OPINION & ORDER Plaintiffs Jorge A. Bar-Levy (“Bar-Levy”) and Lenis Pagan (“Pagan”) (together, “Plaintiffs”), both pro se, bring this action against Defendants Joanne Gerow (“Gerow”), the Town of Liberty (“Liberty”), and Seven Unknown Town Officers (collectively, “Defendants”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs set forth claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983″), alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Id.) Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 (ECF No. 11.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. In essence, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to “seize[] property, injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate” them because of their religious beliefs. (Compl. 8.) This conspiracy manifested itself in two distinct ways according to the complaint, which are detailed below. First, on June 22, 2018, Gerow seized two white German Shepherds belonging to Bar-Levy, which were valued at over $10,000. (Id. 9.) Gerow was aided by “several unknown people” that allegedly were “acting as members of the KKK and other anti Jewish [sic] vigilante groups.” (Id.) After taking the dogs, Gerow posted the seizure on Facebook and “requested others to harm [Plaintiffs] and any other Jews living in Sullivan County.” (Id.) The complaint does not specify where the seizure took place. Second, on June 22, 2018 — the same date she and others seized the German Shepherds — Gerow and “7 unknown Town of Liberty officers” (the “Officers”) “planted evidence [and] trespass[ed] private property to plant poison and other substances” at an unspecified location. (Id. 10.) Gerow and the Officers intended to frame Pagan with “violations of County Codes and State Criminal laws.” (Id.) Several months later, on October 2, 2018, authorities unla[w]fully and falsely arrested” Pagan without probable cause. (Id. 11.) Authorities carried out the arrest sometime after Gerow apparently “made false accusations” against Pagan about “a previously sick goat.” (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege that the goat had become sick due to some “unknown substances spread at the farm by [Defendants] and other unknown KKK and anti Jews Vigilantes [sic].” (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that these entities had been “t[h]rowing poison and other su[b]stances” to get Pagan’s animals sick.” (Id.) Upon Pagan’s arrest, over 200 farm animals were seized, including goats, sheep, geese, chickens, pigeons, and ducks.” (Id.) The arresting authorities did not provide Pagan with documentation about the location of his animals or how he could reobtain them. (Id.) Pagan was subsequently charged with five counts of animal cruelty. (Id.) The complaint does not specify the ultimate disposition of charges levied against Pagan. Plaintiffs maintain that the above misconduct is a result of Liberty’s policy, practice, and custom of having officers ignore other town officers’ illegal conduct. (Id. 16.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that it is Liberty’s policy, practice, and custom to only conduct “minimal investigation[s]” that are designed to exonerate officers who engage in misconduct. (Id. 17.) Because of this policy, Plaintiffs aver, town officers could “reasonably conclude” that they could make false accusations and bring criminal charges without fear of discipline. (Id. 18.) This policy resulted in a “culture of intimidation and threats against Jews” living in Liberty. (Id. 19.) LEGAL STANDARD A. Rule 12(b)(6) On a 12(b)(6) motion, dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When there are well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. The critical inquiry is whether the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to nudge the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A motion to dismiss will be denied where the allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Where a pro se plaintiff is concerned, courts must construe the pleadings in a particularly liberal fashion. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). In fact, courts must interpret the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings “to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings must contain factual allegations that sufficiently “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Jackson v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and the court’s duty to construe a pro se complaint liberally is not “the equivalent of a duty to re-write it,” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. College, 663 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). B. Section 1983 Under Section 1983, “[e]very person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State…subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States…to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1983 “is not itself the source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) “the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” Castilla v. City of New York., No. 09 Civ. 5446(SHS), 2013 WL 1803896, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013); see also Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). DISCUSSION I. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Claims against Individual Defendants Liberally construed, Plaintiffs’ complaint appears to allege, under the Fourth Amendment, a claim by Pagan for false arrest and claims by Bar-Levy and Pagan of wrongful searches and seizures. The Court explores the sufficiency of these claims below.2 A. Claim of False Arrest Pagan alleges he was unlawfully arrested “without probable cause” after Gerow “made false accusation[s] against him.” (Compl. 11.) In seeking dismissal, Defendants argue, inter alia, that, to the extent Gerow made false accusations against Pagan, she “merely [gave] information” to authorities, which, alone, is not enough to impose liability under Section 1983. (Defs. Mem. of Law in Support of Mot to Dismiss. (“Defs. Mot.”), ECF No. 11, at 7.) The Court agrees “A §1983 claim for false arrest…is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Nelson v. City of New York, No. 18 Civ. 4636 (PAE), 2019 WL 3779420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999)). Under New York law, a plaintiff alleging false arrest must show that “(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted). “To prove intent, a plaintiff must establish the defendant affirmatively procured or instigated the plaintiff’s arrest.” Wright v. Musanti, No. 14-cv-8976 (KBF), 2017 WL 253486, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2017). “Liability may attach only when the defendant has ‘affirmatively induced the officer to act, such as [by] taking an active part in the arrest and procuring it to be made or showing active, officious and undue zeal to the point where the officer is not acting of his own volition.” Id. (quoting Vlach v. Staiano, 604 F. App’x 77, 78 (2d Cir. 2015)). “Merely giving information to legal authorities, who are left entirely free to use their own judgment in effecting an arrest, does not constitute intentional confinement.” McGee v. Dunn, 940 F. Supp. 2d 93, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Mitchell v. Home, 377 F. Supp. 2d 361, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). And, although a person who “‘intentionally provide[s] false information’ to instigate an arrest by law-enforcement officials” could be liable under Section 1983, “the provision of false statements…to law enforcement personnel, standing alone, is insufficient to establish §1983 liability.” See Mortiz v. Town of Warwick, No. 15-CV-5424 (NSR), 2016 WL 3248494, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2016) (emphasis added). Here, although it liberally construes and accepts as true Plaintiffs’ allegations, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly state a false arrest claim. To be sure, Plaintiffs have alleged that Gerow and others not only provided information to authorities but that such information was intentionally false. (Compl.
