MEMORANDUM & ORDER Plaintiff Andrew Rodriguez, in his individual capacity and on behalf of others similarly situated, brings this action against Defendants National Golf Links of America and William Muller, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (the “NYLL”). Plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint to add claims of retaliation under the FLSA and NYLL.1 For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows a party to amend its complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving the complaint or within 21 days after a responsive pleading has been served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Where the time for amendment as a matter of course has passed, a party may amend its pleading with the opposing party’s written consent or with leave of the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The [C]ourt should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Id. Nevertheless, “it is within the sound discretion of the [Court] to grant or deny leave to amend.” Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile. Ong v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 199, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 389 (2d Cir. 2015)). “Amendment is futile if the ‘amended portion of the complaint would fail to state a cause of action,’” id. (quoting Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 339 (2d Cir. 2000)), and so an amended complaint must be “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6),” Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007). In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (internal citation omitted). “In addressing the sufficiency of a complaint, [the Court] accept[s] as true all factual allegations and draw[s] from them all reasonable inferences; but [the Court is] not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013). DISCUSSION Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint in order to add claims of retaliation under the FLSA and NYLL, arguing that a separate state court lawsuit filed against Plaintiff by John P. McNiff, a member of Defendant National Golf Links of America, constitutes a retaliatory action that was meant to dissuade Plaintiff from proceeding with this case. (Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (“Pl.’s Mot.”), Dkt. 15, at 2-3; Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint (“Pl.’s Proposed Am. Compl.”), Dkt. 15-3,
106-17.) Specifically, Plaintiff avers that McNiff commenced the state court action against Plaintiff on March 19, 2020, after contacting Plaintiff numerous times and “pressuring [Plaintiff] to either discontinue or settle the instant matter immediately.” (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 15, at 1-2.) Defendants do not dispute this account of events (see generally Defendants’ Supplemental Briefing (“Defs.’ Supp. Br.”), Dkt. 18), but they instead argue that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied as futile because Plaintiff has not alleged, and cannot allege, that McNiff’s state court action is “baseless” or “frivolous” (id. at 1-2). Rather, Defendants argue, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that McNiff’s state court action concerns a $5,000 loan that McNiff had made to Plaintiff to pay the medical expenses of a fellow golf caddy whom Plaintiff had assaulted in September 2018. (Id. at 1.) Defendants maintain that Plaintiff kept the $5,000 for himself and never repaid McNiff, and that, following Plaintiff’s termination from Defendant National Golf Links of America,2 McNiff commenced the state court action against Plaintiff in order to recover the loan amount. (Id.) The retaliation provision of the FLSA makes it “unlawful for any person…to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under [the FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3). “FLSA retaliation claims are subject to the three-step burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) participation in protected activity known to the defendant, like the filing of a FLSA lawsuit; (2) an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, the NYLL provides that an employer shall not “discharge, threaten, penalize, or in any other manner discriminate or retaliate against any employee…because such employee has made a complaint…that the employer has engaged in conduct that the employee, reasonably and in good faith, believes violates [the NYLL].” N.Y. Lab. Law §215(a)(1). The burden-shifting standard for a retaliation claim under the NYLL is the same as that under the FLSA. See Santi v. Hot in Here, Inc., No. 18-CV-03028 (ER), 2019 WL 290145, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2019) (noting that FLSA and NYLL retaliation claims are governed by the same standard). As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged both the first and third elements of a FLSA retaliation claim: (1) Plaintiff filed the instant FLSA lawsuit against Defendants, and (3) McNiff’s state court action was causally related to Plaintiff’s initiation of this FLSA action. See Mullins, 626 F.3d at 53. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that, “[f]ollowing the commencement of the instant action on December 12, 2019,” McNiff began to contact Plaintiff in order “to persuade Plaintiff to discontinue the instant action.” (Pl.’s Proposed Am. Compl., Dkt. 15-3,
