MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Defendants Alan Sheinwald and Alliance Advisors, LLC (“Alliance”) seek to modify the permanent injunction entered by this Court as part of a final judgment on March 14, 2014. Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) opposes the motion. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied. BACKGROUND Sheinwald was the founder and president of Alliance, an investor relations firm. On July 30, 2012, the SEC filed this action, alleging that Sheinwald and Alliance had violated Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by acting as unregistered brokers in connection with securities offerings for two companies.1 On March 14, 2014, Defendants and the SEC notified the Court that they had reached a settlement. See Dkt. 53 (March 14, 2014 Joint Ltr.). With this letter, they filed a proposed final judgment with an executed consent to the entry of this proposed final judgment from Sheinwald and Alliance. See id. The final judgment, which the Court entered that day, included the following permanent injunction: Defendants and Defendants’ agents, servants, employees, attorneys and all persons in active concert or participation with Defendants who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating, directly or indirectly, Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. §78o(a)] to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security unless such broker or dealer is registered with the Commission as such or associated with an entity registered with the Commission as a broker or dealer. Dkt. 54. The final judgment also included an agreement that Defendants were “liable on a joint and several basis for disgorgement of $177,166,” as well as prejudgment interest of $18,022, and civil penalties of $25,000 for each Sheinwald and Alliance.2 Id. Several weeks later, on April 2, 2014, the SEC issued an Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (the “Order”) against Sheinwald and Alliance, who “consent[ed] to the entry of this Order.” Dkt. 65, Ex. 1 (Apr. 2, 2014 Order). The Order first explained that neither Sheinwald nor Alliance was registered with the SEC and thus both were acting as unregistered brokers. Then, noting the final judgment entered in this Court a few weeks prior, it stated that the SEC, as a result, “deem[ed] it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondents Sheinwald and Alliance Advisors’ Offer.” Id. It thus ordered that: Sheinwald and Alliance be, and hereby are,…barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, or transfer agent; barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock, with the right to apply for reentry after two years to the appropriate self-regulatory organization, or if there is none, to the Commission. Id. With the Order, the SEC issued a Litigation Release. The Litigation Release began by announcing the terms of “[t]he final judgment permanently enjoin[ing] Sheinwald and Alliance Advisors LLC from future violations of Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934″ and imposing monetary penalties. Dkt. 65, Ex. 2 (Apr. 1, 2014 Litigation Release). It then noted that, “[b]ased on the final judgment,” the SEC had issued the Order, which “bars Sheinwald and Alliance Advisors by consent from association with any investment adviser, broker, dealer, municipal securities, dealer, or transfer agent[.]” Id. On July 1, 2014, Equifax Compliance Data Center, LLC sent an Advisory Notice, which it had previously issued about Defendants, to Scottrade. The Advisory Notice summarized the final judgment and Order, explaining that, “[b]ased on the final judgment, the Commission issued an Order…that bars Sheinwald and Alliance Advisors by consent from association with any investment adviser, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, or transfer agent…with the right to apply for reentry after two years.”3 Dkt. 59, Ex. 6 (Equifax Advisory Notice). Defendants contend that Scottrade terminated Sheinwald’s brokerage account at an unspecified time after receiving Equifax’s Advisory Notice. Defendants also state that Park Avenue Securities terminated Sheinwald’s brokerage account but do not say when or if it received the Advisory Notice. Nor have Defendants provided documentary proof of closure of either account. In August 2018, Sheinwald also received a letter from E*TRADE Securities LLC (“E*TRADE”), stating that it “ha[d] decided to exercise its discretion to close the above-referenced accounts.” Dkt. 59, Ex. 5 (E*TRADE Ltr.). E*TRADE’s letter did not reference the permanent injunction or the Order. Rather, the only reason provided for closing Sheinwald’s account was that “E*TRADE Securities reserve[d] the right to terminate [his] Account or to block [his] access to the Service without notice, for any reason or no reason.” Id. In addition, in the years following the entry of the final judgment and the Order, Sheinwald twice asked the SEC to modify the Order. First, in March 2016, Sheinwald requested that the SEC vacate the Order “to the extent that it bars him from association with any nationally recognized statistical rating organization (‘NRSRO’) or municipal advisor.” Dkt. 65, Ex. 3 (Aug. 2, 2016 Order); see also Pl.’s Opp. at 4. The SEC denied his request on August 2, 2016, explaining that the Order “did not…bar him from association with an NRSRO or a municipal advisor.” Id. In