgment that proceedings were “without notification of parties involved” is equivalent to an appellate court in this state hearing a matter without oral arguments. He asserts that the complete sentence in the Cassation Appeal Judgment states that the Court “has heard the matter under simplified hearing procedure waiving notification of parties involved.” Counsel further states that in Ukraine, service of papers is made by the Court and that in this case, the Court served Plaintiff’s attorney of record in Ukraine, with due notice of the appeal, and that Plaintiff had the opportunity to present an “answer” to the appeal. Defendant provides copies of the notice of appearance of Mariia Hyria, Esq., on behalf of Plaintiff, filed with the Donetsk Regional Appellate Court, the cover letter for service of process mailed by the Supreme Court of Ukraine on February 1, 2018 to Plaintiff and to her attorney of record regarding the Cassation Appeal, as well as other related documents, together with translations thereof. Defendant contends that the documents demonstrate that Plaintiff was duly notified about the appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court of Ukraine and was provided with an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of lack of notice or due process are without merit. Defendant further argues that the Cassation Appeal Judgment was “well-grounded and made in full accordance with applicable law and procedures”, that there is no reason for this Court to not give it full faith and credit. Defendant’s counsel states that the allegations by Plaintiff’s counsel that Defendant probably fraudulently procured the Cassation Appeal Judgment through connections are scandalous and unsupported by any evidence. Defendant’s counsel submits that the accusation constitutes a violation of professional ethics, and asks the Court to impose sanctions on Plaintiff’s counsel. In regard to Plaintiff’s cross motion for contempt, Defendant argues that, based on the validity of the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce, the existing pendente lite orders in this case should be vacated or at least modified. He asserts that in light of the validity of the Ukrainian divorce, the award of legal fees and temporary maintenance are unjust. He further asserts that Defendat’ non-compliance with the pendente lite orders is not willful, because he is simply unable to make the payments because of insufficient income. Plaintiff’s Reply in Further Support of Cross Motion Plaintiff, through counsel, repeats the arguments made in the cross motion papers. Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s counsel’s description of the procedures before the Cassation Civil Court Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine. Specifically, Plaintiff does not deny that her attorney of record was served with notice of the appeal and had an opportunity to submit an answer to the appeal. Discussion Initially, the Court notes that Defendant has failed to provide copies of any of the pleadings, as required by CPLR §3212[b]. This alone is normally sufficient reason to deny a motion for summary judgment. However, Plaintiff failed to raise the issue, and the Court cannot do so sua sponte. (Mew Equity, LLC v. Sutton Land Services, LLC, 144 AD3d 874 [2d Dept 2016]). Nor did Plaintiff provide copies of the pleadings, which, in the context of these motions and the posture of the case, are especially relevant. The Court further notes that this Court has before it only counsel affirmations, both in support of and in opposition to the respective motions. Missing are any affidavits from the parties. Additionally, while Defendant’s motion is one for summary judgment, his motion, to a large extent, is more properly a motion pursuant to CPLR §5015[a][5] to relieve Defendant from the prior orders of this Court which relied on the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeals December 12, 2017 decision finding the Ukrainian divorce to be invalid. Accordingly, the Court will treat it as same.2 The Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce Under the doctrine of comity, this Court will recognize the validity of a foreign divorce judgment absent a showing the foreign judgment was fraudulently obtained or that recognition would do violence to a strong public policy of this State. (Badawy v. Alesawy, 135 AD3d 792, 793 [2d Dept 2016]; Robinson v. Robinson, 120 AD2d 415, 415-416 [1st Dept 1986]). “It is well settled that (a)lthough not required to do so, the courts of this State generally will accord recognition to the judgments rendered in a foreign country under the doctrine of comity which is the equivalent of full faith and credit given by courts to judgments of our sister States. (Greschler v. Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 376 [1980]). However, a court of this State may still exercise jurisdiction to determine financial issues ancillary to said foreign divorce pursuant to the laws of this State. (T.T. v. K.A., 20 Misc 3d 1104(A) at 4 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2008](citations omitted)). A court may, in its discretion, refuse to recognize a foreign country divorce judgment: “only as a rare exception…. Some evidentiary basis to support the proposition that the particular divorce decree of the foreign country was the product of individualized fraud or coercion or oppression or rested on proximately related public policies fundamentally offensive and inimical to those of this State must be demonstrated.”(Gotlib v. Ratsusky, 83 NY2d 696 at 699-700 [1994], quoting Greschler, 51 NY2d at 376-377; see also In re Caputo, 266 AD2d 538, 539 [2 Dept 1999]; Vartsaba v. Vartsaba, 20 Misc 3d 1145(A) at 5 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2008]). The Court notes that Plaintiff has not provided any evidentiary support for her claim that there was any fraud or corruption in connection with the Court proceeding in Ukraine. Plaintiff’s conclusory denial of knowledge of the proceedings and unsubstantiated suspicions of forgery as to the original divorce papers are insufficient to convince the Court that the foreign judgment of divorce was obtained fraudulently or without her knowledge and consent. (See Vartsaba, 20 Misc 3d 1145(A) at 7). This Court finds no basis to refuse to recognize the validity of the parties’ Ukrainian divorce. Accordingly, to the extent that Defendant’s application seeks to relieve Defendant from the portion of the May 4, 2018 Decision and Order finding the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce to be invalid, the same is GRANTED; and it is hereby ORDERED, that the parties are divorced as of the date of the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce dated October 28, 2013, and the parties are not currently legally married; and it is further ORDERED, that the amended verified complaint served and filed by Plaintiff in compliance with the May 4, 2018 Decision and Order of this Court is hereby vacated; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiff file and serve a second amended verified