Surrogate López Torres
ESTATE OF SUA BILDIRICI, A/K/A CHARLES BILDIRICI, A/K/A CHARLIE BILDIRICI, Deceased (17-900) — Before the court in this contested probate proceeding is proponents’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the objections to probate of a written instrument dated August 30, 2016 (the propounded instrument), as the last will and testament of Sua Bildirici, a/k/a Charles Bildirici a/k/a Charlie Bildirici (decedent). Verified objections were interposed by the surviving spouse and guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the decedent’s minor children. Background The decedent died on November 30, 2016, survived by his spouse, Miriam Fellah (Miriam or the spouse), and their four minor children, namely Sarah Nina Bildirici, Gabriel Cabra Bildirici, Shirel Bildirici, and Israel Bildirici (together, the objectants). The decedent also had four brothers, namely Davut Rifat Bildirici (Davut or David), Nesim Bildrici (Nesim), Yusuf Bildirici (Yusuf), and Morris Bilidirici (Morris). Three months prior to the decedent’s death from pancreatic cancer, he purportedly executed the propounded instrument at a law office in Israel, where he resided with his spouse and children. The sixteen-page document provides for no specific bequests, but directs that the entirety of decedent’s assets shall be “poured-over” into a revocable trust, which was created on the same date as the propounded instrument, to be managed by his brothers Davut and Nesim (together, the proponents), the nominated executors and proponents herein, as trustees of the “Sua Bildirici Revocable Trust” (the trust). The decedent’s remaining brothers, Yusuf and Morris, are nominated successor executors. The trust document, some sixty pages long, provides that the decedent’s estate be divided into two separate shares, referred to as the Credit Shelter Share and the Marital Share. The trust provides that the Credit Shelter Share will hold the first $5,450,000.00 (or whatever amount is equivalent to the federal estate tax exemption amount at the time of the decedent’s death) of the decedent’s assets for the benefit of the decedent’s spouse and children. The trust further provides that the trustees have sole discretion to decide the amount, if any, of trust income and principal distributed to the spouse and children. The trust provides that should the balance of the decedent’s estate exceed $5,450,000.00, which apparently it does not, those assets will fund the Marital Share Trust for the lifetime benefit of the spouse. The spouse must receive all income from the trust, while distribution of trust principal is controlled by the trustees in their sole discretion. According to the proponents, the decedent’s assets approximate $5,500,000.00. A petition seeking to probate the propounded instrument was filed by the proponents on March 3, 2017. By order of the court dated June 2, 2017, a guardian ad litem (the GAL) was appointed on behalf of the decedent’s minor children, and she filed verified objections to the propounded instrument on March 8, 2018. In addition, verified objections were interposed by the decedent’s spouse on January 8, 2019. The GAL’s objections allege lack of testamentary capacity, lack of due execution, and undue influence. The spouse’s objections request, inter alia, dismissal of the petition “in the interest of substantial justice and fairness to Miriam Fellah.” Discovery was exchanged, including examinations before trial, and a Note of Issue with Certificate of Readiness was filed on May 31, 2019. No motions to vacate the Note of Issue or Certificate of Readiness for trial have been filed by any party. Motion for Summary Judgment The proponents bring the instant summary judgment motion to dismiss all objections to the probate of the propounded instrument. In support thereof, they submit i) an affidavit from David, ii) the SCPA 1404 deposition transcripts of the subscribing witnesses, the attorney-drafter, the decedent’s spouse Miriam, and David, iii) copies of a letter of engagement dated August 4, 2016, iv) two brief executive summaries of the proposed estate plan dated August 9, 2016, and August 15, 2016, respectively, v) the attorney-drafter’s handwritten notes and email correspondence, and vi) copies of the pleadings. The proponents contend that the propounded instrument reflects the decedent’s wish to provide for his children and spouse, as well as his faith and confidence in his brothers to manage his finances and assets. The proponents contend that the decedent, who studied business in London and then came to New York, worked at Republic Bank, and then joined his brothers in investing in and managing real property. Through the years, the proponents contend, the brothers acquired many assets together, and while day-to-day operations were handled by their brother Yusuf, they assert that “we always worked together and relied on each other to manage investment properties.” Aside from their professional bonds, the proponents aver that they and the decedent maintained a very close relationship which continued after he moved to Tel Aviv in 2002. The proponents contend that Nessim and Morris assisted the decedent with his medical issues and communications with his doctors, while