DECISION & ORDER I. The defendant was charged by Misdemeanor Information dated December 17, 2018 with Assault in the Third Degree (PL §120.00[1]). On December 20, 2018, the defendant was arraigned with 18b assigned counsel Carly Lynch McGuire; thereafter, the Court issued a temporary order of protection and adjourned the case at defendant’s request to January 31, 2019. On January 31, Ms. Lynch McGuire was relieved as counsel and John R. Lewis, Esq. was assigned as defendant’s new counsel; the case was adjourned at defendant’s to March 18, 2019. On March 18, the defendant requested an adjournment to April 8, 2019. On April 8, the People offered the defendant a plea offer to Harassment in the Second Degree (PL §240.26[1]) with a 1-year conditional discharge, a 2-year permanent order of protection, and a fine and surcharge. Defendant requested an adjournment to April 29, 2019. On April 29, the defendant requested a jury trial and this matter was adjourned by the Court to August 12, 2019 for trial. On August 12, 2019, the People reduced the Misdemeanor Information charging Assault in the Third Degree to a violation charging Harassment in the Second Degree. The defendant was arraigned on the violation, and the People served a supporting deposition and announced readiness. The Court set this matter down for a bench trial1 on September 17, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. On August 29, 2019, the defendant filed a motion seeking to dismiss the violation information on speedy trial grounds pursuant to CPL §30.30. The Court set the following motion schedule: People’s opposition papers were due no later than September 16, 2019; the defendant’s reply papers, if any, were due no later than September 23, 2019, and a decision and court appearance was scheduled for October 28, 2019, which was adjourned at defendant’s request to November 4, 2019. After the opposition and reply papers were received by the Court, the motion was marked fully submitted on September 20, 2019. II. The defendant argues, in the main, that the criminal case against him should be dismissed because the People announced ready more than 90 days after the expiration of the statutory excludable time periods permitted by CPL §30.30(4)(b)[see Lewis Reply Affirm at 2].2 Specifically, the defendant argues that he did not consent to any further adjournments after April 29, 2019 and that therefore any statutory time that accrued after that date was properly chargeable to the People (see Lewis Affirmation at 5; Lewis Reply Affirm at 9). The People simply argue that the parties consented to the statutory time period after April 29, 2019 and that, therefore, the 90-day speedy trial time had not expired prior to the People’s statement of readiness on August 12, 2019 (see Rodriquez Affirmation at
