DECISION AND ORDER BACKGROUND Plaintiff Charles Pettitt (“Plaintiff) commenced this action on July 12, 2017, alleging that defendant Chiari & Ilecki, LLP (“Defendant”) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) under 35 U.S.C. §1962 et seq., by attempting to collect a debt owed by Plaintiff to family law attorney Ann Giardina Hess (“Hess”) based on a judgment in the amount of $1,110.55 obtained over 20 years ago — on April 16, 1992. (Dkt. 1). The case was originally assigned to United States District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo, who issued an order of recusal on July 14, 2017. (Dkt. 3). The case was then reassigned to United States Senior District Judge William M. Skretny, who issued a referral order to United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy for all pre-trial matters, including dispositive motions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). (Dkt. 17; Dkt. 69). On May 30, 2019, Judge McCarthy issued a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”), recommending that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be partially granted, dismissing Plaintiffs claim for abuse of process. (Dkt. 87 at 10). Additionally, Judge McCarthy determined that: (1) collection of the 1992 judgment against [Plaintiff] was not permitted by law in 2016; (2) in 2016 [Defendant] did not intend to violate the FDCPA; and (3) in 2016 [Defendant] had a subjective good faith belief that [Plaintiff] had acknowledged the debt in 2006. (Id.). Based on these conclusions, Judge McCarthy recommended that the pending motions for summary judgment be otherwise denied. (Id.). On June 3, 2019, Judge Skretny recused himself, and the matter was reassigned to the undersigned. (Dkt. 88). Plaintiff and Defendant both filed objections to the R&R. (Dkt. 89; Dkt. 91). The parties filed responses on July 22, 2019. (Dkt. 95; Dkt. 96). Familiarity with the R&R and underlying facts of this matter, as set forth in the R&R, is assumed for purposes of this Decision and Order. After conducting a careful de novo review of the R&R, and the record in this matter, see 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C), the Court adopts the R&R in its entirety. This Decision and Order addresses the specific objections raised by each party. DISCUSSION I. Judgment Collectability Judge McCarthy concluded that the 1992 judgment was uncollectable. (Dkt. 87 at 6). Judge McCarthy found Hess’s deposition testimony was “insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [Plaintiff] had acknowledged the debt.” (Id.) (citing Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (“in certain circumstances a party’s inconsistent and contradictory statements transcend credibility concerns and go to the heart of whether the party has raised genuine issues of material fact to be decided by a jury.”)). Defendant objects on the grounds that Judge McCarthy erred by making a credibility determination as to Hess, arguing there was additional evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Plaintiff had signed a written acknowledgment. (Dkt. 91 at 4-6). Specifically, Defendant cites Plaintiffs statement that funds were removed from his restrained bank account, and a draft of the signed written acknowledgment. (Id. at 5). The Court finds Defendant’s arguments are without merit. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding the removal of funds from his Bank of America account does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff signed a written acknowledgment. Plaintiff testified that his account was restrained in connection with the 1992 judgment by Defendant. (See Dkt. 67-5 at 89). Plaintiff testified the account contained $300.00, but that Bank of America had removed $100.00 in “service fees for the paperwork,” $5.00 a month as a service charge, and $15.00 a month after the account had insufficient funds. (Id. at 92-96). As such, Plaintiff only testified that the funds were removed by Bank of America for service charges. He did not testify that the funds were removed by a creditor executing the 1992 judgment pursuant to a signed written acknowledgment. Defendant has not submitted evidence demonstrating otherwise. Accordingly, the removal of funds does not raise an issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff signed a written acknowledgment of the 1992 judgment. The draft template of the written acknowledgment also does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff signed a written acknowledgment. The template is a draft of a “Turnover Authorization and Agreement.” (Dkt. 67-16 at 3-4; Dkt. 68-12 at 1-2). The draft provides that Plaintiff authorizes Bank of America to withdraw and forward to Hess “all monies contained in accounts maintained in [his] name.” (Id. at 1). The draft also provides that upon the forwarding of such monies, Hess authorizes the removal of the restraint upon Plaintiffs account. (Id.). Significantly, the template is not dated, is not signed by either Plaintiff or Hess, and does not include an acknowledgment of the 1992 judgment. Additionally, it is unlikely the Court can even consider the draft template. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a), the proponent of an item of evidence “must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). However, Hess, the purported author, testified that she had no “independent recollection” as to whether the document was ever signed. (Dkt. 70-3 at 33). Additionally, there is no testimony from Lisa the “techie,” who located the document pursuant to the subpoena, authenticating the template. As such, because the template is not in admissible evidentiary form, it cannot be used to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff signed a written acknowledgment. See GlobalRock Networks, Inc. v. MCI Communs. Servs., 943 F. Supp. 2d 320, 335 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (evidence not in admissible evidentiary form so as to be considered on summary judgment because it had not been properly authenticated through testimony or an affidavit from its author); Lachira v. Sutton, No. 3:05cvl585 (PCD), 2007 WL 1346913, at *3 (D. Conn. May 7, 2007) (plaintiff had not met burden of authenticating letter, in part, where plaintiff did not reference letter in her affidavit, attest date on which letter was written, and state whether letter was actually mailed). Additionally, the Court finds Judge McCarthy did not err in rejecting Hess’s statements about the purported authorization. In her affidavit, Hess affirmatively represented that she had obtained Plaintiffs signed written acknowledgment. (See Dkt. 68-13). Hess’s affidavit, in relevant part, provides: 4. In 2006, Plaintiff signed a document that both acknowledged the judgment and extended the statute of limitations. Likewise, the document released his bank account for purposes of paying the judgment, to the extent the account contained the money, less any bank charges. … 7. If I had not obtained Plaintiffs acknowledgment of the judgment, I would never have retained [Defendant] to collect on the judgment, as Mr. Ilecki confided that he did not want to collect any judgment files unless he had approximately ten years to enforce same. (Id. at 1-2). However, at her deposition, Hess consistently testified that she did not have personal knowledge as to her statements in her affidavit. (See Dkt. 68-11 at 33 (upon being asked whether she witnessed Plaintiff sign the acknowledgment, Hess answers “I don’t recall”), 34 (upon being asked whether she had physically ever seen the acknowledgment, Hess answers “I don’t know”), 35 (upon being asked whether she had personal knowledge for her statement in her affidavit that Plaintiff had signed a written acknowledgment, Hess answers “Do I recall, no”), 41 (upon being asked whether she recalled holding a signed copy of Plaintiff s written acknowledgment, Hess answers “I don’t recall”); Dkt. 70-3 at 126 (upon being asked whether she had personal knowledge as to her affidavit statement that Plaintiff signed the written acknowledgment, Hess answers “I can’t say personally — I can’t say I have personal knowledge”)). In fact, Hess testified that her affidavit was based not on her own personal knowledge, but rather based on the fact that Defendant had proceeded with collection activities. (See Dkt. 70-3 at 118 (“If he didn’t have the right documents, he wouldn’t have proceeded with that. He always made sure he had what he needed. I turned the things over. He wouldn’t proceed if he didn’t have everything he needed. That was the history of these many cases.”)). At the summary judgment stage, Hess’s affidavit, which was not based on personal knowledge, is insufficient to create an issue of fact. See Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 361 (2d Cir. 2001) (a party opposing summary judgment “must present affidavits, based on personal knowledge,…setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and as to which the affiant would be competent to testify”); United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass’n, 44 F.3d 1082, 1084 (2d Cir. 1995) (an affidavit not based upon personal knowledge does “not suffice to create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment”).1 In light of the above, Judge McCarthy correctly found that the record here presented the case where “a party’s inconsistent and contradictory statements transcend credibility concerns and go to the heart of whether the party has raised genuine issues of material fact to be decided by a jury.” Rojas, 660 F.3d at 106. Plaintiff denied having signed a written acknowledgment (Dkt. 68-3 at 5), and Defendant has not submitted admissible evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge McCarthy’s finding that the judgment was uncollectable. II. Bona Fide Error Defense The bona fide error defense allows debt collectors to avoid liability under the FDCPA “if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. §1692k(c). In order to avail itself of this defense, “a defendant must prove: (1) the presumed FDCPA violation was not intentional; (2) the presumed FDCPA violation resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) that [the defendant] maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” Lee v. Kucker & Brush LLP, 958 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation and citation omitted). “To survive summary judgment, [the non-moving party] must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of, or at least a factual question as to, every element of the defense.” Id. A. First Prong — Not Intentional Violation Judge McCarthy found there was no evidence that Defendant intended to violate the FDCPA. (Dkt. 87 at 8). Plaintiff objects on the ground that the bona fide error defense requires the underlying conduct be intentional, not the violation. