MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Brandon Taylor (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendants Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic, U.S.A., Covidien Holding Inc., Covidien, Inc., and Covidien, LP1 (“Defendants”) seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs for injuries he sustained from a mesh implant that was used during surgery to repair his inguinal hernia. See generally Dkt. No. 2, Compl. Plaintiff has moved to remand this case to state court, see Dkt. No. 8; and Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Dkt. No. 9. II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, a resident of Broome County, New York, alleges that he was injured from the Parietex ProGrip mesh used during surgery to repair his inguinal hernia on September 23, 2015. See Dkt. No. 2 at
3-6. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Medtronic Corporation and/or its subsidiary, Covidien, manufactured, designed, distributed, marketed, and sold in the marketplace the Parietex ProGrip mesh to medical providers, including United Health Services Wilson Medical Center, where Plaintiff’s surgery was performed. See id. Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 14, 2018, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Broome County. See generally id. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged four causes of action based on strict liability — failure to warn, design defect, manufacturing defect, and negligence — and two causes of action for breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranties. See generally id. On October 9, 2018, Defendants Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic USA, Inc., Covidien Holding, Inc., and Covidien, Inc. filed a Notice of Removal from New York Supreme Court to this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1332, 1441, and 1446. See Dkt. No. 1, Notice of Removal, at 1. Notably, Defendant Covidien, LP did not join in the removal because, according to defense counsel, it had not been served, and its consent for removal was not required.2 See id. at n.1 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(2)(A)). On November 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed the pending motion to remand this case to state court. See Dkt. No. 8. In response, Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 9. III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s motion to remand Plaintiff relies on three main theories to support his motion requesting that the Court remand this case. First, he argues that Defendants’ Notice of Removal violated the “rule of unanimity.” Second, Plaintiff asserts that, upon review of the complaint, the amount in controversy is indeterminable. Third, he claims that the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Defendant Covidien, LP. 1. Rule of unanimity The procedure governing a defendant’s removal of a civil action from state court to federal district court is set out in 28 U.S.C. §1446. Under that statute, notice of removal must be filed within thirty days after the defendant is served with a copy of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1446(b). In addition, the Second Circuit has recognized the “rule of unanimity,” which requires that all defendants consent to removal within the statutory thirty-day period. See Pietrangelo v. Alvas Corp., 686 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff argues that the Court should remand this case to state court because Defendants allegedly violated the rule of unanimity when Covidien, LP, who was properly served, did not consent to removal. See Dkt. No. 8-2, Pl’s Memorandum in Support, at 4. District courts in this Circuit and other circuit courts have declined to strictly construe the rule of unanimity in situations, such as this one, in which one defendant did not consent in the Notice of Removal but consents to removal later by opposing the plaintiff’s motion to remand.3 Defendant Covidien, LP both opposed Plaintiff’s remand motion and joined in Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See generally Dkt. Nos. 9, 10. The caselaw makes clear that this constitutes consent to removal and functions to cure Defendants’ failure to comply with the rule of unanimity. Additionally, based on the email correspondence that defense counsel provided, it appears that his failure to ascertain Defendant Covidien, LP’s consent for removal was an accident, as he believed in good faith that it had not been served. See Dkt. No. 10-2, Ex. 1. Defendants further contend that, had service been properly communicated, Defendant Covidien, LP would have instructed defense counsel to join the petition for removal. See Dkt. No. 10, Def’s Memorandum in Opposition, at 5. The same counsel represents all Defendants in this matter, and thus it seems clear all Defendants want this case litigated in federal court. Therefore, based on the above-stated facts and caselaw, the Court finds that Defendant Covidien, LP’s technical defect in failing to consent to removal was cured by its subsequent actions.4 2. Amount in controversy A removed case must be remanded if, at any time before final judgment, it appears that the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship so long as the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §1332. Regarding the amount in controversy requirement, “if the jurisdictional amount is not clearly alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, and the defendant’s notice of removal fails to allege facts adequate to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount, federal courts lack diversity jurisdiction as a basis for removing the plaintiff’s action from state court.” Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Defendants, as the removing party, bear the burden of proving “‘that it [would] appear to “a reasonable possibility”‘ that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold mandated by 28 U.S.C. §1332(a).” Duncan v. Crawford, No. 16 CV 4699 (PKC)(JO), 2016 WL 4919891, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2016) (quotation omitted). To prove this “reasonable possibility” standard, Defendants’ Notice of Removal must be specific.5 Here, Defendants assert in their Notice of Removal that Plaintiff’s allegations are particularized in that he alleges “constant pains,” “lump in lower right abdomen,” “significant weight loss,” “worsening lower back pain,” “trauma to [his] abdomen and thereafter severe emotional distress,” “extreme pain and discomfort,” and “superior mesenteric artery syndrome,” and that he “will likely undergo further medical treatment and procedures” as a result of his hernia repair surgery and implanted mesh. See Dkt. No. 1 at 9 (citing Dkt. No. 2 at
