Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of defendant’s motion and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. Papers NYSCEF Doc. Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Exhibits Annexed 20-27 Notice of Cross Motion, Affirmation and Exhibits Annexed 29-30 Affirmation in Opposition and Exhibits Annexed 32, 33 Reply Affirmation 35, 36 DECISION / ORDER Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on this application is as follows: This is a personal injury action. Plaintiff has asserted claims under Labor Law §§240(1), 241(6), 200 and common law negligence. Plaintiff was working as a grip foreman on the construction crew for a televison show. His supervisor was the “key grip.” Plaintiff was injured on August 17, 2015 when a 350-pound wall (8 feet x 10 feet) from a stage set, which had earlier been built and then dismantled by plaintiff and other workers, fell onto plaintiff while it was being pushed into a truck from the lift gate by plaintiff and other workers. Apparently, while pushing the stage set wall into the truck, the wall (which was too big for the box truck) became jammed, and in working to free it, the wall fell on plaintiff, who was unable to jump out of the way quickly enough, and injured his wrist. Defendant Elms Realty Corp., the owner of the premises, including the parking lot where plaintiff’s accident took place, moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff cross-moves for partial summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law §240 (1) claim. Defendant contends that plaintiff is not covered by the Labor Law as the stage set was not a “structure” within the ambit of the Labor Law, that the work of loading the set onto a truck did not involve altering or repairing a building or structure, and that an injury sustained while moving a heavy object is not in itself actionable under Labor Law §240 (1). Further, the defendant contends that it was in no way negligent, that it did not supervise the means and methods of plaintiff’s work, and that the Industrial Code provisions which plaintiff relies on in support of plaintiff’s Labor Law §241 (6) claim do not apply to the work plaintiff was doing. Finally, defendant contends that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, as it was plaintiff who was supervising the work at all relevant times, and he acknowledged at his EBT that he did not follow his own practices and procedures on the date of his accident. Specifically, he testified that he would ordinarily have jumped off the truck to get out of the way. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability because he was injured during the demolition and/or alteration of a stage set shed, which is essentially a free standing room, which is a structure which Labor Law §240 (1) applies to, and that he was injured by a falling object. Defendant’s EBT witness testified that plaintiff’s employer, Warner Brothers, had subleased an indoor space for one week from one of the tenants and had leased the alley way for one week from the property owner, an outdoor space. (EBT Page 5-7). Defendant also argues that no construction work was described in Warner Brothers’ contract to use the space for filming a TV show. A party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate his, her, or its entitlement thereto as a matter of law, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) (Smalls v. AJI Indus., Inc., 10 NY3d 733, 735 [2008]). To defeat summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must show that there is a material question of fact that requires a trial (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Labor Law §240 (1) Labor Law §240 (1) imposes upon owners and general contractors a non-delegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites (see McCarthy v. Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 374 [2011]; Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 500 [1993]; Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 512-513 [1991]). Absolute liability is imposed upon both owners and contractors who violate the statute by failing to provide or erect necessary safety devices for the protection of workers exposed to elevation-related hazards, and where such failure is a proximate cause of the accident (see Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d at 513; Bland v. Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452, 459 [1985]; Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 521[1985]; Henry v. Eleventh Ave., L.P., 87 AD3d 523, 524 [2011]). The statute’s provisions are expressly applied “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” (McCoy v. Kirsch, 99 AD3d 13, 15 [2d Dept 2012]). This statutory duty is not diminished by a plaintiff’s contributory fault (see Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991]), and is imposed regardless of whether the owner, general contractor, or statutory agent with the authority to control the work actually exercises supervision or control over the plaintiff’s work (see Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 500 [1993]). “Proper protection” requires that the device must be appropriately placed or erected so that it would have safeguarded the employee (see Bland v. Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452, 460 [1985]), and that the furnished device itself must be adequate to protect against the hazards entailed in the performance of the particular task which the employee was assigned to do (see Bland v. Manocherian, 66 NY2d at 461; see also Klein v. City of New York, 89 NY2d 833, 834-835 [1996] ["Labor Law §240 (1) requires that safety devices such as ladders be so 'constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection' to a worker"]). To prevail on a cause of action pursuant to Labor Law §240 (1), the plaintiff must establish both “a violation of the statute and that the violation was a proximate cause of his injuries” (Skalko v. Marshall’s Inc., 229 AD2d 569, 570 [2d Dept 1996], citing Bland v. Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452 [1985]; Keane v. Sin Hang Lee, 188 AD2d 636 [2d Dept 1992]; see also Rakowicz v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 56 AD3d 747 [2d Dept 2008]; Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 524 [1985]). The purpose of Labor Law §240 (1) is to protect workers “from the pronounced risks arising from construction work site elevation differentials” (Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 603 [2009]; see also Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 514 [1991]; Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]). Consequently, Labor Law §240 (1) applies to accidents and injuries that directly flow from the application of the force of gravity to an object or to the injured worker performing a protected task (Gasques v. State of New York, 15 NY3d 869 [2010]; Vislocky v. City of New York, 62 AD3d 785, 786 [2d Dept 2009], lv dismissed 13 NY3d 857 [2009]; see also Ienco v. RFD Second Ave., LLC, 41 AD3d 537 [2d Dept 2007]; Ortiz v. Turner Constr. Co., 28 AD3d 627 [2d Dept 2006]; Lacey v. Turner Constr. Co., 275 AD2d 734, 735 [2d Dept 2000]; Smith v. Artco Indus. Laundries, 222 AD2d 1028 [4th Dept 1995]). “While the reach of section 240 (1) is not limited to work performed on actual construction sites, the task in which an injured employee was engaged must have been performed during “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” (Martinez v. City of New York, 93 NY2d 322, 326 [1999] [internal citation omitted]). Under Labor Law §240 (1), a “structure” is “any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner” (Lewis-Moors v. Contel of New York, Inc., 78 NY2d 942, 943 [1991] quoting Caddy v. Interborough R. T. Co., 195 NY 415, 420 [1909]). In its decision in McCoy v. Kirsch, 99 AD3d 13, 15-17 [2d Dept 2012], the Second Department provides this analysis: “Over a century ago, the Court of Appeals made clear that the meaning of the word “structure,” as used in the Labor Law, is not limited to houses or buildings (see Caddy v. Interborough R.T. Co., 195 NY 415, 420, 88 NE 747, 20 NY Ann Cas 198 [1909]). The Court stated, in pertinent part, that “the word ‘structure’ in its broadest sense includes any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner” (id.). Since the legislature definitionally applied Labor Law §240 (1) to buildings or structures, a structure, by implication, may include constructs that are less substantial and perhaps more transitory than buildings. Indeed, courts have applied the term “structure” to several diverse items such as a utility pole with attached hardware and cables (see Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 NY2d 942, 943, 578 NE2d 434, 573 NYS2d 636 [1991]; Girty v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 262 AD2d 1012, 1013, 691 NYS2d 822 [1999]), a ticket booth at a convention center (see Panico v. Advanstar Communications, Inc., 92 AD3d 656, 938 NYS2d 168 [2012]), a substantial free-standing Shell gasoline sign (see Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 NY2d 1000, 1001, 654 NE2d 1210, 630 NYS2d 962 [1995]), a shanty located within an industrial basement used for storing tools (see Henry v. Eleventh Ave., L.P., 87 AD3d at 523-524), a crane used for construction (see Cun-En Lin v. Holy Family Monuments, 18 AD3d 800, 801, 796 NYS2d 684 [2005]; Cornacchione v. Clark Concrete Co., 278 AD2d 800, 801, 723 NYS2d 572 [2000]), a power screen being assembled at a gravel pit (see Hodges v. Boland’s Excavating & Topsoil, Inc., 24 AD3d 1089, 1091, 807 NYS2d 421 [2005]), a pumping station (see Cabri v. ICOS Corp. of Am., 240 AD2d 456, 457, 658 NYS2d 646 [1997]), a utility van (see Moore v. Shulman, 259 AD2d 975, 688 NYS2d 854 [1999]), and a window exhibit at a home improvement show (see Sinzieri v. Expositions, Inc., 270 AD2d 332, 333, 704 NYS2d 293 [2000]). All of the foregoing items and devices meet the standard set forth by the Court of Appeals in Caddy that constituent parts be artificially built up or joined together in a definite, deliberate manner (see Caddy v. Interborough R.T. Co., 195 NY at 420)…. Whether an item is or is not a “structure” is fact-specific and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In determining each case, courts may consider a number of relevant factors. These factors should include, but are not necessarily limited to, the item’s size, purpose, design, composition, and degree of complexity; the ease or difficulty of its assembly and disassembly; the tools required to create it and dismantle it; the manner and degree of its interconnecting parts; and the amount of time the item is to exist. However, no one factor should be deemed controlling. Contrary to defendant’s contention, our courts have found temporary structures similar to the stage set shed at issue here to be a “structure” under the Labor Law (see McCoy v. Abigail Kirsch at Tappan Hill, Inc., 99 AD3d 13, 16 [2d Dept 2012] [and the cases cited therein]). Thus, the case at bar must be considered by comparing the facts here with the facts in similar cases. In McCoy v. Abigail Kirsch at Tappan Hill, Inc. (99 AD3d at 16), the