ADDITIONAL CASES Morgan AuCoin, Plaintiff v. New York University College of Dentistry, Defendant; 160364/2019 The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 were read on this motion for CPLR ARTICLE 78 RELIEF. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 were read on this motion to CONSOLIDATE. DECISION ORDER ON MOTIONS For the reasons set forth herein, the two cases captioned above are consolidated and dismissed. Basic Facts Petitioner Morgan AuCoin officially commenced studying dentistry at respondent New York University College of Dentistry on July 1, 2015. In the spring of 2017 he attended school inconsistently. In the fall of 2017 he attended school inconsistently. In early 2018 he attended school inconsistently. He applied for, and on March 29, 2018, respondent granted him, a medical leave of absence (“MLOA”). Two weeks later petitioner applied to be reinstated, and on June 4, 2018, respondent granted that request. Between July and November 2018, petitioner’s significant absences continued. On December 10, 2018, petitioner requested a second MLOA. Respondent granted this second MLOA, effective December 21, 2018. Pursuant to respondent’s clear rules, petitioner had until March 1, 2019 to request an extension of the second MLOA beyond July 1, 2019, and he had until April 15, 2019 to request that he be reinstated for the school year beginning on that date (NYSCEF Doc. 13, at 7). He failed to meet either deadline. On April 29, 2019 respondent unilaterally deemed him “withdrawn.” In a May 17, 2019 telephone call, respondent informed petitioner of his “withdrawn” status. At the time of this telephone call and, indeed, all of the events here in issue, respondent’s Leave of Absence Policy stated, in relevant part, as follows: “Before returning to the [College of Dentistry], the student is subject to an academic review by the Office of Academic Affairs, to determine when or if the student is eligible to return…. There is no guarantee of reinstatement. Failure to request a return to the next academic year in writing will result in permanent ineligibility for reinstatement of the student.” (See NYSCEF Doc. 13, at 4) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, as stated in a March 29 2018 email to petitioner, respondent stated that “the College understands that at this time, you intend to return to the D3 Class of 2020 in August 2018, although your return is not guaranteed.” (See id.) (emphasis in original). On September 16, 2019, more than four months after respondent’s “declaration,” but less than four months (by one day) after the May 17, 219 telephone call, petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding, essentially seeking to compel respondent to reinstate him. On October 24, 2019, petitioner commenced the instant plenary action, essentially seeking breach of contract damages and, again, reinstatement. Respondent now moves to dismiss; petitioner now moves to consolidate and for disclosure. Discussion Cases are legion that grant educational institutions broad discretion in academic matters, particularly student status. E.g., Susan M. v. New York Law School, 76 NY2d 241, 245 (1990). Likewise, CPLR Article 78 review is limited to whether the challenged action is rationally based. Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 230-31 (1974). This Court sees nothing irrational, arbitrary and capricious, untoward, or nefarious in refusing to reinstate from a second MLOA a student whose academic performance was continually derelict and who failed to meet clear deadlines to apply for reinstatement, or in requiring a student’s course of study to be reasonably continuous and contiguous. This is so especially where the school trains students in an esoteric healing art. At oral argument, petitioner’s determined counsel claimed that petitioner was a “good student.” The record contains no evidence of this, and whether or not petitioner’s absences were his fault, they clearly cast a cloud on his academic credentials. Counsel claimed that respondent assured petitioner that he would be reinstated upon request, but the record belies this claim; indeed, it proves the opposite. Counsel argues that this Court should not defer to respondent’s action because the decision to “terminate” (a word respondent seems not to want to use, perhaps because of its stigma or connotations of violence) petitioner did not require any special expertise. There is something to this argument, but it fails because, among other reasons, you do not need special expertise to refuse to reinstate a student from a second MLOA who “missed numerous clinical rotations,” “failed to attend a mandatory Grand Rounds Seminar,” and “was unable to take a final exam” (NYSCEF Doc. 13 at 3); and who did not comply with clear deadlines to apply for reinstatement. Petitioner’s contract case fails for at least two obvious reasons. First, the documentary evidence, submitted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), clearly shows that respondent complied with all of its obligations; indeed, respondent played strictly according to Hoyle. Second, and arguably more importantly, looking past the trees to the forest, the instant case is a garden-variety academic dispute, subject, as courts have consistently held in similar (albeit not exactly the same) situations, to limited CPLR Article 78 review, rather than full-blown contract principles in a plenary action. You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. Petitioner is angry that respondent effectively terminated him; so are all terminated students. Schools have enormous, albeit not unlimited, power in this area; respondent may have acted heartlessly, but it did not act abusively. Thus, the contract and fraud (and the completely misplaced GBL §349) claims must be dismissed because they fail to state causes of action. The CPLR Article 78 claims must be dismissed for the additional reason that petitioner interposed them untimely. Petitioner claims that the four-month period of limitations runs from the May 17, 2019 telephone call. But petitioner had constructive notice that respondent would deny him reinstatement if he failed to request an extension by March 1, 2019 and if he failed to seek readmission by April 15, 2019. And fail he did. Petitioner’s perspicacious counsel has presented at least one case that requires “actual” notice to start the limitations clock running. But the situation here is not one in which the decision not to reinstate was decided at a private faculty academic committee meeting, the result of which the student would have no idea unless receiving actual notice. Rather, given the clear rules of the game, reinstatement was foreclosed purely by the operation of time, as was visible on any calendar. Petitioner’s request to conduct disclosure prior to this Court’s issuing a decision on the merits is denied in the Court’s discretion. There is absolutely no evidence of foul play or lack of good faith here. Academic institutions could hardly operate efficiently if every aggrieved student could go leafing through every piece of paper and/or computer file to attempt to find the holy grail: some evidence of discrimination or other illegal conduct. Where there is no smoke, courts will not go looking for fire, especially in the hallowed halls of Academia. Conclusion Thus, the instant request to consolidate the two above-captioned cases is granted; the instant request to dismiss both cases is granted; and the Clerk is hereby directed to amend the files and enter judgment accordingly. CHECK ONE: X CASE DISPOSED NON-FINAL DISPOSITION GRANTED DENIED GRANTED IN PART X OTHER APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE Dated: June 8, 2020
