MEMORANDUM & ORDER On June 28, 2017, defendant Chris Messalas was indicted and charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 15 U.S.C. §78j and 18 U.S.C. §§371, 1956. Before the Court are (1) Messalas’s motion to suppress the fruits of a four-month wiretap on his cell phone, (2) his motion to compel discovery of documents containing information on particular topics, and (3) his motion to compel the return of certain electronic devices seized in the search of his home.1 (Suppression Mot. (Doc. No. 143).) After carefully considering the evidence and the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, Messalas’s motions are denied. BACKGROUND I. The Investigation Beginning in 2015, with the help of a confidential cooperating witness (the “Cooperating Witness” or “CW”) and a Confidential Source, the Government conducted an investigation into Messalas’s business dealings, in particular his involvement with a conspiracy to artificially inflate and then sell shares of BioCube, Inc. (See generally October 2016 Wiretap Aff. (“Aff.”), Ex. A2 to Gov’t Opp’n (Doc. No. 149-1).) In October 2016, after over a year of investigation that relied heavily on recordings made by the CW, the Government applied for a wiretap of Messalas’s cell phone pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”), Pub.L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 217. In support of the application, the Government submitted a 65-page affidavit sworn by F.B.I. Special Agent Christopher M. Donohue (the “Affidavit”), which explained why there was probable cause to believe Messalas was committing wire fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering, and explained why a wiretap was necessary to complete the investigation. (See Aff. at
14-91.) On October 13, 2016, then-District Judge Richard Sullivan granted the application. (October 2016 Wiretap Order, Ex. A3 to Gov’t Opp’n (Doc. No. 149-1) at 87-98.)2 Subsequently, in each of the three following months, the Government submitted substantially similar reauthorization applications supported by affidavits of Special Agent Donohue, and Judge Sullivan granted each one. (Exs. B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, C1, C2, C3, C4, D1, D2, D3, D4 to Gov’t Opp’n (Doc Nos. 149-2, 149-3, 149-4).) Familiarity with the content of these documents is presumed for the purposes of this Order. In April 2017, Magistrate Judge Pollak issued warrants for Messalas’s arrest and the search of his home. (Arrest Warrant, Ex. E1 to Gov’t Opp’n (Doc. No. 149-5) at 2-3; Search Warrant, Ex. F1 to Gov’t Opp’n (Doc. No. 149-6) at 2-8.) The search warrant specifically incorporated two attachments. Attachment A identified Messalas’s home as the property to be searched. (Search Warrant at 3.) Attachment B limited seizure to “all records relating to” (a) securities fraud, money laundering, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit the same; (b) involving Messalas and four suspected co-conspirators; (c) occurring after June 1, 2011. (Id. at 4-5.) Attachment B went on to give illustrative examples of the sorts of items to be seized. (Id.) Familiarity with the warrant is also presumed for the purposes of this Order. On the morning of April 14, 2017, F.B.I. agents executed both warrants at Messalas’s residence. Pursuant to the warrant, the agents seized numerous paper documents and electronic devices. They also requested, and received, Messalas’s written consent to search his iPhone. (Consent, Ex. G to Gov’t Opp’n (Doc. No. 149-7) at 2.) With the exception of this iPhone, the Government has since returned all electronic devices and disclaimed intent to use them at trial. (Gov’t Opp’n (Doc. No. 148) at 43.) II. The Instant Motions Through the three instant motions, Messalas seeks the suppression of all evidence seized pursuant to the wiretap, discovery of information primarily related to the affidavit submitted in support of the wiretap application, and an order directing the Government to delete any images it has retained of electronic devices seized in the home search. A. The Wiretap With respect to the wiretap, Messalas argues he is entitled to a hearing and suppression pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), because Special Agent Donohue’s Affidavit was “replete with misstatements and material omissions of fact.” (Suppression Mot. at 18.) These alleged misstatements and omissions include: (1) failing to disclose certain information about the Confidential Source’s involvement with another company associated with Messalas, Therabiogen; (2) overrepresenting Messalas’s ownership share in BioCube; (3) failing to disclose details of the CW’s criminal history; (4) assuming without basis that a parallel SEC investigation would not be fruitful; (5) inaccurately stating that the CW had successfully made contact with multiple suspected members of the conspiracy; and (6) incorrectly implying that Messalas’s old text messages were irretrievable. Messalas adds that the Affidavit failed to establish the necessity of the wiretap because, in addition to the foregoing, it offered unconvincing explanations for why the use of alternative investigative techniques — including the use of an undercover agent and the then-ongoing search through Messalas’s emails — were insufficient.3 Last, Messalas argues that suppression is appropriate for the separate reason that he was essentially being investigated only for securities fraud, a crime for which Title III does not authorize use of wiretaps. (Id. at 30.) The other crimes alleged in the Affidavit, he says, were nothing more than “a cover manufactured to obtain the wiretap.” (Id.) B. Motion to Compel Discovery Next, Messalas asks the Court to compel discovery of documents containing information on five different topics: (1) details regarding the government’s review of Messalas’s email; (2) information related to why the government’s undercover agent “was not able to advance