10-11.) If true, such allegations could support the intent element of a false arrest claim if that false information in fact instigated the subsequent arrest. See Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining that defendants “summoned the police” and provided fabricated evidence, which in turn caused the arrest of plaintiff). But the complaint does not establish, nor can the Court infer without more, that the false information provided to authorities is what caused them to arrest Pagan. Cf. Moritz, 2016 WL 3248494 at *4 (denying motion to dismiss false arrest claim where defendant “knowingly made false statements” to police and those false statements were “memorialized in an affidavit to support a criminal charge of stalking against [p]laintiff”). In other words, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly aver that Gerow or the Officers “affirmatively procured or instigated [Pagan's] arrest.” Wright, 2017 WL 253486 at *9. As Plaintiffs have failed to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims.3 B. Claims of Unreasonable Search and Seizure The complaint appears to assert two search and seizure claims. First, Bar-Levy contends that his two German Shepherds were taken improperly. (Compl. 9.) Second, Pagan avers that his 200 farm animals were improperly seized during his arrest. (Id. 11.) In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to establish “ownership or control of the animals or farm premises which [were] searched” or that any seizure was otherwise wrongful. (Defs. Mot. 6.) The Court assesses these contentions below. i. Seizure of Bar-Levy’s German Shepherds A plaintiff alleging an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment must establish, preliminarily, that he or she “personally ha[d] an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that [the] expectation [was] reasonable.” Tobias v. Cty. of Putnam, 191 F. Supp. 2d 364, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)); Gem Fin. Serv., Inc. v. City of New York, 298 F. Supp. 3d 464, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Generally, as a threshold matter, there must be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the places or items for there to be a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). Here, Bar-Levy contends that Gerow “unlawfully seized” his two German Shepherds. Yet Bar-Levy provides no facts about where this alleged seizure took place, whether he was present during the seizure, or whether Gerow knew that he owned the dogs. The location, in particular, could implicate the degree of Fourth Amendment protection accorded to Bar-Levy (if any), especially if his German Shepherds were found and taken in a public area. Cf. United States v. Mazzara, No. 16 Cr. 576 (KBF), 2017 WL 4862793, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017) (explaining that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public…is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))); Stone v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., No. 11-CV-3932 (SMG), 2014 WL 3110002, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) (explaining, on summary judgment, that “the officers did not infringe on [plaintiff's] constitutional rights when they walked through the public areas of the restaurant, because [plaintiff] had no reasonable expectation of privacy in spaces open to the public”). Without more, the Court cannot reasonably infer, even when liberally construing the allegations, that Bar-Levy’s dogs were seized in a situation that infringed the Fourth Amendment. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Bar-Levy’s search and seizure claims. ii. Seizure of Pagan’s Farm Animals It appears from the face of the complaint that Pagan has intended to plead a claim for improper search and seizure of his farm animals. (Compl. 11.) Defendants, in seeking dismissal, maintain that his claims as non-viable. (Defs. Mot. 6.) The Court agrees. The Court initially notes that any claim related to an improper search and seizure does not allege that either Gerow or the Officers were involved in the purported seizure of Pagan’s animals. Accordingly, any claim against those defendants seemingly fails for lack of personal involvement. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under §1983.”). In any event, even if Gerow or the Officer were involved, Pagan’s claim is still deficient. Indeed, the complaint does not state whether the “seizure occurred without a warrant or, alternatively, was pursuant to a defective warrant,” or “even…who conducted the seizure.” Romano v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-604 (ENV), 2009 WL 1941912, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2009) (holding that plaintiff did not plead enough facts about the allegedly unlawful search or seizure that could plausibly establish that the city was liable for monetary damages). “While [the Court] must liberally construe the pleadings of [the] pro se [P]laintiff[s], [it] cannot merely assume that [Plaintiffs] meant to allege that [] [D]efendants” acted without a warrant without probable cause or pursuant to a defective warrant. Hudson Valley Black Press v. I.R.S., 307 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 (dismissing Fourth Amendment Bivens claim where complaint merely alleged that “all the accountants [sic] records were seized and taken into custody by the defendant” but did not state that plaintiff’s property “was seized int eh course of a warrantless search or that the agents seizing the property were acting under a defective warrant”). As Pagan fails to plead sufficient facts to establish a plausible cause of action, the Court GRANTS Defendants motion to dismiss Pagan’s wrongful search and seizure claim.4 II. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Claims against Individual Defendants A. Equal Protection Claim Liberally construing Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court can discern a potential selective enforcement claim against Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs seem to allege that Defendants selectively enforced county codes and state criminal laws against Plaintiffs because they practice Judaism. (See Compl.
