DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff Patrick Vieira alleges that, on May 20, 2014, he was walking down cement stairs on the loading dock of a building located on the campus of the United States Military Academy at West Point (“USMA”), when the stairs crumbled beneath his feet and caused him to fall. He claims that he lost consciousness and sustained injuries, including an injury to his lumbar spine which required surgery to repair. Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), seeking damages against the United States of America for its alleged negligence as property owner. This case is before me for all purposes on the consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c) (Dkt. #9). By Decision and Order dated November 5, 2018 (Dkt. #26), familiarity with which is presumed, this Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In sum, defendant argued that plaintiff’s tort claim is subject to the discretionary function exception (and thus barred by sovereign immunity) because the USMA has discretion to determine the priority of any structural repairs. I found that defendant had “sufficiently demonstrated that prioritizing Work Orders at the West Point campus is clearly a discretionary function based upon policy considerations of operational needs, regulatory mandates and available funding.” Dkt. #26, at 6-7. I concluded, however, that plaintiff’s negligence claim would not be barred by the discretionary function exception if plaintiff established that defendant: (1) failed to inspect Building 845 and/or to generate a Work Order for renovation/repair of its loading dock; or (2) failed to warn plaintiff about the loading dock’s condition. Id. at 7-9. Presently before this Court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART. A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material within the meaning of Rule 56 where it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 248. In determining whether the moving party has met its burden of proving that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). “Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005). Where “the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case.” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (alteration in original) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, “[a] defendant moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to come forward with enough evidence to create a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an element essential to its case.” Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996). On the other hand, summary judgment must be denied if the court finds “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. B. Failure to Inspect and/or Initiate a Work Order It is undisputed that a USMA liaison officer was on site at Building 845 five days a week, and that the liaison officer’s duties included carrying out inspections of the building. It is also undisputed that Penn employees could report issues to the liaison officer, who would submit work orders to USMA. Further, the parties agree that two work orders were, in fact, initiated for repairs to the loading dock stairs: one in April 2012 and one in August 2013. Dkt. #40-1, #40-2. The details of those repairs are also not in dispute: (1) from April 17, 2012 to April 23, 2012, fifteen hours of masonry work was performed pursuant to a work order to address broken concrete; (2) on August 21, 2013, one hour of masonry work was performed pursuant to a work order stating “pieces of concrete/plaster falling off loading dock in huge chunks (12″x8″) area eroding getting worse[.]” Id. Defendant also proffers the affidavit of Anthony Delfini (DPW Engineer Technician at West Point). Dkt. #40. According to Mr. Delfini: In August 2013, another work order was initiated for additional masonry work on top of that previously completed in April 2012, as the area in question was continuing to erode with pieces of concrete falling off…. [O]nly about an hour of labor was available to be carried out at this time and total repair of the loading dock stairs was incomplete. Because there were limited funds available to cover all work orders across West Point, the repair work to the loading dock stairs was not able to be completed until funding for a contract was awarded earlier this year. The loading dock stairs were replaced as of May 2019. Id. at
