OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs John Falzon, Cindy Falzon, Joseph Voelpel, and Dianna Voelpel bring this action against defendants Brian Ford, Stephanie Ford, SunStarter Solar XXXIV LLC (“SunStarter Solar”), and Solar Provider Group LLC (“Solar Provider,” and together with SunStarter Solar, the “Solar Defendants”), alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state law claims in connection with the Fords’ lease of land to the Solar Defendants to develop a solar panel farm on the Fords’ property. Now pending are defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). (Docs. ##24, 30). For the following reasons, the motions are GRANTED. BACKGROUND For the purpose of ruling on the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in the amended complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, as summarized below. Plaintiffs, the Falzons and the Voelpels, are next-door neighbors in the small town of Minisink, New York. The Fords own eighty-five acres of land directly behind the Falzon and Voelpel properties. Plaintiffs allege Brian Ford, a Minisink town councilman, had helped to enact laws regulating solar energy systems and equipment in Minisink. Plaintiffs further allege that on March 3, 2017, the Fords entered into a long-term lease agreement with SunStarter Solar, a wholly owned subsidiary of Solar Provider. The lease provided that for a term of 300 months (twenty-five years), SunStarter Solar would pay the Fords an annual rent of $1,900 per acre, for seven acres leased, and would also pay the property taxes on the seven acres leased. Plaintiffs opposed the “planned solar panel farm” on the Fords’ property due to the proximity of the anticipated project to plaintiffs’ homes. (Doc. #23 (“Am. Compl.”)
63-64). Plaintiffs allege they complained about the solar panel project to the Minisink Planning Board in 2018 and requested that the project be developed elsewhere on the Fords’ property. Plaintiffs allege their opposition to the solar panel project “brought hostile backlash because Brian Ford used his position as an elected Town official to retaliate against Plaintiffs.” (Am. Compl. 69). Plaintiffs claim Brian Ford “used his position and influence as a Town Board member to induce a number of individuals to yell at and to curse at John Falzon at board meetings and to display outright hostility toward the Falzons and the Voelpels because of their opposition.” (Id. 70). Plaintiffs argue Brian Ford’s actions were “the actions of an elected town official cloaked with the influence of his office — who intentionally retaliated against Plaintiffs.” (Id. 72). Plaintiffs also allege that in “late October 2018, Brian Ford (or someone at his direction) parked a large manure spreader and a dump wagon directly behind the Falzons’ house — only five feet from the property line.” (Am. Compl. 73). Plaintiffs allegedly complained to Minisink officials, including the Minisink Planning Board, about Brian Ford’s conduct and the town’s subsequent failure to act. Plaintiffs allege the manure spreader and dump wagon were finally removed after a local TV station reported on the incident in January 2019. According to plaintiffs, Stephanie Ford told Cindy Falzon that Brian Ford had intentionally parked the manure spreader and dump wagon near the Falzons’ property line in retaliation for plaintiffs’ opposition to the planned solar panel project. Plaintiffs further allege SunStarter Solar’s commissioned visual impact study misled the Minisink Planning Board. According to plaintiffs, SunStarter Solar submitted images collected with a 24-millimeter wide-angle lens but omitted from the study images collected with a 50-millimeter lens, which were meant to approximate the human eye. Plaintiffs allege the change in methodology had no reasonable basis. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standards A. Rule 12(b)(1) “[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Congress.” Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009).1 A cause of action “is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011). The party invoking the Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden to establish that jurisdiction exists. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). When deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction exists at the pleading stage, the Court “must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009). “However, argumentative inferences favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction should not be drawn.” Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int’l Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1992). B. Rule 12(b)(6) In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative complaint under the “two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, a plaintiff’s legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint’s allegations must meet a standard of “plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). II. Application Defendants argue plaintiffs have failed adequately to plead their Section 1983 claim arising under federal law, and therefore, that claim should be dismissed. Because of this, defendants further contend the Court should dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Second Circuit has “ruled that the sufficiency of a color-of-law allegation is to be tested under Rule 12(b)(6).” Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the Court first addresses defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) arguments respecting plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim. A. Section 1983 Claim Against Brian Ford Defendants argue the amended complaint fails to state a Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Brian Ford. The Court agrees. 1. Acting Under Color of State Law To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must first plausibly allege the defendant acted under color of state law. Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008). To act under color of state law or authority for purposes of Section 1983, the defendant must “exercise[] power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Moreover, “[i]t is firmly established that a defendant in a §1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State.” Id. at 49-50. However, it is “axiomatic that under color of law means pretense of law and that acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded.” Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1994). Thus, whether the specific conduct a plaintiff complains of constitutes state action is “necessarily [a] fact-bound inquiry.” Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, the amended complaint does not allege the typical actions of a town board member that would fall plainly within the ambit of actions taken under color of state law. Had Brian Ford acted under color of state law, his actions would have been in the course of legislating or governing. But here there are no such allegations. Moreover, the amended complaint lacks any plausible allegation that Brian Ford possessed influence over his fellow town board members or other individuals. Although plaintiffs allege Brian Ford got other individuals to heckle plaintiffs, they do not specify who those individuals were, or how Brian Ford was able to induce such conduct. Instead, plaintiffs plead conclusory allegations that Brian Ford was able to do so on account of his office. (See Am. Compl.
