By: Shulman, P.J., Cooper, Edmead, JJ. 14-020. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. LONNIE MACKEY, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Diana M. Boyar, J.), rendered May 20, 2013, affirmed. The verdict convicting the defendant of sexual abuse in the third degree (Penal Law §130.55) was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the trial court’s determinations concerning credibility, including its evaluation of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness police officers, and its assessment of a video recording of the incident. In this regard, we note that while the video evidence captured was not conclusive, the court had the benefit of seeing this evidence in the context of contemporaneous testimony of the officers who witnessed the incident. Nor was the officers’ account of the incident so implausible as to be incredible as a matter of law (see People v. Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. By: Shulman, P.J., Edmead, JJ. 17-456. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. VERA KEMPER, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Stephen Antignani, J.), rendered October 28, 2016, affirmed. The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record (see People v. Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]). The credited police testimony satisfied the elements of a valid vehicle checkpoint stop. The testimony established that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was roadway safety and enforcement of vehicular laws and regulations (see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 US 32, 41 [2000]), that the degree of intrusion on drivers’ liberty and privacy interests was minimal (see People v. Scott, 63 NY2d 518, 526-527 [1984]), and that the procedure followed, namely stopping every third vehicle and those with identifiable equipment violations, was “uniform and not gratuitous or subject to individually discriminatory selection” (People v. Dugan, 57 AD3d 300 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 924 [2009], quoting People v. Serrano, 233 AD2d 170, 171 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 929 [1996]; People v. Burton, 8 AD3d 187, 188 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 671 [2004]). Probable cause for defendant’s arrest was established by the arresting officers’ testimony that when the vehicle was stopped at the checkpoint, defendant exhibited classic signs of intoxication, such as having watery, bloodshot eyes, a flushed face and the strong odor of alcohol on her breath (see People v. Johnson, 140 AD3d 978, 979 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 931 [2016]; People v. Thomas, 68 AD3d 482, 483 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 806 [2010]). Since the testimony established that, at a minimum, the police had reasonable suspicion (see People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) that defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, there was a proper basis for the police to detain her to administer the portable breath test (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §1194[2][a][1]; People v. Gonsalez, 144 AD3d 841 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1184 [2017]; People v. Tieman, 112 AD3d 975, 976 [2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 1043 [2014]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, regardless of whether the People properly authenticated the calibration results, “[t]he reliability of the [breathalyzer] test results was an issue for trial and was not a proper issue for the suppression hearing” (People v. Ayala, 87 AD3d 926 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 951 [2011]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. By: Shulman, P.J., Edmead, JJ. 18-332. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. MARK MASOLA, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Lyle E. Frank, J. at plea and sentencing; David Frey, J. at resentencing), rendered November 20, 2017, affirmed. The misdemeanor complaint was jurisdictionally valid because it described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the offenses of petit larceny (see Penal Law §155.25) and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (see Penal Law §165.40). The factual allegations, including defendant’s admission that he removed complainant’s bicycle from the eighth floor stairwell of 495 Broadway, without permission, and placed it inside his apartment, were facially sufficient to support the charged offenses (see People v. Livingston, 150 AD3d 448 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1093 [2017]). No additional evidentiary detail was required for the People’s pleading to provide “adequate notice to enable defendant to prepare a defense and invoke his protection against double jeopardy” (People v. Kasse, 22 NY3d 1142, 1143 [2014]). Defendant’s contention that his waiver of eligibility for sealing constituted an impermissible condition of his plea agreement is unpreserved, since he failed to move to withdraw the plea, despite ample opportunity to do so. We decline to review this unpreserved claim in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that the waiver of eligibility for sealing did not violate CPL 160.59, since the disorderly conduct offense to which defendant pleaded guilty was not an “eligible offense” under the statute, and the waiver not otherwise affect the validity of the plea (see People v. Duran, 60 Misc 3d 141[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51302[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1171 [2019]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. By: Shulman, P.J., Edmead, JJ. 19-360. UNITED HAY, LLC, pet-land-res, v. JULIET HEEG, res-tent-app -and- JOHN DOE & JANE DOE, res — Order (Evon M. Asforis, J.), dated July 9, 2019, affirmed, with $10 costs. Tenant’s pre-answer motion to dismiss the holdover petition, based upon claimed deficiencies in the combined notice of lease nonrenewal and termination, was properly denied. The notice alleged, inter alia, that tenant was not primarily residing in the subject rent stabilized apartment, that a review of security camera footage revealed that tenant was present in the apartment for no more than three hours per day during the last year, that she remained in the apartment overnight on only three nights, and that persons other than tenant have been observed staying overnight at the apartment without tenant. The notice thus set forth case-specific allegations tending to support landlord’s nonprimary residence claim with sufficient detail to have allowed tenant to prepare a defense (see City of New York v. Valera, 216 AD2d 237 [1995]), and otherwise satisfied the specificity requirements of Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) §2524.2(b) (see Oxford Towers Co., LLC v. Leites, 41 AD3d 144, 144-145 [2007]; Hughes v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 AD2d 4, 18 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 829 [1997]). Tenant does not set forth any material allegations within landlord’s knowledge that it failed to include in the notice (see Hughes, 226 AD2d at 18). Any inconsistency in the notice pertaining to the actual time tenant remained in the apartment did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect, since it could not have materially misled or confused tenant as to the nature of the proceeding or hindered the preparation of her defense (see Oxford Towers Co., LLC v. Leites, 41 AD3d at 145; Rascoff/Zsyblat Org. v. Directors Guild of Am., 297 AD2d 241, 242 [2002], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 99 NY2d 573 [2003]; 190 Riverside Dr. v. Nosei, 185 Misc 2d 696 [App Term, 1st Dept 2000]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. By: Shulman, P.J., Cooper, Edmead, JJ. 19-365. SUSAN BECKFORD, plf-app, v. MILANO FURNITURE WAREHOUSE INC., def-res — Appeal from judgment (Lyle E. Frank, J.), entered on or about August 28, 2018, held in abeyance and the matter remanded to Civil Court for issuance of a decision in conformity with the requirements of CPLR 4213(b). The trial court failed to comply with the specificity requirements of CPLR 4213(b) in rendering judgment in defendant’s favor without setting forth its rationale or the facts essential to its determination. Inasmuch as this small claims action hinges in large measure upon issues of credibility raised by the parties’ conflicting testimony, we hold the appeal in abeyance and remand the matter for issuance of a decision setting forth the essential facts as required by CPLR 4213(b) (see Brenner v. De Bruin, 171 AD2d 833 [1991]; Ozzy Constr. Co. v. Scott, 35 Misc 3d 139[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50849[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2012]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
