This is a contested application for limited letters of administration in the estate of Borys Kogan, a domiciliary of Ukraine, who died on October 5, 2017, survived by his spouse and three daughters, one of whom is an infant. An earlier contested administration proceeding between the spouse and daughter A was settled, and letters of administration issued to A on December 18, 2018. Daughter B waived and consented to the spouse’s petition for letters of administration and was not a party to the settlement. Currently before the court is a petition by B for limited letters of administration in order to commence proceedings against the fiduciary to identify and recover assets which B alleges belong to the estate. A claims that the assets are assets of a trust of which she is the sole beneficiary. B alleges that A’s conflict of interest prevents her from discharging her obligations as administrator to the other estate beneficiaries. Objections to the petition were filed by A based on an alleged lack of jurisdiction over necessary parties. The parties consented to determination of this proceeding on the papers submitted. Respondent A asserts lack of jurisdiction because petitioner 1) failed to serve decedent’s mother who, under Ukranian law, is a distributee entitled to certain tangible property; 2) served decedent’s spouse at an incorrect address; and 3) failed to serve decedent’s infant daughter. The assertion that jurisdiction is lacking is without merit. In any proceeding for letters of administration, including limited letters, process must be served on persons eligible for letters (SCPA §707) who have a right to letters prior or equal to that of the petitioner and have not renounced such right (SCPA §1003[2]). Here, decedent’s mother has no prior or equal right to letters. Decedent’s youngest daughter is ineligible to receive letters due to her status as an infant (SCPA §707[1][a]). Decedent’s spouse irrevocably renounced her right to receive letters in accord with the terms of the aforementioned settlement with A. Further, all three persons upon whom lack of service is alleged are non-domiciliaries, itself a ground for the court to dispense with service (SCPA §1003[2]; Matter of Albagli, 141 Misc 2 1073 [Sur Ct, Bronx County 1988]). Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that jurisdiction is complete in this proceeding. Respondent also asserts that, by waiving service and consenting to the issuance of letters of administration to the spouse in the initial petition for administration, petitioner has somehow waived her right to receive limited letters for the purpose stated above. This is not the law. Each proceeding seeking relief in the Surrogate’s Court is a separate proceeding with its own procedural requirements, and a waiver and consent in the administration proceeding in no way bars petitioner from seeking different relief in this separate proceeding for limited letters. There is nothing inconsistent in petitioner’s initial waiver and consent to the spouse serving as administrator, on the one hand, and her current application for limited letters in order to investigate whether the administrator is withholding assets from the estate for personal gain, on the other hand. Such inquiry is the very purpose of SCPA §§702 and 2103, and the administrator cannot use a meritless theory to insulate herself from such inquiry. Accordingly, limited letters of administration shall issue to Arina Kogan. Settle decree. Dated: November 14, 2019