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites Jerman v. Carlisle, McNillie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010). (Dkt. 89 at 6-8). However, the Jerman decision was limited in scope, resolving what types of mistakes constitute “bona fide errors” under the second prong of the defense, see Jerman, 559 U.S. at 583-84, not whether the defendant’s underlying conduct was intentional under the first prong of the defense. The Court held bona fide errors excluded mistakes of law. Id. at 587. The Court’s discussion was limited to supporting the proposition that Congress did not intend to make the bona fide error defense available for mistakes of law, not the broader proposition that the bona fide error defense is categorically unavailable where the underlying conduct is intentional. Although the Second Circuit has not declared its view, it appears courts are generally in agreement that the first prong of the bona fide error defense requires the violation of the FDCPA, not the underlying conduct, be “not intentional.” See Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Grp., LLP, 922 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 2019) (a defendant “must show only that its FDCPA violation was unintentional, not that its actions were unintentional” (quotation and citation omitted)); Arnold v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 659 F. App’x 568, 570 (11th Cir. 2016) (must show FDCPA violation, not underlying conduct, was unintentional); Garcia v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., 401 F. Supp. 3d 241, 252 (D. Conn. 2019) (finding not intentional violation satisfied where no evidence the defendant intended to send debtor letter containing mistake); Moore v. Express Recovery Serv., Inc., No. l:16-cv-00126-TC-EJF, 2019 WL 77325, at *4 (D. Utah Jan. 2, 2019) (“The element depends on the ‘lack of specific intent to violate the act.’” (citing Johnson v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723,728 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he only workable interpretation of the intent prong of the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense is that a debt collector must show that the violation was unintentional, not that the underlying act itself was unintentional.”))); Lee, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (not intentional violation where no evidence that the defendant “knowingly misrepresent[ed] [the plaintiffs] debt”); Marisco v. NCO Fin. Sys., 946 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“If violations of the FDCPA required deliberate or purposeful intent, then the bona fide error defense’s ‘not intentional’ element would tend towards surplusage.” (citation and quotation omitted)); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, No. 1:06 CV 1397, 2011 WL 1434679, at *10 (N.D. Ohio April 14,2011) (Supreme Court’s Jerman decision left undisturbed the district court’s prior finding that where the defendant’s noncompliance was not intentional, the violation was “not intentional” for purposes of bona fide error defense); McLean v. Ray, No. 1:10-cv-456, 2011 WL 1897436, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2011) (bona fide error defense available to defendant who did not knowingly pursue collection matter with intent to violate FDCPA), aff’d, 488 F. App’x 677 (4th Cir. 2012). Here, the record demonstrates that Defendant made a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. Defendant relied upon information provided by Hess and, at the time of the collection activities, Defendant had no knowledge that Hess lacked a signed written acknowledgment. (See Dkt. 68-7 at 23-28). Plaintiff does not argue the record demonstrates otherwise. (See Dkt. 89). Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge McCarthy’s finding that the violation was not intentional. B. Second Prong — Bona Fide Error As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to the preclusive effect of Lockport City Court Judge Thomas DiMillo’s order that Defendant had a good faith belief as to the existence of a written acknowledgment. As such, the Court addresses this argument first. “Under the full faith and credit statute, ‘a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.’” Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 491, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). “Therefore, New York law governs this Court’s collateral estoppel analysis.” Id. “Under New York law, the doctrine of issue preclusion only applies if (1) the issue in question was actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1995). “Issue preclusion…bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). “The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of showing that the identical issue was previously decided, while the party against whom the doctrine is asserted bears the burden of showing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to relitigate in the prior proceeding.” Ho-Shing v. Budd, No. 17 Civ. 4633 (LGS), 2018 WL 2269245, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2018). Plaintiff moved to vacate the state order