Yusuf handled the family business. In or about June 16, 2016, the proponents contend that the decedent asked David to locate an attorney in New York to prepare his estate plan. The proponents contend that their accountant recommended Avi Kestenbaum (Kestenbaum), a partner at the law firm of Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP (the drafting law firm). The proponents aver “[we] initially met briefly with Kestenbaum to determine whether he would be able to assist [the decedent] with his estate plan, and to obtain general information because [the decedent] resided in Israel.” The proponents further contend that Kestenbaum advised that, since the decedent had a non-resident alien spouse, the best plan would be a pour-over will which would distribute the decedent’s assets to a qualified family trust. The proponents submit a copy of a signed retainer agreement dated August 8, 2016, purportedly bearing the decedent’s signature. On or about August 9, 2016, John Proszak (Proszak), another partner at the drafting law firm, prepared a proposed will, trust, and executive summary of the key provisions contained in both testamentary documents, and sent them by email to David. David asserts that he “relayed them to [the decedent],” who did not have an email address. On August 15, 2016, there was a telephone conference with the decedent, David and Proszak to review the testamentary documents; David affirms he arranged and connected the conference call “but the substantive discussion was primarily between [the decedent] and Mr. Proszak.” On August 30, 2016, the proponent contends, the decedent executed the propounded instrument and trust at the Tel Aviv office of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, in the presence of two witnesses while, Proszak and David were on speaker phone. The proponents contend “[t]here is nothing unusual about [the decedent] naming his brothers as fiduciaries,” citing “Miriam’s lack of involvement with these assets.” The proponents contend that the decedent was possessed of testamentary capacity, that he properly executed the propounded instrument on August 30, 2016, and that all of the decedent’s assets are held in trust for the benefit of the objectants, not the proponents. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the GAL submits an affirmation in opposition, with references to the exhibits contained in proponents’ moving papers. The GAL contends that there are triable issues of fact regarding the decedent’s testamentary capacity, the presence of a supervising attorney at the execution of the propounded instrument and trust, the lack of proper execution, and the possibility of undue influence exerted by the proponents and other family members over the decedent during the time period of drafting and execution of the propounded instrument and trust. She contends that a number of factors, including the decedent’s residence in Israel, lack of ability to communicate via email, diagnosis of advanced pancreatic cancer a month prior to execution, treatment with chemotherapy at that time, purported lack of familiarity with English, and failure to meet personally or speak privately with the attorney-drafter, taken together gives rise to genuine issues of fact and law which preclude summary judgment and must be adjudicated at trial. The GAL further contends that there are questions of fact regarding i) the circumstances surrounding the selection of the drafting law firm, ii) the manner in which the decedent received documents from the drafter, iii) the drafter’s contact with the decedent, iv) the supervision of the execution ceremony by an attorney experienced in the practice of trusts and estates, and iv) compliance with the requirements of due execution. In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the spouse submits her attorney’s affirmation, whose arguments and cited cases are substantially identical to those contained in the GAL’s opposition papers. Discussion Summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 is appropriate in a contested probate proceeding where a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for probate and the objectant fails to raise the existence of triable issues of fact concerning the validity of the will. Matter of Sabatelli, 161 AD3d 872, 873 (2d Dept 2018). While it has been long held that summary judgment is a drastic remedy to be used sparingly (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 ([986]), “the traditional reluctance to grant summary judgment in probate proceedings has long since passed, and it is now recognized that ‘[a]lthough summary judgment must be exercised cautiously, it is proper in a contested probate proceeding where the proponent submits a prima facie case for probate and the objectant fails to raise any genuine factual issues,’” Matter of Zirinsky, 10 Misc 3d 1052[A], affirmed 43 AD3d 946 (2d Dept 2007), quoting Matter of Minervini, 297 AD2d 423, 424 (2d Dept 2002). The proponent of a will has the burden of proving that the propounded instrument was duly executed in conformity with the requirements of EPTL 3-2.1 (a) and that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity at the time the instrument was executed. Matter of Moskowitz, 116 AD3d 958 (2d Dept 2014); Matter of Mooney, 74 AD3d 1073 (2d Dept 2010). While it is the objectants’ affirmative burden at trial to establish the existence of undue influence (Matter of Bustanoby, 262 AD2d 407 [2d Dept 1999]), on a proponent’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the objections, the proponent must demonstrate that the propounded instrument was not a product of undue influence. Once the requisite proof has been proffered by the movant, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact requiring a trial of the action. Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 (1980); Chance v. Felder, 33 AD3d 645 (2d Dept 2006). Allegations must be specific, detailed, and substantiated by evidence in the record; “mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Zuckerman, supra at 598. See Matter of Newman, 14 AD3d 567 (2d Dept 2005). “The objectant must assemble and lay bare affirmative proof that his claims are real and capable of being established at trial,” Matter of Bellasaimo, 54 Misc 3d 1216(A) citing Stainless, Inc. v. Employers Fire Ins., 69 AD2d 27 (1st Dept 1979) aff’d 49 NY2d 924 (1980). Capacity The proponent has the burden of proving that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity. In determining testamentary capacity, “the court must look to the following factors: (1) whether she understood the nature and consequences of executing a will; (2) whether she knew the nature and extent of the property she was disposing of; and (3) whether she knew those who would be considered the natural objects of her bounty and her relations with them,” Matter of Kumstar, 66 NY2d 691, 692 (1985). When there is conflicting evidence or the possibility of drawing conflicting inferences from undisputed evidence, the issue of capacity is for the finder of fact. Id. Less capacity is required to enable a testator to execute a will than to make other contracts, and need only be shown at the time the will was executed. Matter of Martinico, 177 AD3d 882 (2d Dept 2019). Where, as here, the propounded instrument contains an attestation clause as well as a self-proving affidavit signed by the subscribing witnesses — which expressly state that the testator was of “sound mind, memory and understanding” — a presumption of testamentary capacity is created. Matter of Rottkamp, 95 AD3d 1338, 1339 (2d Dept 2012). Adam Snukal (Snukal), an attorney and one of the subscribing witnesses, testified that when he met the decedent during the will execution, the decedent was “physically not great” but “mentally sharp; emotionally well.” Snukal testified that he spent approximately 90 minutes with the decedent on the day of execution: “I met [the decedent] at the entrance to the building. We had arranged for a car to pick him up because of his state of health. I accompanied him upstairs to our office. Sat him down. I believe we served him a glass of tea. We signed the document. He and I may have chatted for a few minutes. And I then took him back downstairs to a car that was waiting to bring him home.” Snukal testified that the decedent appeared competent and understood that he was there to execute the propounded instrument that day. Apparently the decedent had made such an impression on Snukal that he went to visit the decedent in the hospital in the weeks before the decedent died, testifying “I thought that [the decedent] was a great man who deserved tremendous honor during the waning days of his life.” The second subscribing witness, Devora Snyder (Snyder) testified that she observed the decedent’s interactions and responses to be appropriate in the context of the conversation being held. She further testified that she believed that the decedent understood that he was there to sign his will, he did not appear to be under influence or duress, he behaved and conducted himself as any regular visitor would, and he “engaged in discourse about the documents at hand and signed things without being told, you have to do this or any kind of assistance of any sort.” Proszak, the attorney-drafter, testified that when he spoke with the decedent by telephone on August 15, 2016, the decedent knew who his family was and stated that he believed that his assets were worth about $5,000,000.00. Proszak testified that the decedent had reviewed the draft of the propounded instrument and trust documents, in particular the August 9, 2016 executive summary, that they spoke for thirty minutes, reviewing the executive summary. He testified that he made handwritten notations to memorialize the decedent’s expressed changes to the draft of the propounded instrument and trust, which changes included: the decedent’s expression of “total trust” in his brothers, his desire for discretionary, rather than mandatory, payments to his spouse and children from the trust, his wish that his spouse not possess a power of appointment or the right to serve as trustee in either the Credit Shelter or the Marital Trust, and his desire for his children to become trustees at specified ages upon the death of his spouse. The attorney-drafter testified that he prepared a three-page executive summary of the key provisions of the trust document and seventeen-page propounded instrument for the