The following papers having been read on this motion: Notice of Motion, Cross-Motion Affidavits, & Exhibits 1-4 Answering Affidavits 5, 6 Replying Affidavits 7-9 Briefs: Plaintiff’s / Petitioner’s 10-11 Defendant’s / Respondent’s Defendants move (sequence 001) for an order inter alia dismissing the complaint against defendant Shea on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations; plaintiff cross-moves (sequence 002) for an order inter alia striking the defendants’ answer. Defendants’ motion presents not only procedural issues suitable for a Bar examination, but a novel question which has not specifically been addressed by an appellate court: should the clause in CPLR 205 (a)’s six-month extension of time to refile an action that has been dismissed — “…provided that…service upon defendant is effected within such six-month period [emphasis added]” — mean that service of process pursuant to CPLR §308 (2) must be delivered “to a person of suitable age and discretion” and mailed to that person’s “last known residence or actual place of business,” in accordance with the two-step procedural requirements of that statute, before the expiration of that six-month period, or should the word “effected” be interpreted to mean, within the context of CPLR §308 (2) service of process, that the process must also, within that six-month window, be filed with the “clerk of the Court” and thus “complete[d],” ten days after that filing? The underlying action seeks to recover commissions which are allegedly due and owing pursuant to an oral agreement between the parties. The plaintiff asserts in its fourth cause of action pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law §274 that the defendants fraudulently conveyed assets to avoid paying those commissions. This cause of action is identical to the fourth cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in a prior action between the parties in the District Court of Nassau County. The first, second and third cases of action in plaintiff’s District Court complaint were dismissed on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court noted in its order dated and entered on January 13, 2017 (Darcy, J.) that the fourth cause of action was voluntarily discontinued by the plaintiff in its cross-motion “in the event” the three other causes of action were dismissed, and consequently the Court ordered the fourth cause of action discontinued pursuant to CPLR §3217 (b). The plaintiff did not appeal or reargue the District Court order of January 13, 2017. Instead, five months and twenty-four days later, on July 7, 2017, the plaintiff filed the instant action. On July 10, 2017, defendant Shea was served by substituted service pursuant to CPLR §308 (2) at his place of business. The process server avers that he mailed a copy of the summons and complaint on July 11, 2017; process was filed with the County Clerk that same day. The defendants argue that the service of process on defendant Shea was completed pursuant to CPLR §308 (2) on July 21, 2017, six months and eight days after the January 13, 2017, dismissal by the District Court of plaintiff’s identical prior action, and thus barred by CPLR §205 (a). CPLR §205 (a) states in relevant part that “[i]f an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff…may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement of the prior action and that service upon defendant is effected within such six-month period. [ephasis added].” CPLR §308 (2) states in relevant part that “[p]ersonal service upon a natural person [may] be made 2. by delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served and by either mailing the summons to the person to be served at his or her last known residence or by mailing the summons by first class mail to the person to be served at his or her actual place of business in an envelope bearing the legend “personal and confidential” and not indicating on the outside thereof, by return address or otherwise, that the communication is from an attorney or concerns an action against the person to be served, such delivery and mailing to be effected within twenty days of each other; proof of such service shall be filed with the clerk of the court designated in the summons within twenty days of either such delivery or mailing, whichever is effected later; service shall be complete ten days after such filing…[emphasis supplied].” In support of their argument that the plaintiff’s action is time-barred by CPLR §205 (a), the defendants rely on a lengthy, thorough, trial court court decision in the Fourth Department, Roth v. Syracuse Hous. Auth., 2002 NY Slip Op 40550 (U) [Sup. Ct., Odondaga County, July 17, 2002, Paris, J.], aff’d 306 AD2d 921 [for the reasons stated at Supreme Court], lv denied 1 NY3d 507 [2004], which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed each cause of action asserted against them, and also held that service of process on a defendant was required to be pursuant to CPLR §308 (2) within the six-month time frame allowed by CPLR §205 (a). Defendants’ counsel maintains that since the Appellate Division, Second Department, has not ruled on whether service must be made, or completed, pursuant to CPLR §308 (2) within the six-month period, this Court is bound by Roth by the doctrine of stare decisis (see, e.g.,Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 102 AD2d 663 [2nd Dept, 1984]. This Court respectfully declines to follow Roth since the Appellate Division Second Department has interpreted CPLR §308 differently in an analogous setting, attempting to “effectuate” service of process within the 120-day time frame required by CPLR 306-b (see, Mighty v. Deshommes, 178 A.D.3d 912, 915 [2nd Dept. 2019]) and the fact that Fourth Department has never discussed specifically the meaning of the word “effected” within the context of service of process in the six-month savings period permitted by CPLR 205 (a). “‘[A] court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof’ (Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 