OPINION & ORDER Before me is the motion of Defendant Chaz Jones (“Defendant” or “Jones”) for “temporary release to home detention pending his sentence date and surrender on June 12, 2020, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3143,” based upon his having had Burkitt Lymphoma as a teenager and the treatment he received for that disease. (Doc. 58, at 1.) Because I do not find by clear and convincing evidence that Jones is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community, and that Defendant has not demonstrated that “there are exceptional reasons why [his] detention would not be appropriate,” 18 U.S.C. §3145(c), his motion for temporary release is DENIED. I. Background and Procedural History According to sealed superseding indictment S1 19 Cr. 125 (“Superseding Indictment”), Jones was a member of a gang operating in the George Washington Carver Houses in New York, New York (the “Carver Houses Crew”). (Sup. Ind. 1.)1 From at least 2014 until approximately May 2019, the members of the Carver Houses Crew engaged “in, among other things, murder, attempted murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, and narcotics trafficking.” (Id.) An arrest warrant for Jones was filed on February 25, 2020, (Doc. 4), and he was arrested pursuant to a writ on February 28, 2020, (Doc. 6). At his initial appearance, Jones consented to detention without prejudice to seeking bail at a future date, and waived the preparation of a presentence report. (Id.) Prior to pleading guilty, Jones never sought a bail hearing. Jones is currently housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”). (Doc. 58, at 1.) On November 25, 2019, Jones pled guilty to a superseding information charging him with possessing a firearm during and in relation to, and in furtherance of, a drug trafficking crime, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Specifically, Jones admitted that “[f]rom 2014 to 2019 in New York County during [his] participation in an agreement or conspiracy to sell crack cocaine, [he] possessed an unlicensed firearm to protect [his] drugs and [himself],” and he knew “it was illegal to possess cocaine, to sell cocaine, and to possess an unlicensed firearm.” (Doc. 45, at 19:6-10.) On March 25, 2020, Defendant filed a letter motion with exhibits seeking his “temporary release to home detention pending his sentence date and surrender on June 12, 2020, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3143.” (Doc. 58, at 1.) The Government filed its opposition on March 26, 2020, (Doc. 59), and Jones filed his reply with exhibits on March 30, 2020, (Doc. 60). On April 16, 2020, Jones filed a supplemental letter. (Doc. 62.) II. Applicable Law Where a defendant has been convicted of a crime for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment, detention pending the imposition of the sentence is mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. §§3143(a)(2), 3142(f)(1)(B). Section 3143(a)(2) requires mandatory detention pending sentencing, unless (1) “the judicial officer finds there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted; or” (2) “an attorney for the Government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and” (3) “the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. §3143(a)(2). Section 3145(c) provides that “[a defendant] subject to detention pursuant to section 3143(a)(2)…and who meets the conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1)…may be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, by the judicial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person’s detention would not be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. §3145(c). Section 3143(a)(1) provides that a “judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence…be detained, unless [a] judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released under section 3142(b) or (c),” and if a “judicial officer makes such a finding, such judicial officer shall order the release of the person in accordance with section 3142(b) or (c).” 18 U.S.C. §3143(a)(1). “[E]xceptional reasons” warranting the release of a defendant subject to mandatory detention are those that “present a unique combination of circumstances giving rise to situations that are out of the ordinary.” United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1991). This can include “an unusual legal or factual question,” or “merely [a] substantial question may be sufficient, in the presence of one or more remarkable and uncommon factors, to support a finding of exceptional reasons for the inappropriateness of detention.” Id. In making such determinations, “a case by case evaluation is essential,” and a district court’s discretion “is constrained only by the language of the statute: ‘exceptional reasons.’” Id.; see United States v. Hugo Witter, No. 19 Cr. 568 (SHS), Dkt. 40 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020) (“Witter”); see also United States v. Lea, 360 F.3d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The test under §3145(c) is necessarily a flexible one, and district courts have wide latitude to determine whether a particular set of circumstances qualifies as ‘exceptional.’”). With this legal framework as guidance, some courts have found that “exceptional reasons” exist where a defendant has a documented health condition that places that inmate at heightened risk of serious complications from exposure to COVID-19, justifying release under §3145(c). See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 19-CR-116 (KMW) (JLC), 2020 WL 1678806, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) (granting temporary release on bond pursuant to §3145(c) where defendant’s asthma made him more susceptible than others to potentially getting very sick, or dying, from COVID-19.”); United States v. McDuffie, No. 19- CR-212 (VEC), 2020 WL 1659879, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2020) (granting temporary release on bond pursuant to §3145(c) where defendant’s rheumatoid arthritis made him “particularly susceptible to COVID-19, a highly infectious and potentially fatal illness that has been found in the facility in which he [was] being detained.”); United States v. McKenzie, No. 18-CR-834, 2020 WL 1503669, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (granting bail where “the heightened threat posed by COVID-19 to an inmate with a documented respiratory condition in a detention facility with multiple confirmed cases present[ed] a unique combination of circumstances.” (citation omitted)); Witter, No. 19 Cr. 568 (SHS), Dkt. 40 at 2-3 (granting bond pending sentencing, pursuant to §3145(c), to defendant, who had pleaded guilty to a narcotics offense, because defendant was at heightened risk because of his hypertension which was being treated with several medications). III. Application Defendant argues that he should be temporary released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3145(c) because as a teenager he was diagnosed with and successfully treated for