requiring compliance with the information subpoena pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3), alleging that Defendant had procured the order to compel by fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. (See Dkt. 67-10 at 2). Judge DiMillo denied Plaintiffs request and found that Defendant “had a good faith belief the written acknowledgment existed and was in [Hess's] possession.” (Id.). Judge DiMillo’s Decision and Order, in relevant part, stated: Plaintiff’s counsel at the time, Chiari & Ilecki, LLP, argued that the motion to obtain the Order to Compel was made in good faith based upon a conversation William Ilecki, of counsel, had with his client, also an attorney, confirming there existed a written acknowledgment of debt which was in his client’s possession. The court finds that the Plaintiff had a good faith belief the written acknowledgment existed and was in his client’s possession. (Dkt. 67-10 at 2). In concluding that Defendant acted in good faith, Judge DiMillo cited the conversation between William Ilecki (“Ilecki”) and Hess. Judge DiMillo did not cite any other fact that would be a basis for finding Ilecki had a good faith belief that the signed acknowledgement existed and, thus, Judge DiMillo necessarily found that the conversation had occurred. See Kravitz v. Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrer a & Wold, LLP, No. 2:14-cv-7031 (DRH)(AYS), 2019 WL 1471128, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2019) (in federal FDCPA action, issue of whether “Defendants misrepresented the debt or communicated false credit information” had been “actually and necessarily decided” where state breach of contract action found “Plaintiff was liable for the debt in question” and, thus, necessarily found that “the lawsuit seeking to collect the debt could not have been predicated on false credit information”). Nonetheless, even if the Court were not to give preclusive effect to Judge DiMillo’s finding, the Court finds there are no triable issues of fact as to whether the conversation occurred. In his declaration, Ilecki stated that Hess had contacted him in 2009. (Dkt. 67-17 at 4). Although Hess testified that she could not recall whether she had personally called Ilecki, and that it was unlikely she would have contacted Ilecki herself (Dkt. 70-3 at 48-50), she does not deny the 2009 conversation occurred (see id.). As such, Plaintiff has not rebutted Defendant’s evidence and, thus, there are no triable issues of fact as to whether the 2009 conversation occurred. See Motiva Enterprise LLC v. W.F. Shuck Petroleum, No. 3:10-cv-793 (JCH), 2012 WL 601245, at * 14 (D. Conn. Feb. 22, 2012) (“[The defendant's] assertion that he does not remember signing the document is not, in itself, sufficient to create a material issue of fact to defeat [the plaintiffs] Motion for Summary Judgment.”); Petrunti v. Cablevision, No. 08-CV-2277 (JFB) (AKT), 2009 WL 5214495, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (“Plaintiffs lack of recollection is insufficient…to create a triable issue of fact.”). The Court now turns to the second prong of the bona fide error defense. Judge McCarthy found that Defendant had a subjective good faith belief that Plaintiff had acknowledged the debt in 2006 (Dkt. 87 at 10), but could not conclude “as a matter of law that [Defendant's] reliance upon Hess’s seven-year-old statement that [Plaintiff] had acknowledged the debt, without more, was objectively reasonable” (id. at 9). Plaintiff argues the error was objectively unreasonable as a matter of law because “no reasonable fact finder could conclude that it was reasonable for an attorney to rely on his unaided recollection of a conversation from seven years ago,” in light of Defendant’s volume of cases. (Dkt. 89 at 12). In support, Plaintiff cites to McCollough v. Johnson, 637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011). (Dkt. 89 at 16). However, the Court finds McCollough is distinguishable. In McCollough, the Ninth Circuit determined it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant to rely on their client where the client’s contract with the defendant “expressly disclaimed ‘the accuracy or validity of data provided’ and instructed that [the defendant] was ‘responsible to determine [its] legal and ethical ability to collect’ the account,” and considering the defendant’s own electronic files informed the defendant that the debtor “had asserted a statute of limitations defense to a collection action filed against him in 2005 over the same debt.” McCollough, 637 F.3d at 949. In contrast, here, Hess never expressly disclaimed the accuracy or validity of her statements to Ilecki. Additionally, unlike the defendant in McCollough, Ilecki’s own files did not indicate that Plaintiff had previously asserted a statute of limitations defense or some other objection to the 1992 judgment. (See Dkt. 67-17 at 69 (“Plaintiff never contested the debt, never responded to the information subpoenas or any correspondence from [Defendant's] office, and never appeared with respect to the motion.”)). It was not until January 2017 that Defendant was made aware of a potential issue with the judgment’s collectability and, upon confirming Hess lacked proof of a signed written acknowledgment, Defendant immediately ceased collection activities. (Id. at
