By: Shulman, P.J., Gonzalez, Edmead, JJ. 18-365. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. ALEXANDER WANG, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Steven M. Statsinger, J.), rendered October 27, 2017, affirmed. Shortly after the 2016 presidential election, defendant entered Trump Tower with a backpack containing a large knife, garrote, handcuffs, rope, flashlight, pocket knife and a powerful firecracker. Upon his arrest, a search of defendant’s dormitory room and computer yielded 35 M-100 firecrackers, a small bomb or grenade, and videos of acts of extreme violence, including bombs dropping on soldiers and people being tied up and executed with guns and knives. The portion of the verdict convicting the defendant of two counts of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see Penal Law §§110.00/265.01[2]) was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations. The credited evidence established that the large knife, which had a nearly seven-inch blade and was characterized by a police officer then serving in the Army Reserve as a “bayonet knife” and a combat weapon, was a “dangerous knife” under the statute (see Matter of Antwaine T., 23 NY3d 512, 516 [2014]; Matter of Jamie D., 59 NY2d 589, 592-593 [1983]). The evidence also established that the garrote, which is used as a “strangulation device,” was a “dangerous instrument” under the statute (Penal Law §§265.01[2], 10.00[13]; People v. Carter, 53 NY2d 113, 116 [1981]). Defendant’s possession of both items is presumptive evidence of his intent to use both unlawfully against another (see Penal Law §265.15[4]), and the requisite intent was, in any event, inferable from defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances, including the presence of the other items in the backpack, particularly the “real” police-style handcuffs wrapped in tape to avoid detection, the M-100 firecracker and the rope (see People v. Campos, 93 AD3d 581, 682 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 971 [2012]). The court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the manner and extent of cross-examination of a police officer because the line of questioning sought to be asked by counsel was too remote and conjectural to have any legitimate influence in determining the facts at issue in this nonjury trial (see People v. Aska, 91 NY2d 979, 981 [1998]; People v. Davis, 43 NY2d 17, 27 [1977], cert denied 435 US 998, 438 US 914 [1978]). We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence given the serious nature of the charges and the potential jail sentence defendant was facing. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
By: Shulman, P.J., Gonzalez, Edmead, JJ. 19-143/145. ABACUS CLINTON LLC, pet-land-app, v. ISIDRO RAMOS, res-res, -and- “John Doe” and “Jane Doe,” res — Final judgment (Jack Stoller, J.), entered on or about April 24, 2018, affirmed, with $25 costs. Appeals from orders (Jack Stoller, J.), dated, respectively, January 25, 2018 and March 12, 2018, dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the final judgment. Although respondent did not timely interpose an answer, it is clear from the record that respondent always intended to contest this licensee holdover proceeding on the merits, given that his attorney appeared on every scheduled court date and previously served an answer that was rejected as untimely. Given the absence of any demonstrable prejudice to petitioner, as well as the public policy favoring a disposition on the merits, the court did not abuse its discretion in deeming respondent to have answered the petition alleging that he is a tenant of the premises (see Trust Mtge., LLC v. Andrews, 154 AD3d 547 [2017]). We note in this regard, that respondent was not required to plead his tenancy status as an affirmative defense in a licensee holdover proceeding (see CPLR 3018[a]; Morita v. Kawasumi, NYLJ, March 23, 1998, at 28, col 2 [App Term, 1st Dept 1998]), and could have raised the tenancy issue even if his answer was deemed to be a mere general denial (see Island Cash Register v. Data Term. Sys., 244 AD2d 117, 120-121 [1998]; Stevens v. Northern Lights Assoc., 229 AD2d 1001, 1002 [1996]). Nor was there any abuse of discretion in the denial of petitioner’s motion for a protective order with respect to the notice to admit. The court had the discretion to allow service of a notice to admit beyond three days before the petition was noticed to be heard (see CPLR 408). Furthermore, the notice to admit, which sought to establish the genuineness of eight documents generated and/or mailed by petitioner, was not burdensome. The petition was properly dismissed after trial. A fair interpretation of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that petitioner recognized respondent as a tenant of the premises through a “litany of serial, affirmative, unforced acts” (see Thoreson v. Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495 [1992]). The record shows that petitioner registered respondent as the stabilized tenant of the subject premises for three years, billed respondent for rent and accepted rent payments from him, commenced a nonpayment proceeding alleging that respondent was a tenant in possession under a lease agreement with landlord, and offered respondent a lease renewal (see UHAB HDFC v. Diaz, 10 Misc 3d 130[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51957[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2005]; City of New York v. Utsey, 185 Misc 2d 715 [App Term, 2nd Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2000]). Consequently, a licensee holdover proceeding predicated upon a 10-day notice to quit (see RPAPL 713[7]), does not lie. We have examined petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. All concur THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