court found that dismantling a wedding canopy (after the wedding) was work on a “structure.” In Panico v. Advanstar Communications, Inc. (92 AD3d 656, 657 [2d Dept 2012]) the court found that an electrician who worked full time for the Javits Convention Center who was hanging a light on a booth that had been erected for a trade show at the Convention Center was not doing work that involved a “significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the…structure.” In both of these cases, decided a few months apart, the structure was temporary and the plaintiff fell from a ladder. The distinction appears to be that the worker taking apart the wedding canopy was working on the structure itself, while the worker who was putting a light on a booth at the Convention Center was not working on the structure, as the lamp in question clipped onto the frame of the booth, without tools. The court next reviews the falling object cases, which are similarly very fact specific. In Travers v. RCPI Landmark Props., LLC (74 AD3d 956 [2d Dept 2010]), a stagehand who was a full time employee at a theater who was injured by a falling audio speaker was found not to be doing covered work, as he was tasked with moving speakers on a stage to specific locations for a show at the theater and was not involved in the erection of a temporary structure. Similarly, in Holler v. City of NY (38 AD3d 606 [2d Dept 2007]), a worker installing a hoist motor for lifting scenery at a theater that he worked for as a full time employee, in preparation for a new show, was determined to be doing work more in the nature of routine maintenance, outside of the context of construction work. In contrast, in Rutkowski v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp. (146 AD3d 686 [1st Dept 2017]), the First Department reversed the dismissal of a Labor Law §240 (1) claim where a plaintiff, who was removing furniture from a temporary exhibition booth at the conclusion of a trade show when a lighting bar that was simultaneously being removed from the top of the temporary booth by electricians fell and struck him in the head, implicitly recognizing the temporary booth to be a structure within the ambit of the Labor Law. In Shea v. Bloomberg L.P., 124 AD3d 621 [2d Dept 2015], a stage hand injured during the breakdown phase of stages and carnival attractions constructed on Randall’s Island for a private party was held to have raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he was performing covered work at the time he was injured. Here, the plaintiff’s work included constructing, and later disassembling, the stage set shed, consisting of three walls and a roof as well as a fourth wall with a built-in steel window. This was construction, and later was demolition, of a temporary structure within the ambit of the Labor Law, akin to the work on the wedding canopy in McCoy v. Abigail Kirsch at Tappan Hill, Inc. (99 AD3d 13, 16; see also Kharie v. South Shore Record Mgt., Inc., 118 AD3d 955, 956 [2nd Dept 2014] [fall while dismantling shelves in a warehouse that were to be reassembled in a different portion of the warehouse]; Sinzieri v. Expositions, Inc., 270 AD2d 332, 333 [2nd Dept 2000] [fall while dismantling a trade show exhibit]). The court finds that, considering all relevant factors, the stage set here was a “structure” which plaintiff was working on dismantling. A very recent case, decided after these motions were argued, has similar facts to those herein. In Ali v. Sloan-Kettering Inst., 176 AD3d 561 [1st Dept 2019], a plaintiff was injured when an air conditioner coil that weighed approximately 300 pounds tipped over while on the truck’s liftgate and fell on his leg as he and three coworkers were unloading it. The court held that “in view of the weight of the coil and the amount of force it was able to generate, even in falling a relatively short distance, plaintiff’s injury resulted from a failure to provide the protections required by Labor Law Section 240(1)…moving the coil safely required either hoisting equipment or a device designed to secure the coil against tipping or falling over. No such equipment was provided.” In the case at bar, plaintiff testified that the wall was brought to the truck on a Hollywood Jack, which secured it and had wheels so it could be rolled. The wall was removed from this piece of equipment because it could not fit into the truck while secured on it. Clearly, plaintiff should have been provided with a larger truck. He testified that he had no supervision or control over the truck or its driver, who was in a different union than plaintiff. The fact that the structure here had already been disassembled at the time of the accident does not take the plaintiff’s claim out of the Labor Law (see Saint v. Syracuse Supply Co., 25 NY3d 117, 124 [2015] [determining whether plaintiff was engaged in the type of work covered by section 240 (1) is not limited to plaintiff's activity at the moment of his injury]; Shea v. Bloomberg, L.P., 124 AD3d 621, 621-622 [1st Dept 2013] [accident occurred when plaintiff was on his way from the parking lot to the staging tent to receive his work assignment in braking down temporary stages and canopies for a corporate party]; Pino v. Robert Martin Co., 22 AD3d at 552 [2d Dept 2005] ["While removing boxes from shelves is not a protected activity under Labor Law §241 (6), the plaintiff's placement of the ladder in preparation for the removal of the boxes to be followed by the dismantling of the shelves was 'work incidental to or associated with the total or partial dismantling…of a…structure'" for purposes of a Labor Law §241(6) claim]). Similarly, the fact that the stage set wall was being loaded onto a truck on the same level as plaintiff at the time of the accident (here, on an elevated lift gate) does not bar the Labor Law §240(1) claim. There is no bar to recovery where an object’s base rests on the same level as the plaintiff (see Wilinski v. 