583 [1998] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]” (State of New York Mortg. Agency v. Braun, 182 A.D.3d 63, 119 N.Y.S.3d 522, 529 [2nd Dept. 2020]). The Court of Appeals has “recognized that meaning and effect should be given to every word of a statute. ‘Words are not to be rejected as superfluous where it is practicable to give each a distinct and separate meaning’ (Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 100; see also, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes §231)” Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 N.Y.2d 95, 104 [2001]; see, Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Daniels, 33 N.Y.3d 44, 67 [2019]; Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208 [1976]; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §92 [a]). Applying these fundamental principles of statutory construction here, this Court concludes that the Legislature could have clearly and simply stated in CPLR §205 (a) the word completed instead of effected in the context of service of process pursuant to CPLR §308, especially since the Legislature declared in CPLR §§308 (2) and (4) that “service is complete ten days after the filing [of the affidavit of the service of process with the clerk of the court].” Consequently, this Court holds that the word effected as stated in CPLR §205 (a) must be construed as embodying only the two-prong jurisdictional predicate in CPLR 308 §(2) of “delivering” and then “mailing” the process within a twenty period (see, Siegel & Connors, NY Prac. §52, at 116 (6th ed. 2018) ["if the plaintiff in the second action uses the substituted service methods in CPLR 308 (2) and (4), both service steps must be carried out within the 6 month period [mandated by CPLR 205 (a)]“; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heaven, 176 A.D.3d 761, 762-63 [2nd Dept. 2019]), and should not be interpreted to also include the eventual “complet[tion]” of that service of process whenever it is filed with the clerk of the court (see, Siegel & Connors, NY Prac. §72, at 179, 181-182 (6th ed. 2018) ["[s]ervice becomes ‘complete’ 10 days after proof of service is filed…means only that the defendant’s responding time will not start until then…The ‘completion’ of service under CPLR 308 (2) has nothing to do with the statute of limitations…which is satisfied if…[b]oth the delivery and the mailing [is] carried out within the 120-day period for service that follows the filing of the action”]). “[T]he failure to file proof of service within the time specified…[in CPLR 308] was not a jurisdictional defect but was rather a ‘procedural irregularity’ that could be cured by an order permitting the late filing of proof of service, absent an order curing the irregularity…” (Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 103 A.D.3d 117, 120-21 ([2nd Dept. 2012]). Accordingly, the branch of defendants’ motion for an order pursuant to CPLR §3211(a) (5) dismissing the complaint against defendant Shea on the ground that it is time-barred is denied. The branch of defendants motion for an order dismissing the fourth cause of action against ASTI or alternatively, if the branch of defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211 (a) (5) is denied, granting the defendants leave to amend their answer, pursuant to CPLR §3025(b) and CPLR §203 (d), to allege additional affirmative defenses and counterclaims consistent with the proposed amended answer annexed to the moving papers, is granted in its entirety (see, CPLR §3217 [b]; CPLR §3025 [b]). “[A] voluntary discontinuance, by any method at all [i.e., by notice, by stipulation, or by order] is an exception to CPLR 205(a) and does not get the six months [to re-commence the action]…A discontinuing plaintiff planning to start over must always make sure either that the original statute of limitations is still alive, or that the plaintiff has in hand an agreement by the defendant not to interpose the statute of limitations defense in the new action” (see, Siegel & Connors, NY Prac. §298 at 716 [6th ed. 2018]). The proposed amended answer shall be deemed served by the electronic uploading of this order to the Court’s e-filing system. The cross-motion by the plaintiff for an order (1) pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) striking defendants’ answer for failing to comply with plaintiff’s demand for documents and demand for responses to the interrogatories 57-80 propounded by the plaintiff, or alternatively, (2) for an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 (2), precluding the defendants from offering into evidence at trial any documents pertaining to the plaintiff’s demand for documents and demand for responses to interrogatories, or alternatively, (3) for an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 (1), resolving in plaintiff’s favor the issues contained in the documents demanded, or alternatively, (4) compelling the defendants to respond to the plaintiff’s document demands and responses to interrogatories 57-80, is granted to the extent that the defendants shall comply with plaintiff’s document demands and responses to interrogatories 57-80 within 60 days after the service of a copy of this order upon the defendants’ attorney. However, in the interests of judicial and litigation economy, this Court directs that a settlement conference be conducted, either telephonically or by Skype for business, on June 17, 2020, at 11 a.m., in view of the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent orders promulgated by the Executive and Judicial branches of government. Counsel are directed to contact the undersigned by remote email on June 15 to ascertain whether the conference will take place as scheduled. In the event that the parties cannot agree on settling the matter, then respective counsel shall communicate with each other on a stipulation, to be “so-ordered,” regarding the scheduling of all outstanding discovery. The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court. NOT FINAL DISPOSITION Dated: May 15, 2020