decedent, which they went over line by line. He further testified that the decedent asked questions that made it clear that he had read and understood the documents’ provisions, and that he specifically made clear that he was not interested in other alternatives proposed by the attorney-drafter, such as fixed minimum payments. The objectants aver that the propounded instrument does not reflect “the clear wishes of the Testator” because they contend that i) the decedent did not have a pre-existing relationship with the attorney-drafter, ii) he never had a face-to-face meeting or a private telephone conversation with the attorney-drafter, iii) the attorney-drafter did not send drafts of any of testamentary documents directly to the decedent, and iv) the attorney-drafter was not physically present in the room when the will was executed. None of these contentions, even if true, are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the decedent’s testamentary capacity. In the GAL’s objections, she alleged that English was not the decedent’s native language. Miriam, the decedent’s spouse, testified that the decedent “spoke lousy English and was even dyslexic,” and when asked if the decedent could read or understand what was written in an English newspaper, she responded “nothing at all because — nothing because he couldn’t see well because he wasn’t using his glasses. And he needed the glasses because he was dyslexic.” Yet, by her own testimony, she admitted that she and the decedent “almost always” spoke English to one another at home, and it is undisputed that the decedent attended college in London and later worked in the United States at a financial institution in New York. The spouse also testified that the decedent’s mental state was not good “because he was suffering side effects of chemotherapy.” She further presents inconsistent testimony, testifying that the decedent was “incapable of thinking about anything” until he died, but also that in the months before his passing, the decedent was “very attentive” to her and able to understand what she was saying. The objectants fail to proffer any evidence, medical or otherwise, to substantiate their claim that decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to his cancer diagnosis and treatment, or by virtue of his alleged learning disability. It has been held that sufficient capacity to execute a will can exist although there is an ongoing diagnosis of medical conditions involving mental illness, depression or progressive dementia. See Matter of Fiumara, 47 NY2d 845, 847 (1979); Matter of Friedman, 26 AD3d 723, 725 (3d Dept 2006); Matter of Esberg, 215 AD2d 655, 656 (2d Dept 1995). The deposition testimony of the attorney-drafter and subscribing witnesses, together with the self-proving affidavit, provide that the decedent was not suffering from any impairment which might affect his ability to make a valid will, and that he could read, write and converse in the English language. The proponents have established that the decedent understood the nature and consequences of making a will, the nature and extent of his property, and the natural objects of his bounty. In opposition, the objectants’ unsupported assertions fail to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the decedent’s capacity; accordingly, the branch of the motion seeking to dismiss the objection alleging lack of capacity is granted. Due Execution The proponent of a will has the burden of proving that the propounded instrument was duly executed in conformance with EPTL 3-2.1, which proscribes the statutory formalities which must be followed to execute a valid will. Matter of Rottkamp, supra. The decedent must sign the will in the presence of, or acknowledge his signature to, at least two witnesses, having declared to them that the instrument he is signing is his will. This “publication” requirement is satisfied as long as the attesting witness in fact knows that the document they witness is the testator’s will. Matter of Hedges, 100 AD2d 586 (2d Dept 1984). The witnesses must both attest the decedent’s signature and, at the request of the decedent, sign the will within a thirty-day period. Where, as here, an attestation clause and self-proving affidavit accompanies the propounded instrument, there is a presumption of compliance with the statutory requirements. Matter of Selvaggio, 146 AD3d 891 (2d Dept 2017); Matter of Farrell, 84 AD3d 1374 (2d Dept 2011). Here, the proponents established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the objection based on lack of due execution by submitting, inter alia, the 1404 deposition testimony of the attorney who drafted the will, along with the testimony and affidavits of the two attesting witnesses. Matter of Mele, 113 AD3d 858 (2d Dept 2012); Matter of Mooney, 74 AD3d 1073, 1074 (2d Dept 2010). The burden then shifts to the objectants to provide evidence of a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment, which the objectants here fail to do. Matter of Malan, 56 AD3d 479 (2d Dept 2008). The objectants debate at length the role of Snukal, whether he was only a witness or also the supervising attorney. The objectants raise the inconsistency between Snukal’s Affidavit of Attesting Witness, wherein