MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER1 I. INTRODUCTION Originally commenced in New York State Supreme Court, this action was removed to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1. The Complaint alleges, inter alia, negligence on the part of Defendant in the maintenance and servicing of commercial printing equipment. Dkt. No. 2, Compl. at 20. Defendant now moves for summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Dkt. No. 25. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Dkt. No. 32. Defendant has filed a reply. Dkt. No. 34. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This case involves an unfortunate factual situation in which Plaintiff was injured at work. Given the nature of the legal issue presented by the Motion, only a brief summary of the relevant facts is provided here. Plaintiff is employed by the State of New York Information Technology Services (“ITS”). Dkt. No. 32-3, Pl.’s Aff., 3. She frequently worked in a print room where state documents were printed. Id. This litigation arose as a result of an incident that took place there on August 14, 2014. On that date, Plaintiff was working in the print room on a print job consisting of New York Department of Motor Vehicle titles. Id. at 10. The documents were being processed through three separate machines: a cutter, a merger, and finally a stacker. Id. at 6. During that process, several documents were determined to be missing and were located on the bottom of the stacker. Id. at
14-15. The rear panel on the stacker was not in place at the time. Id. at 12. Plaintiff had not removed the stacker’s back panel and does not know who did. Id. Plaintiff reached into the machine through the space the panel would normally cover and her arm was then impaled by an internal part of the stacker. Id. at 15. Ricoh, the Defendant in this action, has a contract with the State of New York to service machinery for ITS, including the stacker. Compl. at 14; Pl.’s Aff. at 5; Dkt. No. 25-4, Savona Dep., p. 13. Several different service technicians working for Defendant had experience working on machines at Plaintiff’s work location. See Savona Dep. at p. 16; Dkt. No. 25-5, Osman Dep., p. 6; Dkt. No. 25-6, Fleck Dep., p. 6. Defendant was responsible for maintenance and service and would be notified of problems with machinery in that location. Pl.’s Aff. at 8. The service technicians employed by Defendant who testified in this case all testified that they did not take off the back panel and fail to replace it or that they did not know who had done so. Savona Dep. at p. 50; Osman Dep. at p. 16; Fleck Dep. at p. 65. III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [ ] affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994). To that end, sworn statements are “more than mere conclusory allegations subject to disregard…they are specific and detailed allegations of fact, made under penalty of perjury, and should be treated as evidence in deciding a summary judgment motion” and the credibility of such statements is better left to a trier of fact. Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d at 289 (citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) and Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). “[T]he trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, where a party is proceeding pro se, the court must “read his supporting papers liberally, and [ ] interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994); accord Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). IV. ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION “Because this is a diversity action based upon events occurring in New York, New York substantive law applies.” Van Auken v. Adamkiewicz, 2009 WL 1437586, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §1332; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938)). “To establish a prima facie case of negligence under New York law, three elements must be demonstrated: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a cognizable duty of care as a matter of law; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) plaintiff suffered damage as a proximate result of that breach.” Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998). As a result, “a threshold question in tort cases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the injured party.” Vogle v. N. Country Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 170 A.D.3d 1491, 1492 (3d Dep’t 2019). Under New York law, “a contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party.” Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 138 (2002). The New York Court of Appeals has identified only three exceptions to this general rule, which [were] summarized in Espinal. These are (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, launches a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties; and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty to maintain the premises safely. Stiver v. Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 253, 257 (2007) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted); see also Hnatko v. Sun Automation Grp., 2016 WL 6902356, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016). There is no dispute that Defendant contracted with New York State to service the stacker. Criscione Aff.,