the investigation by meeting with other alleged co-conspirators”; (3) information “as to why the SEC declined to pursue any case against Mr. Messalas relating to the conduct charged in this case”; (4) information related to “why the government’s investigation of Mr. Messalas in 2010 and 2011 did not result[] [in] any criminal charges”; and (5) “information known to the government at the time of the submission of the Wiretap Affidavit concerning the CW that was not presented to the authorizing district judge.” (Suppression Mot. at 39-40; see also Reply at 18 n.9.) With the exception of the request for information related to the email search, Messalas’s sole stated basis for these requests is to strengthen his arguments for suppressing the fruits of the wiretap. (Reply at 18 n.9.) Messalas states that information related to the email search would also serve this purpose, but might support other motion practice as well. (Suppression Mot. at 39.) C. Motion to Compel the Return of Electronic Devices Finally, Messalas had initially moved to compel the return of certain electronic devices seized by the Government in the search of his home. (Suppression Mot. at 38.) The Government subsequently returned the devices it had seized, with the exception of Messalas’s iPhone. (Gov’t Opp’n at 43.) In his reply memorandum, Messalas acknowledges that these items have been returned, but requests pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) that the Court direct the Government to delete any electronic images of those devices that the Government has retained. (Reply at 19 n.10.) DISCUSSION For the reasons explained next, the Court finds each of Messalas’s arguments to be unavailing. Accordingly, his motions are denied. I. The Wiretap Title III authorizes federal judges to order the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, and it sets forth the procedure by which the Government may apply for such orders. See 18 U.S.C. §§2516, 2518. In a wiretap application, the Government must supply, inter alia, “details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed,” and “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” Id. §2518(1)(b)-(c). In other words, the Government must show probable cause to believe a crime is or was afoot and the necessity of using a wiretap to investigate that crime. See United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 77-78 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing the “probable cause” and “necessity” elements of wiretap applications); United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2013) (same). If the judge is satisfied as to these elements — and two others not relevant here — she may issue the wiretap order. See 18 U.S.C. §2518(3). When a defendant seeks to suppress the fruits of a wiretap on the grounds that the application misled the authorizing judge, his motion is analyzed under the framework established by the Supreme Court in Franks. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 at 151. “The Franks standard is a high one.” Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir. 1991). To be entitled to a Franks hearing and ultimately to suppression of wiretap evidence, “a defendant must make a ‘substantial preliminary showing’ that: (1) the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the result of the affiant’s deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the judge’s probable cause [or necessity] finding[s].” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72; Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 146. In other words, a defendant must show the claimed inaccuracies or omissions were both (1) “designed to mislead” or “made in reckless disregard of whether [they] would mislead” and (2) materially false. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 153-54 (citation omitted). “If, after setting aside the allegedly misleading statements or omissions, the affidavit, nonetheless, presents sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause [and necessity], the district court need not conduct a Franks hearing.” Salameh, 158 F.3d at 113 (citing Levasseur, 816 F.2d at 43). “To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack [on the affidavit] must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. A. Messalas Has Not Shown He Is Entitled to a Hearing or to Suppression Under Franks Messalas points to six specific inaccuracies or omissions in the detailed, 65-page Affidavit that he says are material and show Special Agent Donohue recklessly disregarded the truth or intentionally lied. For differing reasons, none of them — together or individually — satisfies the defense’s burden under Franks. First, several of them are not, in fact, inaccuracies or omissions. Second, the few that are omissions are not material to the probable cause or necessity showings required by Title III, and Messalas has not offered any basis to conclude they were intentional or the product of reckless disregard for the truth. i. Probable Cause a. The Confidential Source’s Involvement with Therabiogen In making the case for probable cause, the Affidavit states that, in 2009 and 2010, using materially false information provided by Messalas, the Confidential Source induced investors to buy shares of the company Therabiogen. (Aff. at 24.) As a result, “the Confidential Source was convicted of federal charges of securities fraud and income tax evasion upon a guilty plea on or about April 2, 2014.” (Id.) It adds that, the “Confidential Source’s information is consistent with information provided by [the CW].” (Id.) In the subsequent reauthorization requests, Special Agent Donohue omitted most of this information from his affidavits, instead stating only that the FBI had “received information from a Confidential Source that Messalas was engaged in securities fraud.” (See, e.g., First Reauthorization Aff., Ex. B2 to Gov’t Opp’n (Doc. No. 149-2) at 17.) After some initial confusion about whether the Government stood by the statements in the Affidavit — which it does4 — Messalas argues they are incomplete. For example, the Affidavit does not explain why Messalas was not also prosecuted. Messalas theorizes this may be because the Confidential Source was a failed cooperator — something the Affidavit should disclose if true. (Reply (Doc. No. 154) at 17-18.) Messalas further suspects that the comparative lack of detail about the Confidential Source in subsequent reauthorization requests evidences the Government’s recognition that something about the Affidavit was inaccurate. (Id.) This amounts to speculation and guesswork, not a “substantial showing” of materiality or dishonesty. