DECISION & ORDER Appeal from a judgment of conviction of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (Martin J. Kerins, J.H.O.), rendered October 10, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant, after an “inquest,” of operating an unregistered motor vehicle, and imposed sentence. PERCURIAM ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, the fine, if paid, is remitted, and the matter is remitted to the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, for all further proceedings. Defendant was charged in separate simplified traffic informations with operating a motor vehicle without insurance (Vehicle and Traffic Law §319 [1]) and operating an unregistered motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law §401 [1] [a]), respectively. Subsequently, defense counsel appeared in court and pleaded not guilty on behalf of defendant. Prior to the scheduled trial date, defense counsel filed an affirmation of actual engagement and, over the prosecutor’s objection, the court adjourned the trial. On the next trial date, defense counsel filed a second affirmation of actual engagement and defendant did not appear in court. After dismissing the Vehicle and Traffic Law §319 (1) charge, upon the prosecutor’s request for a “default” as to the Vehicle and Traffic Law §401 (1) (a) charge, the court conducted what it described as an “inquest,” at which the police officer who had issued the citations to defendant testified. Following the “inquest,” the court indicated that, pursuant the rules of the Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, a failure of a defendant to appear will result in a “default conviction,” and that since there was no “answer” or “appearance” from defendant, it had entered “a default judgment of conviction” pertaining to the Vehicle and Traffic Law §401 (1) (a) charge and imposed sentence. However, the court did not indicate by what standard of proof it had determined defendant’s guilt, i.e., whether beyond a reasonable doubt or the standard applied at inquests taken upon a default in a civil action; rather, the court merely stated that it had assessed an appropriate fine for the violation. Vehicle and Traffic Law §1806-a (1) permits a court to “enter a plea of guilty on behalf of the defendant and render a default judgment of a fine,” which judgment is considered to be civil in nature, when a person charged with a traffic infraction does not answer the summons within the time specified. More specifically, Vehicle and Traffic Law §1806-a (1), entitled “Default judgment in cases of failure to answer,” provides: “In the event a person charged with a traffic infraction does not answer within the time specified, the court having jurisdiction, other than a court in a city over one million population may, in addition to any other action authorized by law, enter a plea of guilty on behalf of the defendant and render a default judgment of a fine determined by the court within the amount authorized by law. Any judgment entered pursuant to default shall be civil in nature, but shall be treated as a conviction for the purposes of this section. However, at least thirty days after the expiration of the original date prescribed for entering a plea and before a plea of guilty and a default judgment may be rendered, the traffic violations bureau or, if there be none, the clerk of the court, shall notify the defendant by certified mail: (a) of the violation charged; (b) of the impending plea of guilty and default judgment; (c) that such judgment will be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the operator or registrant is located, and (d) that a default or plea of guilty may be avoided by entering a plea or making an appearance within thirty days of the sending of such notice. Pleas entered within that period shall be in a manner prescribed in the notice. In no case shall a default judgment and plea of guilty be rendered more than two years after the expiration of the time prescribed for originally entering a plea. When a person has entered a plea of not guilty and has demanded a hearing, no fine or penalty shall be imposed for any reason, prior to the holding of the hearing which shall be scheduled by the court of such city, village or town within thirty days of such demand.” However, Vehicle and Traffic Law §1806-a (1) does not authorize the entry of a default judgment against defendant here since he answered the summonses and, thereafter, through his counsel, pleaded not guilty in court (see People v. Cole, 63 Misc 3d 149[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50729[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]; People v. Hernandez, 62 Misc 3d 9 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018]). We note that, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law §1806-a (1), had the entry of a default judgment been authorized, the court should have merely entered a guilty plea on defendant’s behalf. Instead, the court held an “inquest” in defendant’s absence, without any basis therefor. Rather, assuming that its denial of defense counsel’s request for an adjournment had not been an improvident exercise of discretion, the court could have conducted a trial in absentia, but only if defendant had first been given the warnings called for in the case of People v. Parker (57 NY2d 136 [1982]), and there had otherwise been compliance with the requirements of that case (see Cole, 63 Misc 3d 149[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50729[U]). However, nowhere in the record is there an indication that a trial in absentia had been conducted. The People nevertheless argue that a trial in absentia had in fact been conducted here, notwithstanding the court’s description of the proceeding as an “inquest,” with its much lower burden of proof. The People attempt to establish that Parker warnings were given to defendant via trial scheduling letters that were allegedly sent by the court to defendant. However, since we find that the court failed to indicate by what standard of proof it had determined defendant’s guilt, because it seemingly treated the proceeding as an inquest rather than as a trial in absentia, we need not pass on whether these trial scheduling letters — which, in any event, the People failed to establish were received by defendant — qualified as providing sufficient Parker warnings. In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the propriety of the court’s denial of defense counsel’s adjournment request. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, for all further proceedings. ADAMS, P.J., TOLBERT and RUDERMAN, JJ., concur. Dated: June 18, 2020
