MEMORANDUM AND ORDER On November 13, 2015, Plaintiff Zsa Zsa Jewels, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Zsa Zsa Jewels”) commenced this products liability action1 against Defendants BMW of North America, LLC (“BMW”); Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC (“Bridgestone”); Morris County Auto Sales, Inc. a/k/a BMW of Morristown (“BMW of Morristown”); and Open Road of Edison, Inc. a/k/a Open Road BMW (“Open Road”). (See Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaintiff amended the complaint on June 14, 2016 (see Am. Compl., ECF No. 32), and later voluntarily dismissed its claims against Bridgestone, BMW of Morristown, and Open Road pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (see ECF Nos. 82, 85). The only remaining Defendant is BMW, hereinafter referred to as “Defendant”. Pending before the Court are Defendant’s motions: (i) to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s proposed expert, Peter J. Leiss (“Leiss”), under Federal Rule of Evidence 702; (ii) for summary judgment; and (iii) for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. (See ECF No. 86). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion to preclude expert testimony is granted; Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part; and Defendant’s motion for sanctions is denied without prejudice. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 822 F.3d 620, 631 n. 12 (2016) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “In making this determination, the Court ‘must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.’” Id. (quoting Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “‘The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed’ to the extent that a jury could reasonably believe it.” Grant v. City of New York, 15-CV-3635 (ILG) (ST), 2019 WL 1099945, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). “Conversely, ‘the court…must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.’” Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a New York corporation that “design[s], produc[es], and sell[s] hand-crafted jewelry.” (Am. Compl.
3, 8). In 2011, Plaintiff’s sole owner, Meena Catalano (“Catalano”), leased a 2012 BMW X3 designed and manufactured by Defendant (the “Subject Vehicle” or the “Vehicle”) from BMW of Morristown in Morristown, New Jersey. (See Def. 56.1 SOF 1, ECF No. 86-1; Def. Ex. B, ECF No. 86-5; Catalano Dep. at 37:9-10).2 On November 6, 2013, the Vehicle caught fire while it was being driven by Plaintiff’s employee, Tiffany Sobers (“Sobers”), resulting in the destruction of inventory that the Vehicle was transporting. (See Def. 56.1 SOF
