By Chambers, J.P.; Austin, Duffy and Christopher, JJ. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, res, v. Adam Fishbein, appellant def — (Index No. 14091/09) IM Law Group, Cedarhurst, NY (Igor Meystelman of counsel), for appellant. In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Adam Fishbein appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sylvia G. Ash, J.), dated March 12, 2018. The order granted the plaintiff’s motion to vacate an order of the same court dated January 28, 2014, directing dismissal of the action, and to restore the action to active status, and denied that defendant’s cross motion, inter alia, to vacate his default in appearing and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer. ORDERED that the order dated March 12, 2018, is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order dated January 28, 2014, and to restore the action to active status is denied, and the cross motion of the defendant Adam Fishbein, inter alia, to vacate his default in appearing and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer is denied as academic. The plaintiff commenced this action by summons with notice dated June 5, 2009, against the defendant Adam Fishbein, among others, to foreclose a mortgage. Fishbein did not appear in the action or answer the complaint. After several appearances in the Foreclosure Settlement Conference part, the matter was marked “not settled” and put down for a status conference. The initial status conference was then adjourned to January 28, 2014. On that date, the Supreme Court directed dismissal of the action without prejudice, in effect, pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR 202.27), after neither Fishbein nor the plaintiff appeared for the scheduled status conference. By notice of motion dated November 2, 2017, the plaintiff moved to vacate the order of dismissal and to restore the action to the active calendar. Fishbein opposed the motion and cross-moved, inter alia, to vacate his default in appearing and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer. In an order dated March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied Fishbein’s cross motion. Fishbein appeals. In order to vacate a default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Financial Freedom Acquisition, LLC v. Unknown Heirs to the estate of Emmie Kenner, 172 AD3d 1173, 1175; Option One Mtge. Corp. v. Rose, 164 AD3d 1251, 1252; Stein v. Doukas, 157 AD3d 743, 744; Wright v. City of Poughkeepsie, 136 AD3d 809, 809; Mazzio v. Jennings, 128 AD3d 1032, 1032). The determination of whether an excuse is reasonable lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see Polsky v. Simon, 145 AD3d 693, 693; Herrera v. MTA Bus Co., 100 AD3d 962, 963; Walker v. Mohammed, 90 AD3d 1034, 1034). The court has discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005) where the claim is supported by a detailed and credible explanation of the default (see Option One Mtge. Corp. v. Rose, 164 AD3d at 1252; GMAC Mtge., LLC v. Guccione, 127 AD3d 1136, 1138; Bank of N.Y. v. Young, 123 AD3d 1068, 1069; 1158 Props., LLC v. 1158 McDonald, LLC, 104 AD3d 658, 658; People’s United Bank v. Latini Tuxedo Mgt., LLC, 95 AD3d 1285, 1286; Kohn v. Kohn, 86 AD3d 630, 630). Here, the plaintiff’s bare allegation of law office failure was conclusory and wholly unsubstantiated. The plaintiff did not proffer an affidavit from anyone with personal knowledge of the purported law office failure and failed to provide any details regarding such failure (see Fremont Inv. & Loan v. Fausta, 164 AD3d 1314, 1315; Option One Mtge. Corp. v. Rose, 164 AD3d at 1252; OneWest Bank, FSB v. Singer, 153 AD3d 714, 716; Bank of N.Y. v. Young, 123 AD3d at 1069). Having failed to provide a detailed and credible explanation for the default, the plaintiff’s allegation of law office failure did not rise to the level of a reasonable excuse for its default. Since the plaintiff failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its default, this Court need not consider whether it demonstrated a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Option One Mtge. Corp. v. Rose, 164 AD3d at 1253; Stein v. Doukas, 157 AD3d at 744; Natural Prod. Import Am., Inc. v. J&J Express Trucking Corp., 137 AD3d 883, 884; Wright v. City of Poughkeepsie, 136 AD3d at 809). In light of our determination, Fishbein’s cross motion, inter alia, to vacate his default in appearing and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer has been rendered academic. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order dated January 28, 2014, and should have denied Fishbein’s cross motion as academic. CHAMBERS, J.P., AUSTIN, DUFFY and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.