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155, 171 (defendant is entitled to a hearing only upon a “substantial preliminary showing” of falsity supported by proof). No doubt, there exists more information about Therabiogen and the Confidential Source than what was included in the Affidavit. But Messalas gives no reason to suspect that any of it would be relevant to the investigation of crimes relating to other companies like BioCube. Nor does he offer any reason to think that Special Agent Donohue deliberately or recklessly omitted such information. Though Messalas may wish to cross-examine Special Agent Donohue about these subjects, a “mere desire to cross-examine” is not enough to earn a hearing under Franks. See id. at 171. b. Messalas’s Control of BioCube The Affidavit states that “Messalas owns or controls significantly more than 5 percent of BioCube’s stock” but has not filed the requisite disclosure forms. (Aff. at 35.) It goes on to provide supporting evidence for this claim, including noting that “Messalas told the CW that he owns BioCube stock through three separate entities: (i) Admetus Capital; (ii) Alpine Securities; and (iii) Blackwater Capital.” (Id.) Messalas contends this passage is misleading because he did not secretly control BioCube through Alpine and Blackwater. (Suppression Mot. at 23-24.) Alpine, he claims, is simply an unaffiliated broker-dealer which does not itself own or control stock; and Blackwater, with whom his affiliation is no secret, controlled only convertible debt. These arguments are premised on a far-too-literal reading of the word “own” as Affidavit plainly meant it. Yes, broker-dealers do not own stock on behalf of their customers5 and, yes, convertible debt is not an ownership share until it is converted into stock, but these distinctions have no practical meaning in this context. What the Affidavit was attempting to convey, and what Messalas conspicuously does not contest in his briefing, was that Messalas effectively owned and controlled significant shares in BioCube through a brokerage account with Alpine Securities and in the form of convertible debt held by Blackwater. Even were the Court willing to fault the Affidavit for word choice — which it is not — it bears emphasis that this passage merely paraphrases Messalas’s conversation with the CW. So, not only is the meaning of the challenged language sufficiently clear, but the Government is not even the source of it. The Court discerns no falsehood or attempt to mislead here. c. The CW’s Criminal History The Affidavit discloses that, sometime after 2011, the CW was “charged with wire fraud, after which he pled guilty to wire fraud pursuant to a cooperation agreement” and that “[h]e is currently cooperating in hopes of receiving leniency at sentencing.” (Aff. at 32 n.4.) It adds, however, that “[h]e has provided reliable information in the course of this investigation” which has “been corroborated by other evidence.” (Id.) Messalas objects that this disclaimer omits critical information about the CW’s criminal past, including (a) that he was identified in 2013 as an unindicted co-conspirator in a pump-and-dump stock fraud case brought in the Central District of California, and (b) that he was “named in an SEC enforcement action filed in response to a scheme…to sell more than 21 billion shares of stock in violation of the registration provisions of the federal securities laws.” (Suppression Mot. at 21-22.) Although this appears to be an omission, it satisfies neither of the Franks prongs. First, there is nothing to suggest it is material. To establish probable cause, the Affidavit primarily relies on physical evidence — i.e., recordings of conversations between the CW and the suspected conspirators — and not the CW’s say-so. There was therefore no need to expound at length on the CW’s credibility. See Levasseur, 816 F.2d at 43-44 (holding that failure to include an informant’s full history of criminal activity, drug abuse, and psychiatric problems did not require a Franks hearing where a large portion of the challenged affidavit relied on other sources to establish probable cause); United States v. Pecker, No. 03-CR-1308 (TCP), 2006 WL 8423960, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006) (collecting similar cases). Second, Messalas points to nothing that would suggest Agent Donohue intentionally or recklessly omitted this information. Viewed in context, the omission of a portion of the CW’s history does not, by itself, show anything more than negligence. See United States v. Long, 678 F. App’x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (neglecting to include that the confidential informant was “a drug addict” who had been paid $3,000 for help with the investigation does not constitute an intentional falsehood); United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2005) (neglecting to include a witness’s prior conviction does not constitute an intentional falsehood). ii. Necessity a. The SEC’s Parallel Investigation In making the case for the necessity of the wiretap, the Affidavit notes that there was a parallel SEC investigation that, “to date…has not provided sufficient information to obtain arrest warrants or