DECISION The defendant moves to dismiss the superseding information charging Obstructing Governmental Administration, 2nd Degree, dated November 19, 2019. (An initial information verified August 14, 2019 had been filed with the court and dismissed after it was superseded.) The defendant was arraigned on the superseding information on December 24, 2019. The defendant contends that the superseding information, assertedly based on insufficient allegations, is improper and should be dismissed for facial insufficiency. CPL 100.15. The information, to be sufficient on its face, must establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof. CPL 100.40. The factual part of the superseding information reads as follows: “The defendant(s) at the above date, time and place, (August 14, 2019 at approximately 03:20 PM at Depot Square in Tuckahoe) did intentionally obstruct and impair an investigation by the Tuckahoe Police Department (TKPD), an official function of Tuckahoe Police Department. Your deponent and other TKPD officers responded to the above mentioned location investigating a disturbance involving the defendant who was reportedly screaming at staff over an order and they wanted him removed from the premises. When your deponent first asked defendant to provide his identification and he refused to do so, stating that he “did not need to show any identification.” After informing the defendant that I was investigating what had occurred at Starbucks, he again refused to provide identification. Other TKPD officers arrived on scene, and defendant was asked by Lt. Rotta for his identification once again, at which point defendant fled the scene on foot. I, along with other officers had to leave the active investigation to pursue the defendant and were able to eventually apprehend him. Pursuant to CPL 710.30, the People intend to use these statement (sic) at trial. The above allegations(s) of fact are made by the complainant herein on direct knowledge (and upon information and belief), with the sources(s) of complainant’s information and the grounds for his or her belief being: Direct Knowledge.” In the information, there is a hearsay allegation that the defendant was “screaming” at the staff over an order at Starbucks. Although, according to the police, the staff wanted the defendant removed from the premises, the information does not state that the staff had asked him to leave and that he had refused. In fact, after the police requested his identification three times, the defendant each time refusing, and the reporting officer telling the defendant that he was investigating what had occurred, he fled the premises and was eventually apprehended. The authority of a police officer to arrest for any offense is limited to circumstances when the officer “has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such offense in his or her presence” (CPL 140.10 [1] [a]. The screaming was not in an officer’s presence and, in any case, did not constitute an offense, non-criminal or otherwise, and the officer had no authority to arrest him. (Screaming is nonetheless objectionable and best handled by telling the screamer to stop or leave.) Since the officer had no basis to detain the defendant, the defendant had no duty to stop or respond to the officers’ repeated requests for identification. In fact, the defendant had the right to walk or run away from the police officer. People v. Howard, 50 NY 2d 583, 590-1; People v. Stokes 32 NY 2d 202, 206-7. It is, coincidentally, difficult to see how knowing the defendant’s name or where he was from would have advanced the investigation. Obstructing Governmental Administration — 2d Degree §PL 195.05, is stated as follows, “A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act, or by means of interfering, whether or not physical force is involved, with radio, telephone, television or other telecommunications systems owned or operated by the state, or a county, city, town, village, fire district or emergency medical service or by means of releasing a dangerous animal under circumstances evincing the actor’s intent that the animal obstruct governmental administration.” The information states essentially that the defendant obstructed governmental administration by refusing to provide his identification. Since, as shown above, he was not legally required to give identification, the charge cannot be supported. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted and the information is dismissed. Dated: January 9, 2020 Tuckahoe, NY
