Plaintiff Lodging Solutions, doing business as Accommodations Plus International (“API”), has moved for a preliminary injunction blocking Defendant Robert Miller from beginning his employment at Defendant Corporate Lodging Consultants (“CLC”) and its parent company, Defendant Fleetcor Technologies. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.1 I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Plaintiff API is a travel management company that helps crews and employees in the airline, cruise line, and rail industries find lodging. This is largely accomplished through their technology platform. For nearly a decade, Defendant Robert Miller was a Vice President of Business Development and a successful salesman for API; but on October 18, 2019, Miller submitted his letter of resignation. Now, Miller seeks to take his talents to Defendant Fleetcor, and specifically CLC, its subsidiary. CLC operates primarily in the corporate lodging space, as opposed to the transportation sector. However, they do provide lodging for rail crews, as does API. This litigation arises out of Miller’s attempted move to CLC. B. Procedural History On November 11, 2019, Plaintiff sued Defendants in New York Supreme Court, alleging breach of a restrictive covenant in Miller’s employment agreement, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, breach of a duty of loyalty, and tortious interference. Plaintiff subsequently added a claim that Fleetcor breached a non-solicitation clause contained in a non-disclosure agreement executed while Fleetcor was in talks to buy API. Plaintiff also moved for temporary injunctive relief ordering Miller to return any confidential API information still in his possession, preventing him from using or accessing any API confidential information, and preventing him from beginning his new position at CLC. The state court judge granted some of the temporary relief, including blocking Miller from using any API confidential information, but denied the request to enjoin Miller from beginning his new employment at CLC. Plaintiff then discontinued the state court action and, on November 21, 2019, filed this action alleging the same claims as above, while also adding a federal misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order: 1) enjoining Miller from accessing his Outlook email; 2) ordering Miller to return all API data still in his possession; 3) enjoining Miller from using any nonpublic API information; 4) ordering Miller to provide API access to his electronic devices; 5) enjoining Fleetcor from allowing Miller to begin employment there; and 6) ordering Fleetcor to perform on its contract with API. Defendants consented to much of this relief. Specifically, they stipulated to an order: 1) enjoining Miller from copying or sharing information in his Microsoft Outlook cloud account; 2) ordering Miller to return any API data still in his possession; 3) enjoining Miller from using any nonpublic information obtained from API; and 4) ordering Miller to provide API with access to all electronic devices that he used to store, access, or otherwise interact with API data. See Dkt. No. 8. But Defendants again objected to an order preventing Miller from beginning his new position at CLC. On November 22, 2019, this Court denied the motion for a TRO enjoining Miller from beginning his new employment, on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of showing irreparable harm. Notwithstanding the Court’s decision, Defendants voluntarily decided to push back Miller’s start date into the new year, and have agreed that the temporary relief enjoining Miller from using API confidential information will remain in place for the pendency of this action. Tr. 299:3-12. Plaintiff then converted its motion for a TRO into a motion for a preliminary injunction, with the intention of augmenting the evidentiary record. For purposes of this preliminary injunction motion, the only issue before the Court is whether Miller may begin his employment at CLC during the pendency of this litigation.2 The Court held an evidentiary hearing on December 17, 2019, and the parties gave oral summations on December 19, 2019. II. DISCUSSION A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must show (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.” Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 639 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of showing irreparable harm. The Second Circuit has described irreparable harm as an “injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 660 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Forest City Daly Hous., Inc. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1999)). “Irreparable harm…is the ‘sine qua non for preliminary injunctive relief.’” JBR, Inc. v. Keurig Green Mt., Inc., 618 F. App’x 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1295 (2d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, a Court must find a “likelihood that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted…’before the other requirements for the issuance of [a preliminary] injunction will be considered.’” JBR, Inc., 618 F. App’x at 33 (quoting Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam)) (last alteration in original). Plaintiff advances several theories as to how Miller’s employment at CLC would lead to irreparable harm. The Court addresses each of these in turn. A. Miller Is Unlikely to Misappropriate Trade Secrets Plaintiff claims that Miller possesses API trade secrets, principally in the form of details regarding API’s contracts with its customers and the ways in which API customizes its technology platform for individual customers. It contends that if Plaintiff does not have physical or electronic copies of this information, then he at the very least possesses it by virtue of his memory. Plaintiff further argues that Miller is likely to misappropriate these alleged trade secrets if he goes to work for CLC. Misappropriation of trade secrets can in some cases lead to irreparable harm. See Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2009). Defendants disagree that Miller possesses trade secret information and further dispute that Miller is likely to even disclose or otherwise use this information in his new position. The Court concludes that even if the information at issue constitutes trade secrets, Miller is unlikely to misappropriate, use, or disclose this information in his new role at CLC. First, the Court finds that Miller is unlikely to intentionally use or disclose any of the information that API claims to be a trade secret. Miller stated under oath, repeatedly and unambiguously that he will not use or disclose any of the information deemed by API to be confidential, including contact information, for at least his first year at CLC. See, e.g., Tr. 201-204. The Court credits this testimony. See IBM Corp. v. Visentin, Case No. 11-cv-399, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), aff’d, 437 F. App’x 53 (2d Cir. 2011); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Imhof, 620 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Ron Rogers, President of CLC, further stated in a sworn affidavit that Miller’s new position will not require him to disclose trade secret information. See Rogers Affidavit, Dkt. No. 11,