even additional email search warrants. This information has been useful but it has been insufficient to show any criminal intent by the targets.” (Aff. at 90.) Separately, it states that issuing subpoenas to suspected conspirators “would not be completely successful” because “they would most likely be uncooperative and invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege.” (Id. at 81.) Eliding these two separate claims, Messalas characterizes the Affidavit as “stat[ing] that Grand Jury subpoenas and the SEC’s parallel investigation would be unlikely to reveal evidence because members of the conspiracy would likely refuse to answer questions.” (Suppression Mot. at 26.) He then argues there is “no specific factual basis” for this assumption, since the SEC has broad investigatory powers and Messalas had cooperated with the SEC in the past, when it was investigating his hedge fund, LeadDog Capital. (Id.) The Court is unpersuaded. First, the Affidavit never even suggested Messalas would not cooperate with the SEC — instead, it explained that the SEC’s fact-gathering process had limited capacity to uncover criminal wrongdoing. As the Government correctly points out, it cannot secretively conduct a criminal investigation through the SEC. See, e.g., United States v. Mahaffy, 446 F. Supp. 2d 115, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that Supreme Court precedent suggests that it may be appropriate to reverse a conviction or dismiss an indictment “where the Government has brought a civil action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution or has failed to advise the defendant in its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution” (quoting United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970))). Second, the Government was not required to rely on its own or the SEC’s subpoena power where, as here, it was legitimately concerned that issuing subpoenas would be unproductive and could jeopardize the investigation. See United States v. Papadakos, 729 F. App’x 41, 44 (2d Cir.) (summary order) (accepting an affidavit’s rejection of “investigative techniques like trash pulls, pole cameras, GPS tracking, grand juries, and interviews based on the officers’ belief that they would either be ineffective or risk the investigation’s detection”), cert. denied sub nom. Zografidis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 166 (2018); United States v. Shipp, 578 F. Supp. 980, 989-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“The judgment of the agents that subpoenaeing [a witness] before a grand jury would result in a wall of silence even at the risk of contempt accords with common experience. The Court finds that a proper basis existed for a finding, with respect to the initial wiretap order, that normal investigative techniques had failed, were likely to do so, or were too dangerous.”). Here again, the Court discerns no inaccuracy or omission. b. The CW’s Interactions with Other Co-Conspirators In the necessity section, the Affidavit explains why the Government will not be able to complete the investigation using the CW as its primary source of information. One reason it offers is CW’s mixed success penetrating the conspiracy over the course of his year and a half of recording phone calls: While Messalas sometimes references other participants in his financial deals with the CW, the CW is still not fully privy to the workings of the group of co-conspirators, its activities or its membership. Specifically, other than [suspected co-conspirators Dimitrios] Argyros and [Andreas] Karasamanis, Messalas has not introduced the CW to other members of the conspiracy. While Messalas has alluded to the fact that he is operating with co-conspirators, he has not specifically identified which individuals with whom he is dealing who are aware of the conspiracy’s fraudulent nature. Furthermore, were the CW to question Messalas in detail regarding this topic, it may make Messalas suspicious that the CW is working at law enforcement’s direction. (Aff. at 72.) The Government now admits this passage was incomplete. The CW had contact with three other individuals who, in subsequent reauthorization requests, were identified as target subjects of the investigation: Jan Chason, Dominick Bianco, and Rodney Liebowitz. (Gov’t Opp’n at 18.) More specifically, according to Messalas, the CW had been included on email communications with, and had personally met, Jan Chason; he had spoken to and corresponded by email with Dominick Bianco; and he had “met with and consensually recorded phone calls with” Rodney Liebowitz. (Suppression Mot. at 24-25.) In addition, Chason was listed on BioCube’s public filings as an officer, director, and shareholder of the company. (Reply at 9.) Although Messalas has identified an inconsistency, he again has not made a “substantial showing” of either materiality or disregard for the truth. Taking materiality first, there is no evidence that including the omitted information would have weakened the claim of necessity. See Salameh, 158 F.3d at 113 (holding that a hearing is unnecessary if, “after setting aside the allegedly misleading statements or omissions, the affidavit, nonetheless, presents sufficient information”). The point the Affidavit makes in this passage is that the CW is unable, for various reasons, to fully penetrate the conspiracy. One of those reasons, for example, was that “individuals involved in securities fraud often compartmentalize aspects of their operations.” (Aff. at 73.) Another, the one challenged here, is that Messalas remained guarded with the CW despite their long history together. Thus, the CW was “not fully privy to the workings of the group,…its activities or its membership.” (Id. at 72.) This included having not been introduced to more than a handful of the larger group of suspected co-conspirators. Whether, of the eight suspected co-conspirators the Affidavit disclosed, (see id. at