complaint within twenty five (25) days of the date of this Decision and Order, the Defendant is to file and serve an answer and any counterclaims pursuant to the CPLR, and thereafter Plaintiff shall serve and file a reply pursuant to the CPLR. However, issues that were not addressed in the Ukraine divorce may be addressed by the Court in this action. Domestic Relations Law §236B[2] and [5] state that the provisions of this part shall be applicable to proceedings to obtain maintenance or a distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, commenced on and after the effective date of this part. (See, Elson v. Elson, 149 AD2d 141 [2d Dept. 1989]; Lavi v. Lavi, 103 AD2d 400 [2d Dept. 1984]). Thus, the Plaintiff’s claims for child custody, child support, maintenance, and equitable distribution of marital property held outside of Ukraine, if any, shall continue. The Prior Pendente Lite Orders-Downward Modification of Child Support 22 NYRR 202.16 provides, in relevant part: (k) Motions for alimony, maintenance, counsel fees pendente lite and child support (other than under section 237[c] or 238 of the Domestic Relations Law). Unless, on application made to the court, the requirements of this subdivision be waived for good cause shown, or unless otherwise expressly provided by any provision of the CPLR or other statute, the following requirements shall govern motions for alimony, maintenance, counsel fees (other than a motion made pursuant to section 237[c] or 238 of the Domestic Relations Law for counsel fees for services rendered by an attorney to secure the enforcement of a previously granted order or decree) or child support or any modification of an award thereof: …. (2) No motion shall be heard unless the moving papers include a statement of net worth in the official form prescribed by subdivision (b) of this section. In support of his motion for an order granting a downward modification of his child support obligation, Defendant did not provide a statement of net worth. Indeed, no affidavit from Defendant or other admissible evidentiary proof was submitted. The affirmations of Defendant’s counsel are insufficient. (See 22 NYRR 202.16-b, which provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny attorney affirmation in support or opposition or memorandum of law shall contain only discussion and argument on issues of law except for facts known only to the attorney.”) Accordingly, Defendant’s request for an order granting a downward modification of his child support obligation is hereby DENIED, without prejudice. Defendant’s Requests for Summary Judgment As to Claims of Unjust Enrichment and Theft of Funds CPLR §3212[b] states that a motion for summary judgment “shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions.” If an attorney lacks personal knowledge of the events giving rise to the cause of action or defense, his ancillary affidavit repeating the allegations or the pleadings, without setting forth evidentiary facts, cannot support or defeat a motion by summary judgment. (Olan v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 105 AD2d 653 [1st Dept. 1984]; aff’d 64 NY2d 1092 [1985]; Spearmon v. Times Square Stores Corp., 96 AD2d 552 [2d Dept. 1983]; Weinstein-Korn-Miller, New York Civil Practice Sec. 3212.09; See also 22 NYRR 202.16-b, which provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny attorney affirmation in support or opposition or memorandum of law shall contain only discussion and argument on issues of law except for facts known only to the attorney.”) In support of Defendant’s application for summary judgment awarding him $198,000.00 toward rent payments and $2,330.78 for reimbursement of the costs of utilities and house maintenance pertaining to the Valley Stream home, and $2,000.00 for funds allegedly stolen from a bank account by Plaintiff, Defendant submits only the affirmation of his attorney. There is no indication that counsel has personal knowledge of any of the facts asserted. Moreover, Defendant submits no proof as to the claimed fair market value rent or proof of payment of utilities or maintenance expenses. In any event, there remain questions of fact as to whether Plaintiff has any rights or interest in the house and bank account under a theory of constructive trust. Accordingly, Defendant’s application for summary judgment is denied. The Parties’ Respective Application for Counsel Fees As with applications for pendente lite maintenance and child support, 22 NYRR 202.16(k)(2), applications for interim counsel fees must be accompanied by a statement of net worth. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has provided a statement of net worth. Nor does either party provide an affidavit setting forth any financial information, or any other facts whatsoever. Accordingly, the parties’ respective applications for interim counsel fees are hereby DENIED, without prejudice. Prior Award of Counsel Fees to Plaintiff Defendant argues that the prior award of interim counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §237[a] should be vacated, since the Ukrainian Judgment of Divorce has been upheld, and, accordingly, the parties were already divorced when this action was commenced. However, as Defendant’s counsel himself points out, Domestic Relations Law §237[a] expressly provides that a Court may award counsel fees in various types of matrimonial actions, including one “to obtain maintenance or distribution of property following a foreign judgment of divorce”. (Domestic Relations Law §237[a]). Defendant’s other argument is that he is, in any event, the less monied spouse. However, as discussed above, Defendant provides no statement of net worth or other affidavit as to his financial circumstances. Accordingly, Defendant’s application to vacate the prior award of counsel fees to Plaintiff is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Contempt In regard to Plaintiff’s request to hold Defendant in contempt for failure to pay temporary child support and maintenance, the Court finds that same is procedurally defective. The notice of cross motion lacks the required notice, on the face of the application, that the purpose of the hearing is to punish the accused for a contempt of court, and that such punishment may consist of fine or imprisonment, or both, according to law together with the legend: “Warning: Your Failure to Appear in Court May Result in Your Immediate Arrest and Imprisonment for Contempt of Court” printed or type written in a size equal to at least eight point bold type. (Nelson v. Nationwide Measuring Serv., Inc., 59 AD2d 717, 718 [2d Dept 1977]). Moreover, the application is not supported by an affidavit by Plaintiff, but only by counsel’s affirmation. Accordingly, the application to hold Defendant in contempt is DENIED, without prejudice. The parties and counsel are directed to appear for a conference on September 23, 2019 at 10:30 am. All other requested relief, not specifically addressed herein, is hereby DENIED. This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court. Dated: August 5, 2019 Mineola, NY
