The following papers were read and considered in deciding the People’s motion in limine: PAPERS NUMBERED NOTICE OF MOTION 1 AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT 2 EXHIBITS (1-4) 3-6 AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION 7 REPLY AFFIRMATION 8 Defendant stands accused by the Grand Jury of the County of Dutchess of one count of Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree, a Class D Felony, in violation of §145.10 of the Penal Law; two counts of Criminal Contempt in the First Degree, a Class E Felony, in violation of §215.51 (d) of the Penal Law; one count of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of §215.50(3) of the Penal Law; and one count of Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of §140.10 (a) of the Penal Law. By notice of motion dated July 12, 2019, the People seek the following in limine rulings: (1) that Defendant be collaterally estopped from presenting evidence and argument on the issue of whether Defendant has a property right, by way of easement or other such similar right, over the complainants’ property; (2) that the People be permitted to introduce at trial all prior written court decisions in civil matters in which Defendant was a party, holding that Defendant did not have an easement over the complainants’ property; and (3) that the People be permitted to introduce at trial two pro se motions that Defendant has filed with the Court. By affirmation of counsel dated July 29, 2019, Defendant opposes the relief requested. For the reasons set forth herein, the People’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. DISCUSSION The charges in the indictment stem from a long-standing dispute between Defendant and the Varney family regarding property owned by the Varney family at 258 Hicks Hill Road in the Town of Pine Plains, County of Dutchess. For years, Defendant, whose property abuts the Varney property, has claimed right of title to some portion of the Varney property. According to the People, there have been numerous prior instances of Defendant trespassing over the Varney property despite court orders prohibiting him from doing so. The People argue that Defendant should be collaterally estopped from raising the defense that an easement exists in his favor over the Varney property. In support of this argument, the People point out that Defendant has litigated this very issue in prior civil and criminal proceedings and has lost each time, including in the Appellate Division [see Hudson v. Varney, 196 AD2d 856 (2d Dept. 1993) (affirming Supreme Court's dismissal of Defendant's action under RPAPL Article 15 on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel)]. The People’s motion presents a novel question: whether the People can utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel offensively against a defendant to bar him from raising a defense at trial that had been asserted, and rejected, in prior civil and criminal proceedings. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court is constrained to answer this question in the negative. “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a common-law doctrine that, when applied, prevents a party from relitigating an issue decided against it in a prior proceeding.” People v. Aguilera, 82 NY2d 23, 29 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While the principal applies in criminal cases as well as civil cases [see People v. Goodman, 69 NY2d 32, 37 (1986); People v. Sailor, 65 NY2d 224 (1985), cert denied, 474 US 982 (1985)], “in the criminal context ‘it cannot be applied in quite the same way as in civil cases’” [Aguilera, 82 NY2d at 29 (quoting People v. Plevy, 52 NY2d 58, 65 [1980]); People v. Acevedo, 69 NY2d 478, 485 (1987)]. “The desire to avoid repetitious litigation must sometimes give way to concerns peculiar to criminal prosecutions.” People v. Plevy, 52 NY2d 58, 64-64 (1980). “As collateral estoppel has evolved in our criminal jurisprudence, the formal prerequisites are identity of parties; identity of issues; a final and valid prior judgment; and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior determination” [Aguilera, 82 NY2d at 29-30 (citing Goodman, 69 NY2d at 38 [collecting cases])]. The Court is not satisfied, based upon the record before it, that each of these elements has been met. Specifically, it is unclear to the Court whether Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior results such that the Court would be warranted in precluding him from asserting a defense at trial. As defense counsel points out, Defendant was not represented by counsel in the prior civil proceedings upon which the People intend to rely. As such, the Court questions the extent to which Defendant’s property right claims were fully and fairly litigated in the prior proceedings. As the Court of Appeals instructed in Aguilera, the court “must also consider the realities of the prior litigation, including the context and other circumstances which, although not legal impediments, may have had the practical effect of discouraging or deterring a party from fully litigating the determination which is now asserted against him” [Id. at 32-33 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]. Moreover, even if all of the elements of the doctrine were deemed satisfied in this matter, the Court finds that it would not be appropriate to grant the People’s application under these circumstances [People v. Morrison, 156 AD3d 126, 130 (3rd Dept. 2017), lv app denied, 30 NY3d 1118 (2018)]. The People have offered no precedent to support the proposition that they can offensively use collateral estoppel in a criminal prosecution to foreclose a defendant from asserting a defense to the crimes charged in the indictment. The Court, in its own research, has found no authority for extending the doctrine of collateral estoppel as the People suggest. The People’s reliance on People v. Carroll [200 AD2d 630 (2d Dept. 1994)] is misplaced. In Carroll, the Appellate Division upheld Nassau County Court’s denial of a defendant’s request for a Dunaway hearing after Suffolk County Court, in a related prosecution stemming from the defendant’s arrest, had conducted a Dunaway hearing and concluded that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. In light of the Court of Appeals’ caveat that collateral estoppel is “not to be liberally applied in criminal