In this small claims proceeding where the defendant/third-party claimant Charlene Morrisseau seeks to recover damages from the third-party defendants for their alleged fraud in asserting court transcription services were rendered as plead in the first- party claim, the third-party defendant Eileen Byrne moves to dismiss the third-party action pursuant to CPLR §§3211(a)(2) & (7) on the grounds: 1) that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and 2) the third-party claimant has failed to state a cause of action. Defendant/third-party plaintiff opposes the motion and cross-moves for sanctions. The claimant, Catherine Armentano, initially filed a claim against defendant/third-party claimant Charlene Morrisseau seeking amounts due for trial transcripts that she provided to the defendant. Defendant/third-party plaintiff then filed a third-party claim1 against plaintiff and third-party defendant Eileen Byrne seeking damages on alleged claims for fraud and defamation on the basis that the third-party defendants did not render the services as plead in the first-party claim. Third-party defendant Eileen Byrne is the Chief Clerk of White Plains City Court. Third-party plaintiff fails to assert any facts indicating that her claims against Ms. Byrne are against her in an individual capacity. Rather, from a review of the third party complaint it is evident that her claims against Ms. Byrne arise out of her position as the Chief Clerk of White Plains City Court. The third-party defendant Eileen Byrne moves to dismiss this action, contending that the exclusive jurisdiction for claims against the Unified Court System, as a state government agency, and its employees while acting in their official capacity, is in the Court of Claims. The third-party defendant further asserts that the third-party complaint fails to properly state a cause of action with the requisite particularity as required for causes of action sounding in fraud and defamation. The plaintiff opposes the motion against the “State” on several specious grounds including: that the “State” failed to respond to and then lost subpoenas she filed in the criminal action for which the claimant was a court reporter; the “State” contrarily ruled that subpoenas she filed in another separate criminal action were held not to be within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction but rather the jurisdiction of the Mount Vernon City Court; that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over her action against Ms. Byrne; that the action should be transferred to Supreme Court rather than dismissed pursuant to CPLR §3252; that the pleadings of a third-party claim are not held to the same standard as complaints; and that she should be given an opportunity to amend her claim, if necessary. Defendant/third-party plaintiff also seeks sanctions based upon her assertions that the “State” mishandled her previously filed subpoenas in both aforementioned criminal cases. Defendant/third-party plaintiff’s papers are devoid of any assertions regarding Ms. Byrne’s alleged actionable conduct that form the basis of the claim against her. The Court notes, however, that defendant/third-party plaintiff acknowledges in paragraph 26 of her opposition papers “that the action against Ms. Byrne is not properly filed in the Small Claims Part of the Mt. Vernon City Court.” It is well settled that monetary claims against the State can only be brought in the Court of Claims (Glendora v. New York State Div. of Housing and Community Renewal, 216 AD2d 391 (2d Dept 1995); Daniel v. New York State Div. of Housing and Community Renewal, 179 Misc 2d 452 (Sup Ct NY Co 1998)); see also Court of Claims Act §9). Moreover, “where the action is, in reality, one against the State — i.e., where the state is the real party in interest” jurisdiction lies in the Court of Claims. Derrick v. Bergren, 2 Misc 3d 396, 398 (Sup Ct Kings Cty 2003). Further, “an action against a State officer is really asserted against the State when it stems from an action or determination made in the officer’s role, which involves rights asserted solely against the State, not the officer individually.” Id. See also Dinerman v. NYS Lottery, 58 AD3d 669 (2d Dept 2009); Borawski v. Abulafia, 117 AD3d 662 (2d Dept 2014). In the case at bar, the minimal allegations in the small claims third-party complaint indicate that the alleged actions giving rise to defendant/third-party plaintiff’s claim against third-party defendant Byrne were done solely as part of her capacity as an employee of the NYS Unified Court System. Since defendant/third-party claimant’s instant third-party action seeks to recover damages from an employee of a State agency acting in her capacity as such, this small claims third-party action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the Mount Vernon City Court. Based upon the foregoing, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter is granted. As such, the remainder of third-party defendant’s motion seeking dismissal for failure to state a cause of action as well as defendant/third-party plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions are rendered moot. The above constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. The Court considered the following papers on this motion: Notice of Motion dated September 9, 2019, Affirmation in Support of Third Party Defendant Eileen Byrne Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A; Opposition to NY State’s Motion for Dismissal & Request for Sanctions dated September 30, 2019; Reply Affirmation in Further Support of Third Party Defendant Eileen Byrne’s Motion to Dismiss dated October 1, 2019; Morisseau’s Reply to State’s Opposition to Request for Sanctions. Dated: October 17, 2019 Mount Vernon, New York
