OPINION & ORDER U.S. Bank National Association (“Plaintiff”) brings this Action for quiet title against Walter D. Haskins (“Defendant”), seeking relief under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) §1352. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 2-1); see also Pet. for Removal 1 (Dkt. No. 2).) Currently before the Court are the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment. (See Not. of Pl.’s Mot.; Not. of Def.’s Cross Mot. (Dkt. Nos. 29, 33).) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion, denies Defendant’s Cross Motion, and grants Plaintiff the relief it seeks. I. Background A. Factual Background The following facts are taken from the Parties’ Rule 56.1 Statements and Counterstatements.1 (See Pl.’s 56.1 Statement in Supp. of Mot. (“Pl.’s 56.1″); Def.’s 56.1 Statement in Supp. of Cross. Mot. (“Def.’s 56.1″); Def.’s Counterstatement to Pl.’s 56.1 (“Def.’s Counter 56.1″); Pl.’s Counterstatement to Def.’s 56.1 (“Pl.’s Counter 56.1″) (Dkt. Nos. 30, 35, 36, 41).) Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the real property 549 Purchase Street, Rye, New York 10580 (the “Property”). (Pl.’s 56.1 6.) The ownership arose from a series of transactions, summarized here. On October 11, 2005, Metrocities Mortgage LLC D.B.A. No Red Tape Mortgage (“Metrocities”) gave a mortgage to Christine Principato (“Principato”), the previous owner of the Property, and secured a note of the same date representing a mortgage loan of $617,500. (Id. 8.) On February 14, 2011, Aurora Loan Services LLC (“Aurora”), which had acquired the Principato note and mortgage from Metrocities, commenced an action in Westchester County Supreme Court against Principato for the foreclosure and sale of the Property. (Def.’s 56.1 1.) The note and mortgage were transferred from Aurora to Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”) through an assignment executed on October 5, 2012 and recorded on December 11, 2012. (Id. 2.) The foreclosure action’s notice of pendency, filed on February 14, 2011, was valid for three years. (Pl.’s 56.1 13.) That notice was not re-filed until April 21, 2014, creating a “gap” in the record of the notice of pendency for the foreclosure action. (Id.) On March 25, 2014 — during this gap — Defendant filed an abstract of judgment in the amount of $111,872.57 granted to him by a court in this District against Principato with the County Clerk’s office. (Id. 12; see also Decl. of Paul E. Svensson, Esq. (“Svensson”) in Supp. of Def.’s Cross Mot. (“Svensson Decl.”) Ex. 1 (“Def.’s Judgment”) (Dkt. No. 34-1).) On November 2, 2016, the Westchester County Supreme Court finally granted Nationstar a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. (Def.’s 56.1 8.) On April 10, 2017, the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale was transferred to Plaintiff through an assignment of mortgage, which was executed on April 10, 2017 and recorded on August 4, 2017. (Id. 12.) Plaintiff then purchased the Property through a referee’s deed dated April 25, 2018 and recorded on May 13, 2018. (Pl.’s 56.1 7.) Although the total foreclosure amount was $1,195,310.83, the Property sold for $1,092,218.93, $103,091.93 less than the full amount. (Def.’s 56.1 17.) Defendant was not joined as a party to the initial foreclosure action. (Pl.’s 56.1 15.) Therefore, Defendant’s lien survived the execution of the judgment of foreclosure. (Id. 16.) At the time of the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, the amount owed to the plaintiff in that foreclosure action on the mortgage was $823,147.48, plus interest and other sums delineated in the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. (Id. 17; see also Svensson Decl. Ex. 3 (“Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale”) (Dkt. No. 34-3).) Defendant avers that he did not have “actual or constructive notice of the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale” until the instant Action was commenced in 2018. (Def.’s 56.1 20.) Plaintiff asks the Court to provide Defendant with a period of time within which to redeem his interest in the Property, including the value of any improvements made to the Property by Plaintiff, or face foreclosure of any interest in the Property, thereby clearing the remaining cloud on Plaintiff’s title to the Property. (Compl. 6.) Defendant counterclaims, seeking declaratory judgments that his lien is still valid against the Property; that his lien “takes preference” to Plaintiff’s mortgage lien; and that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Defendant’s lien on the Property filed with the County Clerk, as well as damages in excess of $75,000 based on Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy Defendant’s lien. (Counterclaims
1-4 (Dkt. No. 10 at ECF 4).) B. Procedural Background Plaintiff first filed its Complaint, signed July 17, 2018, on July 18, 2018. (See Compl. 7.) On September 18, 2018, Defendant removed the Action to this Court on diversity grounds. (See generally Pet. for Removal.) Defendant answered the Complaint and filed Counterclaims on September 19, 2018. (See Def.’s Ans. & Counterclaims (Dkt. No. 10).) Plaintiff answered the Counterclaims on October 23, 2018. (See Pl.’s Ans. (Dkt. No. 17).) Plaintiff filed its Notice of Motion and accompanying moving papers on May 22, 2019. (See Not. of Pl.’s Mot.; Pl.’s 56.1; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 31); Aff. in Supp. of Mot. (“Pl.’s Aff.”) (Dkt. No. 32).) Defendant filed his Cross Motion, including his Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, and accompanying papers on June 20, 2019. (See Not. of Def.’s Cross Mot.; Svensson Decl.; Def.’s 56.1; Def.’s Counter 56.1; Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. and in Supp. of Cross Mot. (“Def.’s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 37).) Plaintiff filed its Reply and accompanying papers on July 8, 2019. (See Decl. of Justine Valle, Esq. (“Valle”) in Supp. of Mot. and in Opp’n to Cross Mot. (“Valle Decl.”); Pl.’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. and in Opp’n to Cross Mot. (“Pl.’s Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. Nos. 39, 40); Pl.’s Counter 56.1.) Defendant filed his Reply and accompanying papers on July 22, 2019. (See Svensson Reply Decl. in Opp’n to Mot. and in Supp. of Cross Mot. (“Svensson Reply Decl.”); Def.’s Reply Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. and in Supp. of Cross Mot. (“Def.’s Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. Nos. 42, 43).) II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). “In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,” a court must “construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and…resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); see also Borough of Upper Saddle River v. Rockland Cty. Sewer Dist. No. 1, 16 F. Supp. 3d 294, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same). “It is the movant’s burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists.” Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Berry v. Marchinkowski, 137 F. Supp. 3d 495, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (same). “However, when the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim,” in which case “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” CILP Assocs., L.P. v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[t]o survive a [summary judgment] motion…, [a nonmovant] need[s] to create more than a ‘metaphysical’ possibility that his allegations were correct; he need[s] to ‘come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’” Wrobel v. County of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), “and cannot rely on the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings,” Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 45 F. Supp. 3d 310, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quotation marks omitted); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (“When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documents or other evidentiary materials, the party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading….”). And, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). “On a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 746 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). At this stage, “[t]he role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” Brod, 653 F.3d at 164 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a court’s goal should be “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (quotation marks omitted). However, a district court should consider only evidence that would be admissible at trial. See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 746 (2d Cir. 1998). “[W]here a party relies on affidavits…to establish facts, the statements ‘must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant…is competent to testify on the matters stated.’” DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)). As a general rule, “district courts may not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses at the summary judgment stage.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (noting that at the summary judgment stage, the court is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter”); Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 622 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment.”) (quotation marks omitted). Where the evidence presents “a question of ‘he said, she said’” the court “cannot…take a side at the summary judgment stage.” Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 726 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Kassel v. City of Middletown, 272 F. Supp. 3d 516, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting that “it is not the role of the [c]ourt at summary judgment to resolve [a] factual clash”); Bale v. Nastasi, 982 F. Supp. 2d 250, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that “[w]here each side…tells a story that is at least plausible and would allow a jury to find in its favor, it is for the jury to make the credibility determinations and apportion liability, and not for the court.”). And, even if the non-movant’s evidence is “thin, [a non-movant's] own sworn statement is adequate to counter summary judgment.” Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 290-91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that “[t]he credibility of [Plaintiff's] statements and the weight of contradictory evidence may only be evaluated by a finder of fact.”). B. Applicable Law Generally, the plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action is required to join as a party to that action any person whose lien or incumbrance is claimed to be subject and subordinate to the plaintiff’s lien. See N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. §1311(3). Junior lienholders are typically required to be joined to foreclosure actions because “the underlying objective of foreclosure actions [is] to extinguish the rights of redemption of all those who have a subordinate interest in the property and to vest complete title in the purchase at the judicial sale.” 6820 Ridge Realty LLC v. Goldman, 701 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When a necessary party is omitted from the foreclosure action, “that party’s rights [are] unaffected by the judgment and sale, and the foreclosure may be considered void as to the omitted party.” Id. (citations omitted). “However, in such cases, the purchaser of the foreclosed property has two potential remedies — the commencement of a strict foreclosure action pursuant to RPAPL [§] 1352, or a reforeclosure action pursuant to [§] 1503.” Id. When the purchaser chooses to pursue a strict foreclosure action, RPAPL §1352 “authorizes the court to issue a judgment that fixes a time period within which any person having a right of redemption or right to foreclose a subordinate lien must act to redeem or begin a foreclosure action. If the person having a right of redemption or subordinate lien fails to redeem the property or commence a foreclosure action within the time period fixed by the court, such person shall be excluded from claiming any title or interest in such property and all title or interest of such person…shall thereby be extinguished and terminated.” Id. (citing N.Y. Real. Prop. Acts. §1352) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “a judgment of strict foreclosure cures a defect in the judgment or sale under the first foreclosure.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The alternative remedy — an action for reforeclosure under RPAPL §1503, when read together with §1523(1) — provides that “a judgment of reforeclosure may be issued only where it appears that there was a defect in the original foreclosure proceeding…which was not occasioned by the fraud or willful neglect of the plaintiff.” Id. at 27 (citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted). “In contrast, [RPAPL §] 1352 places no such limitation on the right to obtain a judgment of strict foreclosure.” Id. (alterations omitted) (emphasis added).2 The section of the RPAPL that provides for strict procedure reads in full: Where real property has been sold pursuant to a judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, and an action is thereafter brought to foreclose or extinguish a right of redemption in such real property, the judgment, instead of directing a sale of the property, shall fix the right of any person having a right of redemption therein or the right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien and shall provide that a failure to redeem or commence an action for the foreclosure of such mortgage or other lien within such time shall preclude such person having a right of redemption or the holder of such mortgage or other lien from redeeming such property or foreclosing such mortgage or other lien, and thereafter such person having a right of redemption or the holder of such mortgage or other lien shall be excluded from claiming any title or interest in such property and all title or interest of such person having a right of redemption in, or the right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien against such property shall thereby be extinguished and terminated. N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. §1352. C. Application At the outset, it is clear that Defendant’s lien is subordinate to the mortgage under which Plaintiff purchased the property. The mortgage — which was ultimately transferred to Plaintiff through a series of assignments, (see Def.’s 56.1