cases” [People v. Hilton, 95 NY2d 950, 952 (2000)], this Court reads Carroll as limited to the unique circumstances present in that case and finds it factually distinguishable from the case at bar. Neither the holding nor rationale of Carroll authorize extending the collateral estoppel doctrine to preclude a defendant from asserting a defense at trial. Granting the People’s application would impinge upon Defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial [Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284, 294 (1973) (the right to present a defense is one of the "minimum essentials of a fair trial")]. Finally, one of the primary factors underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine — a desire to conserve the time and resources of the court and the parties [Aguilera, 82 NY2d at 30] — is not a concern in the present proceeding. Whereas a collateral estoppel ruling that forecloses an unnecessary pre-trial hearing will save time and resources, Defendant’s trial is moving forward regardless of this Court’s ruling on this motion. The minimal benefit the Court might receive from streamlining the trial is, in the Court’s opinion, far outweighed by the potential prejudice to Defendant. For the foregoing reasons, the People’s application to collaterally estop Defendant from raising the defense that an easement exists in his favor over the Varney property is denied. Prior Civil Adjudications Next, the People seek permission to introduce on their case-in-chief three prior civil rulings involving Defendant and the Varneys, each of which was decided against Defendant. The People assert that each of these prior rulings put Defendant on notice that he had no property right in the Varney land and, thus, is relevant to the instant charges. Specifically, the People seek to introduce the following decisions and orders: (1) Varney v. Hudson, Dutchess County Supreme Court, Index Number 2300/1984; (2) Hudson v. Varney, Dutchess County Supreme Court, Index Number 3717/1990; and (3) Hudson v. Varney [196 AD2d 856 (2d Dept. 1993)], the Appellate Division, Second Department decision and order cited supra. First, the Court, in its August 6, 2019 Decision and Order on the People’s Molineux application, already granted the People permission to utilize the 1984 Varney v. Hudson Order on their direct case. That decision remains unaltered. As to the remaining two civil rulings, the Court will analyze the People’s motion as a further Molineux application. For the reasons set forth in the Court’s August 6, 2019 Decision and Order, the Court finds that the proffered evidence is relevant to the Defendant’s motive, identity, and intent; provides necessary background information; and places the charged conduct in context. People v. Morales, 171 AD3d 945 (2d Dept. 2019); see also People v. Leonard, 29 NY3d 1 (2017); People v. Dorm, 12 NY3d 16 (2009). The Court also finds, subject to the limitations discussed below, that the probative value of the Decision and Order in the Hudson v. Varney case [Index 3717/1990] outweighs any potential prejudice to Defendant. That Decision and Order is replete with references to matters in which Defendant was prosecuted criminally related to past trespasses on the Varney property. The Court, in its August 6, 2019 Decision and Order, denied the People’s Molineux application regarding these criminal prosecutions and convictions. In order to harmonize this Court’s August 6, 2019 Decision and Order with the instant Decision and Order, and to avoid any undue prejudice to Defendant, the Court directs the People to submit proposed redactions to the 1990 Hudson v. Varney Decision and Order [Index 3717/1990] consistent with this Decision and Order on or before October 15, 2019, on notice to Defendant and defense counsel. Upon the Court’s approval of the proposed redactions, the People will be permitted to introduce a redacted version of the Hudson v. Varney Decision and Order [Index 3717/1990] on their case-in-chief. However, as to the Appellate Division Decision and Order, the references therein to the prior criminal prosecutions are too numerous to be redacted without vitiating the substance and context of the Decision and Order. The Court finds that that potential prejudice to Defendant from introduction of the Appellate Division Decision and Order outweighs its probative value. Accordingly, the People’s motion to introduce the Appellate Division Decision and Order is denied. Defendant’s Pro Se Filings Finally, the People seek permission to introduce two1 pro se motions filed by Defendant in this action while being represented by the Public Defender’s Office. There is nothing in the record to indicate that these motions are anything but voluntary, unsolicited filings by Defendant. In fact, on at least one prior occasion, the Court ordered Defendant not to file documents on his own while represented by counsel. Because these two submissions were voluntary and self-initiated, and because they contain material that is relevant to the proceedings, the People’s motion to admit them on their case-in-chief is granted. Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, that the People’s motion to collaterally estop Defendant from presenting evidence and argument at trial on the issue of whether Defendant has a property right, by way of easement or other such similar right, over the complainants’ property, is denied; and it is further ORDERED, that the People’s motion to introduce at trial prior written court decisions in civil matters in which Defendant was a party is granted as to the Decision and Order in Varney v. Hudson, Dutchess County Supreme Court, Index Number 2300/1984; and it is Further ORDERED, that the People’s motion to introduce at trial prior written court decisions in civil matters in which Defendant was a party is granted as to the Decision and Order in Hudson v. Varney, Dutchess County Supreme Court, Index Number 3717/1990, subject to the Court’s approval of the People’s proposed redactions; and it is further ORDERED, that the People’s motion to introduce at trial prior written court decisions in civil matters in which Defendant was a party is in all other respects denied; and it is further ORDERED, that the People’s motion to introduce at trial Defendant’s two pro se motions is granted. The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: October 2, 2019 Poughkeepsie, New York