Burkitt Lymphoma which he asserts likely caused “lasting deleterious effects on his immune system, making him more vulnerable than most to the escalating coronavirus pandemic.”2 (Doc. 58, at 1.) In opposition the Government argues that “the defendant cannot demonstrate the circumstances necessary to justify his release based upon his assertions regarding the current COVID-19 pandemic.” (Doc. 59, at 1.) Specifically, the Government asserts that (1) “defendant’s arguments in favor of release due to COVID-19 rely on a number of asserted eventualities regarding Jones’ likelihood of contracting COVID-19, and the MDC’s purported failure to contain COVID-19, all of which are speculative,” (Doc. 59, at 2-4); (2) the case law warrants detention, (id. at 4-5); (3) Defendant’s health condition does not warrant his temporary release, (id. at 5); (4) Defendant is a danger to the community, (id. at 5-6); and (5) Pretrial Services ability to supervise Defendant may be diminished due to the COVID-19 pandemic, (id. at 6). A. Section 3143(a)(2) As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Defendant’s detention after his guilty plea was mandatory. Section 3143(a)(2) requires mandatory detention pending sentencing unless (1) “the judicial officer finds there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted; or” (2) “an attorney for the Government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and” (3) “the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. §3143(a)(2). Defendant has not sought to establish the first prong and I do not find a likelihood that a motion for acquittal or a new trial will be granted, and the Government is not recommending a sentence of no imprisonment, nor could it since the mandatory sentence required by statute is five years. With regard to the third prong, prior to filing the instant motion Defendant did not attempt to establish that he was not likely to flee or pose a danger to any person or the community; therefore, mandatory detention is appropriate. “Accordingly, [Jones'] only hope for release is the ‘escape hatch’ found in Section 3145(c), which authorizes bail where a defendant (1) ‘meets the conditions of release set forth in [S]ection 3143(a)(1),’ meaning he establishes by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) ‘if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person’s detention would not be appropriate.’ 18 U.S.C. §3145(c).” United States v. Paulino, No. 19 CR. 54 (PGG), 2020 WL 1847914, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020); see also United States v. Cubangbang, No. (S1) 18 CR. 601 (PGG), 2020 WL 1905591, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2020). B. Section 3142(a)(1): Risk of Flight and Danger to the Community Defendant argues that his temporary release to his mother “subject to conditions of strict home incarceration and electronic monitoring[,] [] would prevent any risk of flight or danger to the community during the COVID-19 crisis.” (Doc. 59, at 2.) Defendant also argues that he is “indigent with very little resources but the love of his mother and family.”3 (Id. at 10.) The crux of Defendant’s argument is that the moral suasion of his mother, strict home confinement, and electronic monitoring amount to a combination of conditions that are sufficient to assure his future appearance and the safety of the community. In opposition the Government argues that Defendant is a danger to the community because: (1) of the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty; (2) his alleged membership in the Carver Houses Crew; (3) his criminal history; (4) his commission of the instant offense while on parole; and (5) the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic will likely limit the ability of Pretrial Services “to effectively supervise the defendant if released[,]…as officers’ ability to travel and visit with the defendant could be limited, and the resources of Pretrial Services are otherwise stretched.” (Doc. 60, at 5-6.) Defendant does not discuss the underlying charge to which he pled guilty or the mandatory five-year sentence he faces as factors to be considered in making a determination of whether or not a finding can be made by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or to pose a danger to any other person or to the community. See 18 U.S.C. §3143(a)(1). In other words, Defendant does not substantively discuss the charge to which he pled guilty or the charges contained in the Superseding Indictment as it relates to whether he poses a danger to the community. The closest Defendant comes to making such an argument is his claim that he was “well on his way to rehabilitation” because he had two jobs at the time of his arrest. (Doc. 58, at 6-7.) However, no proof has been submitted to me to substantiate that Defendant was employed or other corroborative evidence to support the inference that his having legitimate employment is a sign of his rehabilitation. For the purpose of making this bail determination, I will accept the proffer that Defendant had two jobs prior to his arrest, but this fact is insufficient to outweigh Defendant’s guilty plea, the allegations in the Superseding Indictment, Defendant’s criminal record, and the fact that he committed the instant offense while on parole supervision. In other words, as detailed below, on this record I cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that Jones is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released. Defendant admitted during his plea allocution to participating in a five-year drug conspiracy during which he possessed an unlicensed firearm to protect his drugs and himself. (Doc. 45, at 19:6-10.) This charge carries a mandatory five-year sentence that must be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment. Upon his plea of guilty Defendant was subject to mandatory detention, see 18 U.S.C. §§3143(a)(2), 3142(f)(1)(B), and there does not appear to be a dispute that Defendant committed the instant offence while he was on parole. These facts do not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant is not a flight risk or does not pose a danger to the community, and militate against temporary release. See Paulino, 2020 WL 1847914, at *6 (finding a risk of flight and danger to the community based on defendant’s commission of Hobbs Act robbery during probation, stipulated guidelines range of 84 to 105 months’ imprisonment, prior issuance of bench warrant, and attempts to evade arrest). The Government proffers in its opposition and alleges in the Superseding Indictment that Defendant was a member of the Carver Houses Crew and that from at least 2014 until approximately May 2019, the members of the Carver Houses Crew engaged “in, among other things, murder, attempted murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, and narcotics trafficking.” (Sup. Ind. 1.) In fact, the Superseding Indictment charged Defendant with the following crimes: (1) participating in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) conspiracy, (id.