Snukal is denominated as “supervising attorney,” and Snukal’s deposition testimony, wherein he testified that he is an attorney who witnessed the will signing and attended to the decedent during the entirety of the will execution. There is perplexingly lengthy speculation, during the deposition of Snukal and in the objectants’ papers, over Snukal’s role as more than just an attesting witness. Specifically, the objectants query whether Snukal was also the supervising attorney during the will execution and if so, assert that he was not qualified due to his inexperience in the area of trust and estates. Thus, they assert that perhaps the propounded instrument was not properly supervised and therefore not duly executed, notwithstanding that the attorney-drafter was on the telephone conference line during the entirety of the execution ceremony. Assuming the objectants’ contention to be true, that there was no attorney supervision, there is no requirement contained in the Estate Powers and Trust Law, case law, or other statute which requires that a will execution ceremony must be attorney-supervised, the absence of which renders a proffered will improperly executed. While attorney supervision creates a presumption of regularity, a will can be properly executed without the benefit of such supervision. As discussed above, the undisputed fact that an attestation clause and self-proving affidavit is contained and annexed to the propounded instrument has already created a presumption of due execution. Matter of Sabatelli, 161 AD3d 872 (2d Dept 2018). Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, that is, assuming that there was no attorney supervision during the execution of the propounded instrument, the objectants still fail to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact regarding due execution to overcome the presumption. Both attesting witnesses testified that they and the decedent understood that the document being signed was the decedent’s will; they further testified that they witnessed the decedent sign the propounded instrument which they also signed in the presence of the decedent and each other. The testimony of the subscribing witnesses, together with their attestation clause and self-proving affidavits, provide prima facie evidence that the propounded instrument was duly executed in conformance with section 3-2.1 of the EPTL, against which no triable issue of fact has been presented. Accordingly, the branch of the motion seeking to dismiss the objection of lack of due execution is denied. Undue Influence The objectants have the burden of proof on their claim of undue influence. Matter of Bustanoby, supra. To defeat the proponent’s motion for summary judgment, the objectants must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of triable fact by allegations which are specific and detailed, substantiated by evidence in the record beyond mere conclusory assertions. Matter of O’Hara, 85 AD2d 669, 671 (2d Dept 1981). The objectants must show by that there was motive, opportunity, and actual undue influence exercised over the decedent. Matter of Walther, 6 NY2d 49 (1959). Having some influence over the decedent is not enough to rise to the level of undue influence; rather, the Court of Appeals has stated, “it must be shown that the influence amounted to a moral coercion which restrained independent action and destroyed free agency, or which, by importunity which could not be resisted, constrained the testator to do that which was against his free will and desire, but which he was unable to refuse or too weak to resist,” Children’s Aid Society v. Loveridge, 70 NY 387, 394 (1877); Matter of Kumstar, 66 NY2d 691 (1985). It is “seldom practiced openly, but it is rather the product of persistent and subtle suggestion imposed upon a weaker mind and calculated, by the exploitation of a relationship of trust and confidence, to overwhelm the victim’s will to the point where it becomes the willing tool to be manipulated for the benefit of another,” Matter of Burke, 82 AD2d 260 (2d Dept 1981); see also Matter of Neary, 44 AD3d 949, 951 (2d Dept 2007). The existence of undue influence is often proven by circumstantial rather than direct evidence, and “can be shown by all the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator, the nature of the will, his family relations, the condition of his health and mind, his dependency upon and subjection to the control of the person supposed to have wielded the influence, the opportunity and disposition of the person to wield it, and the acts and declarations of such person,” Matter of Bach, 133 AD2d 455, 459 (2d Dept 1987) quoting Matter of Anna, 248 NY 421 (1928) quoting Rollawagen v. Rollawagen, 63 NY 504, 519 (1876). The proponents contend that they did not pressure or exercise influence over the decedent in creating the propounded instrument and trust, which they contend only benefits the objectants and not themselves. They further contend that the decedent fully trusted the proponents and that their nomination as trustees and co-executors is consistent with the proponents’ long history, perhaps spanning twenty-five to thirty years, of managing the family assets. They note that the decedent’s spouse has had