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1, 9 [2011]). The test is “whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential” (Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 603 [2009]; see also Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of Americas, L.L.C., 22 NY3d 658, 662-663 [2014] ["In order to prevail on summary judgment in a section 240(1) "falling object" case…the plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking" [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Here, as in Ali v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research (176 AD3d 561 [1st Dept 2019]), safely moving the stage set wall from the lift gate of the truck into the truck “required either hoisting equipment or a device designed to secure the [wall] against tipping or falling over.” Further, to the extent plaintiff’s own actions may have played a role in causing the accident, it would constitute contributory negligence and was not the sole proximate cause of his injuries (see Portes v. New York State Thruway Auth., 112 AD3d 1049, 1050-1051 [3rd Dept 2013] ["While this action by claimant (attaching his lanyard to the suspension cable) could go to comparative negligence (which is not available in a Labor Law §240 [1] action), it was not the sole proximate cause of the accident and does not establish the recalcitrant worker defense”]; Morales v. Spring Scaffolding, Inc., 24 AD3d 42, 48-49 [1st Dept 2005] ["Even if plaintiff had been sitting on the parapet wall…(t)he sidewalk bridge was an inadequate safety device that was improperly and negligently constructed in violation of applicable codes and rules. At most, plaintiff's conduct would constitute negligence, not the sole proximate cause"]). Accordingly, plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to partial summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law §240 (1) claim and defendant has failed to raise an issue of fact to overcome it. Labor Law §241(6) Labor Law §241(6) imposes a non-delegable duty upon owners and general contractors to comply with the applicable provisions of the Industrial Code, in particular, those which mandate compliance with specific, concrete specifications (see Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 502, 505 [1993]; Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 NY2d 290, 300 [1978]). The interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation and the determination of whether a particular condition is within the scope of the regulation presents questions of law for the court (see Messina v. City of New York, 300 AD2d 121, 122 [1st Dept 2002]). To establish liability under Labor Law §241(6), a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation by the defendant of an Industrial Code rule or regulation which mandates compliance with a specific, positive command (Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]; Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 348-349 [1998]). Such a violation does not impose per se liability, but may be considered in evaluating defendant’s negligence (Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 515 [2009]; Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 522 [1985]; see Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d at 349-350). Upon proof of negligence, other statutorily responsible parties become vicariously liable without regard to their particularized fault (Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 502, n 4). Further, unlike Labor Law §240(1), plaintiff’s comparative negligence may be considered (see Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 NY3d at 515; Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d at 350; Maza v. University Ave. Dev. Corp., 13 AD3d at 66 ["Negligence on plaintiff's part may require an apportionment of liability but does not absolve defendants of their own liability under §241(6)"]). Liability under Labor Law §241(6), as with Labor Law §240(1), is not limited to accidents at a building construction site, but includes “work of the types performed in the construction, erection, alteration, repair, maintenance, painting or moving of buildings or other structures,” as construction work is defined in 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13) (Joblon v. Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 466 [1998]). Thus, to be covered by Labor Law §241(6), an injury must arise out of such work (see Esposito v. New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 NY3d 526, 528 [2003]; Rodriguez v. 1-10 Indus. Assoc., LLC, 30 AD3d 576, 577 [2d Dept 2006]). “Demolition is defined [by 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(16)] as ‘work incidental to or associated with the total or partial dismantling or razing of a building or other structure including the removing or dismantling of machinery or other equipment’” (Wade v. Atl. Cooling Tower Servs., Inc., 56 AD3d 547, 549 [2d Dept 2008] [holding that demolishing a part of the sprinkler system attached to a cooling tower constituted the demolition of a structure within the meaning of Labor Law §241(6)]; Kharie v. S. Shore Record Mgmt., Inc., 118 AD3d 955, 956 [2d Dept 2014] ["Demolition, for purposes of