DECISION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Proceeding pro se, Christopher Vega (“Vega” or “Movant”) has filed a Motion to Vacate the Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (“Section 2255″). For the reasons discussed below, the Section 2255 Motion is denied. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 19, 2017, Vega appeared with his defense attorney, Mark Hosken, Esq. (“Trial Counsel”) before Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr., United States District Judge, and entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 4 of a four-count Indictment. Count 1 charged Vega with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1); Count 4 charged him with possession of firearms, including a short-barreled rifle,1 in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A)(i). See Plea Agreement (ECF #36). The parties agreed that the aggregate sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) was 177 to 191 months. The Plea Agreement provided that, should the Court impose a sentence within that range or less, Vega would be precluded from directly or collaterally challenging his sentence. In signing the Plea Agreement, Vega averred that he had read it and had a full opportunity to discuss it with Trial Counsel, that it represented the total agreement reached between himself and the Government, and that he had not been made any promises or representations other than what was contained in the agreement. The Plea Agreement was executed in open court following an extensive plea colloquy during which the Court carefully reviewed the Plea Agreement’s salient terms. See Transcript of 6/19/17 Plea Proceeding (“Plea. Tr.”), Government’s Exhibit 2 (“Ex. 2″) (ECF #3). The Court confirmed that Vega was of sound mind and had not been coerced in any way into entering the plea of guilty. Plea Tr., pp. 2-3. The Court also confirmed that Vega reviewed the Plea Agreement with his attorney, and that he was satisfied with Trial Counsel’s representation. Id., p. 3. The Court informed Vega of the charges against him, the maximum penalties applicable to each, the elements of the charged offenses, and also confirmed that there was a factual basis to support the guilty pleas. Id., pp. 4-9. Vega affirmed several times that one of the firearms he possessed was a sawed-off, short-barreled rifle. Id., pp. 7, 8, 9, 18. The Court further confirmed Vega’s understanding of the Guidelines as they applied to Count 1, and that the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for Count 4 must be run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 1. Plea Tr., pp. 9-11. Further, the Court ascertained that Vega understood that when the sentences regarding Counts 1 and 4 were combined, he faced an aggregate sentencing range of 177 to 191 months. Id., p. 11. Vega confirmed his understanding that, if he were sentenced within that range, he would be waiving his right to directly appeal the sentence. Id., pp. 12-13. When asked if there was anything about the Plea Aagreement that he did not understand or if he had any questions for counsel, Vega replied in the negative. Id., pp. 13-14. Vega then executed the plea agreement in the presence of the Court and both parties. Id., pp. 14-15. The Court read aloud the criminal charges to which Vega was pleading, Vega entered pleas of “guilty” to both Counts 1 and 4. Plea Tr., pp. 15-16. The Court then reviewed the substance of the colloquy he had had with Vega, wherein Vega expressed his understanding of the charges against him, acknowledged the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights, and articulated a sufficient factual basis for his plea. The Court found that based upon Vega’s statements on the record, the “plea is in all respects knowing and voluntary.” Therefore, the Court “does accept the plea of guilty.” Id., p. 21. At sentencing on September 20, 2017, Trial Counsel confirmed that the defense had no objections to the Pre-Sentencing Report (“PSR”). See Transcript of 9/20/2017 Sentencing Proceeding (“Sentencing Tr.”), Gov’t Ex. 3 (ECF #3), p. 2. Vega did make a statement to the Court but at no time objected to the fact that one of the firearms he admitted to possessing was classified as a sawed-off, short-barreled rifle. Sentencing Tr., pp. 7-10. The Court adopted the PSR. After addressing the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553, the Court departed downward on Count 1 and sentenced Vega principally to an aggregate term of 144 months’ imprisonment. Id. pp. 2, 10-15. After notifying Vega of his right to appeal and advising him to discuss potential appellate issues with Trial Counsel, the Court observed that because he was sentenced within the parameters of the Plea Agreement, he had waived his right to appeal. Id., p. 22. Vega did not file a notice of appeal. On September 21, 2018, Vega filed the instant Section 2255 Motion (ECF #47), asserting that Trial Counsel failed to provide constitutionally effective assistance because he did not file a Notice of Appeal despite Vega asking him to do so. After being directed to respond to the Section 2255 Motion, the Government filed a Motion for Order to Compel Affidavit asking the Court to compel Trial Counsel to submit an affidavit Vega asked him to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court (Geraci, D.J.) granted the motion in an Order dated November 14, 2018, finding that by pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to file a Notice of Appeal, Vega had waived the attorney-client privilege protecting his communications with Trial Counsel on this issue. The Government filed its Response (ECF #61) on November 5, 2019. Per the terms of the Judge Geraci’s previous scheduling text order, any reply from Vega was due within 20 days of his receipt of the Government’s Response. To date, Vega has not filed a reply or sought an extension of time in which to do so. The Section 2255 Motion was transferred to the undersigned on November 7, 2019. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER SECTION 2255 Section 2255 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(a). A court may dismiss a Section 2255 motion without a hearing if the motion and the record “conclusively show[,]” id., that the movant is not entitled to relief. See, e.g., Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2001) (district court was not required to hold full testimonial hearing before deciding federal prisoner’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence based on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel prevented him from exercising his right to testify on his own behalf, where prisoner made only general allegation, and record was supplemented by detailed affidavit from trial counsel credibly describing circumstances concerning prisoner’s failure to testify). MERITS OF THE SECTION 2255 MOTION I. The Ineffective Assistance Claims A. Standard of Review “A defendant in criminal proceedings has a right under the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance from his attorney at all critical stages in the proceedings, which include entry of a plea of guilty…and sentencing[.]” Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2013)(citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-04 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967)). To succeed on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must fulfill a two-part test. First, the defendant “must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687 (1984), such that, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,” id. at 690. In addition, the defendant must show “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” id. at 687. Prejudice is generally defined as “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694. In the particular context of guilty pleas, the prejudice prong requires the defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. “With respect to a claim of ineffective assistance in sentencing, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s substandard performance, he would have received a less severe sentence.” Gonzalez, 722 F.3d at 130 (citing Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012); Glover, 531 U.S. at 203 (“Authority does not suggest that a minimal amount of additional time in prison cannot constitute prejudice. Quite to the contrary, our jurisprudence suggests that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.”). An ineffective assistance claim must be rejected if the defendant fails to meet either prong of the Strickland test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. B. Trial Counsel’s Alleged Errors 1. Failure to File a Notice of Appeal a. Overview This particular claim of ineffective assistance is premised on Vega’s assertion the rifle-barrel of one of the weapons he was accused of possessing2 was shortened by law enforcement officials after they seized it from his home. See Section 2255 Motion (ECF #47), pp. 5-6, 8. Vega claims he was unaware it was shortened and believed it was longer than 26 inches at the time he possessed it. Id., p. 5. In considering whether the failure to file a notice of appeal constitutes ineffective assistance, the Second Circuit has “adopted the Seventh Circuit’s approach under which counsel is ineffective only when ignoring a defendant’s explicit direction to file an appeal.” Fernandez v. United States, 146 F.3d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citing Morales v. United States, 143 F.3d 94, 96-96 (2d Cir. 1998); Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1994)). In Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2006), the Second Circuit extended the Supreme Court’s holding in Roe v. Flores — Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), to situations where a defendant has voluntarily waived his right to appeal. Specifically, the Second Circuit held in Campusano that the defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by ignoring the defendant’s “specific instruction” to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding the defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. Id. at 773, 775 (citing Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477). In Campusano, the Second Circuit announced that “w[]hen a defendant claims that his attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal, the following proceedings will ensue: (1) a hearing before the district court pursuant to §2255 to determine whether the client requested the appeal; (2) an appeal from the district court’s ruling, should either party seek one; and (3) a direct appeal if the defendant did in fact request that a notice of appeal be filed.” 442 F.3d at 776. The Second Circuit described the fact-finding it now requires as “relatively simple” and noted that “the district court has discretion to determine if a testimonial hearing will be conducted.” Id. (citing Chang, 250 F.3d at 85 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that, “although a hearing may be warranted, that conclusion does not imply that a movant must always be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing”)). For instance, the Second Circuit held in Chang that, where the defendant and his counsel submitted conflicting affidavits on the question of whether defense counsel had denied the defendant the opportunity to testify in his own defense, the district court “reasonably decided that “the testimony of [the defendant] and his trial counsel would add little or nothing to the written submissions[,]” 250 F.3d at 86, especially given that the defendant relied “ solely on his own highly self-serving and improbable assertions” while counsel offered a “detailed description of events [that] was eminently credible.” Id. Following Campusano, district courts have routinely resolved ineffective assistance claims premised on the alleged failure to file a notice of appeal without requiring a full testimonial hearing. E.g., Kapelioujnyi v. United States, 779 F. Supp.2d 250, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 422 F. App’x 25 (2d Cir. 2011); Garcia v. United States, No. 02 CR. 1033LBS, 2007 WL 1295726, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2007), aff’d, 321 F. App’x 90 (2d Cir. 2009). b. An Evidentiary Hearing Is Unnecessary Under Campusano, the first step is determining whether an appeal, in fact, was requested. As discussed below, the Court finds that the evidence in the record does not substantiate Vega’s claim that he requested an appeal. Consequently, there is no need for a full testimonial hearing. At the outset, the Court reviews the statements Vega made before filing his Section 2255 Motion regarding his understanding of the factual basis for Count 4. First, Vega signed the Plea Agreement and, in doing so, confirmed that he had read, understood, and agreed with the Agreement’s description of the rifle in question as a sawed-off .22 long rifle caliber, Marlin 795 semi-automatic rifle, bearing serial number 98460559. He further agreed that it was short-barreled rifle having a barrel length of 11 5/8 inches and an over-all length of 21 15/16 inches. Gov’t Ex. 1 (ECF #3),
5a, 5b. Then, in open court at the plea hearing, Vega stated under oath that he knowingly possessed the sawed-off .22 long rifle caliber Marlin 795 semi-automatic rifle, and that it was short-barreled rifle. Gov’t Ex. 2, p. 8. Next, the PSR, which Vega reviewed, described the rifle as a short-barreled rifle, referring to it in six different paragraphs. See PSR, p. 1,