By Scheinkman, P.J.; Maltese, Lasalle and Christopher, JJ. M. Radh Achuthan, appellant-res, v. Nisha Sahai Achuthan, res-res — (Appeal No. 1) M. Radh Achuthan, ap, v. Nisha Sahai Achuthan, res — (Appeal No. 2) (Index No. 9591/14) In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, (1) the plaintiff appeals, and the defendant cross-appeals, from a judgment of divorce of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (David T. Reilly, J.), entered October 21, 2016, and (2) the plaintiff appeals from an order of the same court dated March 16, 2018. The judgment of divorce, insofar as appealed from, upon a decision of the same court dated July 22, 2016, made after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant maintenance in the amount of $2,000 per month for a period of 10 years, directed the plaintiff to provide security for his obligation to pay maintenance, and equitably distributed the marital assets by awarding approximately 51 percent to the defendant and approximately 49 percent to the plaintiff. The order denied the plaintiff’s motion, in effect, to vacate so much of the judgment of divorce as awarded the defendant maintenance, directed the plaintiff to provide security for his obligation to pay maintenance, and equitably distributed the marital assets, and thereupon, to award the plaintiff 60 percent of the marital assets. ORDERED that the cross appeal from the judgment of divorce is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further, ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the judgment of divorce as awarded the defendant maintenance in the amount of $2,000 per month for a period of 10 years and directed the plaintiff to provide security for his obligation to pay maintenance is dismissed as academic in light of our determination on the appeal from the order; and it is further, ORDERED that the judgment of divorce is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provisions thereof awarding the plaintiff and the defendant the amount of $87,200.50 each as their respective equitable shares of a CitiBank account containing $174,401, and substituting therefor provisions awarding the plaintiff the amount of $112,973.85 and the defendant the amount of $61,427.15 as their respective equitable shares of the CitiBank account containing $174,401; as so modified, the judgment of divorce is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further, ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provisions thereof denying those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were, in effect, to vacate so much of the judgment of divorce as awarded the defendant maintenance and directed the plaintiff to provide security for his obligation to pay maintenance, and substituting therefor provisions granting those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment of divorce in accordance herewith; and it is further, ORDERED that one bill of costs in connection with each separately briefed appeal is awarded to the plaintiff. The parties were married on May 28, 1981, in New Delhi, India, and have one adult daughter. At the time of the marriage, the plaintiff was 45 years old and the defendant was 36 years old. At the time of trial in 2015, the plaintiff and the defendant were approximately 80 years old and 71 years old, respectively. At the time of the marriage, the plaintiff was a professor of physics at Southampton College, where he had been employed since 1966. At the time of trial, he was employed full time at Long Island University with an annual salary of approximately $122,530, and he had annual social security income in the amount of $29,014. At the time of the marriage, the defendant was studying for her doctorate in political science at Columbia University while on leave from her position with the government of India, where she had been employed since 1968. After obtaining her doctorate in 1985, the defendant returned to India and resumed her career with the government of India in order to qualify for her 20- year “golden handshake” retirement package, which she expected to receive in 1988. However, she was unable to qualify due to her years of absence while pursuing her studies in the United States. She continued to work for the government of India until retiring in 1999 at the age of approximately 55. At trial, there was scant evidence regarding the amount of the defendant’s earnings during the years she was employed in India. Upon her retirement, the defendant’s pension was in the amount of approximately $7,500 per year. According to the defendant, there are governmental restrictions that impede her ability to transfer funds out of India. Notwithstanding that the defendant obtained her green card in approximately 2001, which she achieved with the help of an attorney paid for by the plaintiff, she never secured gainful employment in the United States. At the time of trial in 2015, she had been working as a freelance interpreter but claimed that she had only earned $240 for the year and that the contract had terminated. Since 2010, the defendant received social security income of $14,400 per year based on the plaintiff’s earnings. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant’s income from all sources was $55,000 per year. For a significant amount of time during their 33-year marriage, the plaintiff and the defendant lived apart, with the plaintiff residing at the marital residence located in Southampton, which he had purchased prior to the marriage, and the defendant residing in India. After their marriage in 1981, the parties resided together at the marital residence from July 1981 through November 1985, along with their daughter, who was born in October 1982. For the daughter’s first three years, the defendant was her primary caregiver, with the plaintiff assisting in the late afternoons while the defendant worked on her studies. Subsequently, in December 1985, the defendant returned to India with the parties’ daughter and remained in India until approximately 1999. Over the course of the years 1985 to1999, the family spent time together intermittently in India, in Southampton, and while on vacation. The parties’ daughter resided with the defendant in India from 1985 to 1997, except for the 1993-1994 school year, during which she resided with the plaintiff in Southampton. The parties’ daughter began living with the plaintiff and attending high school in Southampton in 1997 and remained in the United States, except for periodic visits to India. After retiring, the defendant returned to the marital residence in Southampton in 2000, where she resided intermittently between Southampton and India until May 2014, when the divorce action was commenced, after which the defendant remained in the United States. During the marriage, while maintaining separate finances, the parties each amassed substantial marital assets. The parties agreed that the plaintiff accumulated marital assets totaling $2,573,440.69, including real property located in India with a value of $733,179.23. The defendant accumulated marital assets totaling $1,424,673.55, including real property located in India, the marital portion of which was valued by the Supreme Court at $1,234,072.57 after awarding the defendant a separate property credit of $63,714.55. This action for a divorce and ancillary relief was commenced on May 8, 2014. At trial, the parties stipulated, inter alia, to the identity and valuation of all the marital property at the time of commencement, except for the value of the real property in India, which was ultimately determined by the Supreme Court after trial. The issues of equitable distribution and maintenance were determined by the court after a nonjury trial in a decision dated July 22, 2016. The court entered a judgment of divorce on October 21, 2016. The court, inter alia, (1) awarded the defendant maintenance in the amount of $2,000 per month for a period of 10 years, (2) directed the plaintiff to provide security for his obligation to pay maintenance, and (3) equitably distributed the marital assets by awarding approximately 51 percent to the defendant and approximately 49 percent to the plaintiff. The court stated that “[s]ome additional assets were distributed to the defendant as an adjustment for the loss of health insurance benefits.” One of the marital assets distributed by the court was the marital portion of the plaintiff’s TIAA-CREF account, which was stipulated to be in the amount of $945,082, which the court divided equally between the parties. The remaining portion of the plaintiff’s TIAA-CREF account in the amount of $1,027,239.89 was stipulated to be the plaintiff’s separate property. The plaintiff appeals from stated portions of the judgment of divorce. While the defendant filed a notice of cross appeal from the judgment of divorce, we must dismiss the cross appeal as abandoned since the defendant does not seek reversal or modification of any portion of the judgment of divorce in her brief (see Kamins v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. of N.Y., Inc., 171 AD3d 715, 716).