December 2017, Sheinwald again sought to vacate the Order, but this time “to the extent that it bars him from association with an investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, or transfer agent, subject to a right to reapply after two years.” Dkt. 65, Ex. 4 (July 5, 2019 Order); see also Pl.’s Opp. at 4. On July 2019, acting “in [its] discretion,” the SEC granted Sheinwald’s request to vacate this language but “otherwise le[ft] the Order unmodified.” Id. On November 26, 2019, Defendants filed the present motion to modify the permanent injunction in the final judgment. They allege that, “[f]ollowing the entry of the Injunction in this matter, numerous un-related, third parties have repeatedly misinterpreted the Injunction as having a much broader application than contemplated by the plain language of the Injunction itself.” Defs.’ Mot. at 2-3. The SEC opposed Defendants’ motion. LEGAL STANDARD “[A] continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need,” even if “it was entered by consent.” United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). As such, “[t]he power of a court of equity to modify a decree of injunctive relief is long-established, broad, and flexible.” N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d Cir. 1983). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “state[s] this inherent power as a rule,” Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 732 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1984), permitting, “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party of its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if — as relevant in this action — “applying [the judgment] prospectively is no longer equitable” or for “any other reason that justifies relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)(6). “[T]he Rule provides a means by which a party can ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if ‘a significant change either in factual conditions or in law’ renders continued enforcement ‘detrimental to the public interest.’” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (citation omitted); see also Sierra Club, 732 F.2d at 256 (“[A] court may modify a final or permanent injunction only where conditions have so changed as to make such relief equitable, i.e., a significant change in the law or facts.”). “The party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief[.]” Horne, 557 U.S. at 447. DISCUSSION Defendants seek to modify the permanent injunction to “clarify that [they] are not prohibited or enjoined from: (1) owning brokerage accounts; (2) trading with a brokerage account; (3) participating in stock offerings; (4) trading on behalf of a hedge fund; or (5) voting as a general partner of a hedge fund.”4 Defs.’ Mot. at 1. They contend that the injunction is currently “being misinterpreted by third parties” to bar this activity, and thus they have “suffered significant harm.” Defs.’ Mot. at 4. Citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6), Defendants suggest that modification of the permanent injunction is permitted because factual circumstances render the injunction no longer equitable.5 See Defs.’ Reply at 3. The Court, however, agrees with the SEC that Defendants have “failed to establish the significant change in factual conditions required” for the Court to modify a final judgment. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216 (1997). The Court first notes that “the language in the injunction is clear.” Pl.’s Opp. at 6. It does not bar Defendants from owning or trading with brokerage accounts, participating in stock offers, trading on behalf of a hedge fund, or voting as a general partner of a hedge fund, but solely prohibits future violations of Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Dkt. 54. Defendants acknowledge this, explaining that their present motion only asks this Court to clarify that they are not prohibited or enjoined from certain activities. See Defs.’ Mot. at 1. But still, Defendants do not identify what language in the permanent injunction is causing the alleged confusion among third parties or why that language would lead third parties to believe that Defendants are “enjoin[ed]…from partaking in a much broader category of legal activities than contemplated by the plain language of the Injunction itself.” Defs.’ Mot. at. 1. The Court thus believes — as both parties seem to agree — the injunction’s language and scope is clear. For that reason alone, the Court is hesitant to modify the final judgment. But perhaps more significantly, even if the injunction’s language was unclear, Defendants have also failed to establish that third parties are misinterpreting the permanent injunction — the factual circumstances that Defendants urge warrant modification of the permanent injunction. Defendants’ basis for seeking this modification is that (1) Equifax issued an Advisory Notice, which was sent to Scottrade in July 2014; (2) E*TRADE closed Sheinwald’s brokerage account in August 2018; and (3) Scottrade and Park Avenue Securities closed Sheinwald’s brokerage accounts. They also rely on Sheinwald’s declaration, which asserts that “the Injunction has become a burden” because he was “told by certain firms that [Equifax's] advisory was used as a reason for either declining to open an account for me or to close an already opened account.” Dkt. 59, Ex. A (Sheinwald Decl.)