the statute, is defined under 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(16), and specifically includes "dismantling" (internal citation omitted)]). Thus, the dismantling of the stage set here may well have constituted demolition for purposes of Labor Law §241(6) (see Pino v. Robert Martin Co., 22 AD3d at 552 ["Since the shelving is a structure, and because the plaintiff was directed to dismantle this structure, we find that he was engaged in demolition work covered by Labor Law §241(6)"]). Further, the loading of the dismantled stage set onto a truck would presumably be part of that covered work (see Shea v. Bloomberg, L.P., 124 AD3d at 621-622 [plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he was engaged in construction or demolition work when he was ejected from the rear cargo box of a John Deere Gator utility vehicle while on his way from the parking lot to the staging tent to receive his work assignment in connection with breaking down, among other things, temporary stages and canopies for a corporate party]). However, for a Labor Law §241 (6) claim, the plaintiff must also plead and prove the violation of a specific and applicable Industrial Code regulation (see Garcia v. 225 E. 57th St. Owners, Inc., 96 AD3d at 91) and none of the Industrial Code provisions which plaintiff relies on in this action are applicable to these facts. Loading the wall onto a truck was not the demolition of an exterior wall under Industrial Code §23-3.3(b)(5) and there is no evidence that a lack of sound footing caused or contributed to the accident. Similarly, the work did not involve weakened or deteriorated floors or walls or loosened material under Industrial Code §23-3.3(c) (see Vega v. Renaissance 632 Broadway, LLC, 103 AD3d 883, 885 [2d Dept 2013] ["the provisions of 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3) and (c) also are inapplicable, as the hazard arose from the plaintiff's actual performance of the demolition work itself, rather than from "structural instability caused by the progress of the demolition"]). Finally, the work did not involve debris, bricks or other materials being removed by buckets or hoists under Industrial Code §23-3.3(e)(2) (see Campoverde v. Bruckner Plaza Assocs., L.P., 50 AD3d 836, 837 [2d Dept 2008] ["respondents also demonstrated that 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e), applying to buckets and hoists, did not apply to the facts of this case, as that regulation requires buckets and hoists to be used in the removal of demolition debris from the interior of structures, not in the removal of material from its original place in a wall or ceiling"]; Freitas v. New York City Transit Auth., 249 AD2d 184, 185 [1st Dept 1998] ["this rule obviously applies to debris being removed from a height to the ground and does not apply in the present situation where debris on the ground was being collected. In such circumstances, a "bucket," a "hoist" or "chute" would simply be inappropriate for the removal of debris while the wheeled container used was appropriate"]). Further, plaintiff has abandoned reliance upon the other Industrial Code provisions cited in his bill of particulars by not addressing them in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss his §241(6) claim (see Harsch v. City of New York, 78 AD3d 781, 783 [2d Dept 2010]). Thus, defendant has made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §241(6) claims and plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact to the contrary. Labor Law §200 and Common Law Negligence Labor Law §200 is a codification of the common-law duty of property owners and general contractors to provide workers with a safe place to work (see Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 352 [1998]; Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]; Lombardi v. Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 294 [1992]). A precondition to imposing this common-law duty upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work is that the party charged with that responsibility have the authority to control the activity which brings about the injury (see Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]). Where the dangerous condition arises from a subcontractor’s methods or materials, recovery against the general contractor cannot be had unless it is shown that the party to be charged exercised some supervisory control over the operation (see Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505-506 [1993]). Here the injury clearly arose from the means and methods of the work, and defendant has shown that it did not supervise or control plaintiff’s work. To the extent plaintiff claims the parking lot surface under the truck was cracked and broken, which, along with the slope of the driveway, allegedly caused him to hesitate so he didn’t jump out of the way fast enough when the wall started to fall, the court must note that the condition of the lot and/or the driveway was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident. Thus, defendant has made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §200 and common law negligence claims and plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact to the contrary. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law §240(1) claim is granted, and it is further ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted to the extent that the plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6), 200 and common law negligence claims are dismissed. This constitutes the decision and order of the court. Dated: December 2, 2019