no involvement in the family business, and also as a nondomiciliary alien would be ineligible to serve as fiduciary. The proponents finally assert that the decedent’s trust in them was well-placed because they, together with their brothers, have “made substantial loans from our own funds to [the spouse] to ensure that she and [the decedent's] children were provided for during the pendency of the probate proceeding.”1 However, the proponents aver that because of delays caused by the objectants in this probate process, they have ceased making payments. While the proponents aver that they do not benefit from the decedent’s testamentary instruments, the propounded instrument and trust do enable the proponents to maintain control over the decedent’s assets which are invested in the proponents’ joint business ventures. An earlier draft of the trust had contained a provision of mandatory payments to the objectants from the Credit Shelter Trust, specifically that “[t]he Trustees must distribute income and principal of the Trust to any of [the decedent's] descendants which is necessary for that beneficiary’s health, education, maintenance and support.” This provision was removed and replaced with a provision that grants “absolute and total discretion” to the trustees with no set income distribution for the decedent’s family to maintain their health and welfare. Another suggested provision to provide the spouse with the power to carry shares passing to the decedent’s descendants after her death, was also removed. The record reveals that the decedent, who lived in Israel, did not select his own lawyer to draft his testamentary instruments. It was the proponents, who live in New York, who chose the drafting law firm and, along with another brother, initially met with Kestenbaum to discuss the decedent’s situation. The proponents do not recall who paid the retainer, and there is no record of how a signed retainer agreement was obtained. It appears that based on the initial communication between the proponents and the drafting law firm, and without communication with the decedent, the first draft of the decedent’s testamentary documents was produced. The drafting law firm had no means of contacting the decedent other than through David as intermediary — they did not have his home telephone number, cell phone number, home address, fax number, or an email address. Every communication with the decedent was arranged by David and through David. David participated in every communication between the decedent, the attorney-drafter and other attorneys from the drafting law firm. Despite a request from the attorney-drafter to David on August 18, 2016, which stated, “[a]lso, as we discussed, please have [the decedent] call me at his convenience,” the decedent never spoke with the attorney-drafter privately. Multiple detailed emails discussing changes and edits to the testamentary documents, and arrangements and detailed instructions for executing the propounded instrument, were sent to David, who contends he conveyed all communications to the decedent. For the execution ceremony, David made all the arrangements, including the time, date, and location of the ceremony, the presence of a notary and witnesses, even obtaining the “dial-in” number for him and the attorney-drafter to be present by telephone during the ceremony. David was also on the conference line throughout the execution ceremony, and afterward the propounded instrument and other documents were mailed directly to David. In short, the preparation and oversight of execution of the propounded instrument was mediated entirely through David. The evidence submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment is always scrutinized in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Makaj v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 18 AD3d 625 (2d Dept 2005). Where there is any doubt as to the existence of issues of fact, “issue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure,’” Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 (1957) (internal citations omitted). Upon all the circumstances presented, including the nature of the propounded instrument and the trust, which place total discretionary control into the proponents’ hands with no direction for even a minimal provision for the decedent’s immediate family, together with the decedent’s decades-long reliance on the proponents in handling his financial matters and the dominant role and omnipresent involvement of at least one of the proponents in every aspect of the preparation of the decedent’s testamentary plan, the objectants have demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether or not the decedent was unduly influenced by the proponents to warrant a determination by the trier of fact. Accordingly, the branch of the motion seeking to dismiss the objection based on undue influence is denied. Conclusion For the reasons set forth herein, the proponents’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment to dismiss the objections alleging lack of capacity and due execution is granted, while the motion for summary judgment on the issue of undue influence is denied. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. Dated: May 26, 2020
