DECISION and ORDER Currently before the Court, in this employee benefits action filed by the New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund and eight Fund Trustees (“Plaintiffs”) against Eastern Regional Contracting, Inc. (“Defendant”), is Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 14.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Generally, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert two claims: (1) a claim that Defendant violated the parties’ participation agreement, collective bargaining agreement and 29 U.S.C. §1145 by failing to pay delinquent employee benefit contributions owed under the agreements, as well liquidated damages, and audit fees; and (2) a claim that Defendant is also liable to Plaintiffs for additional compensatory relief including interest on unpaid contributions, the greater of liquidated damages or an additional award of interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2). (Dkt. No. 1 [Pls.' Compl.].) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is liable for an outstanding balance for delinquent employee benefit contributions totaling $24,275.95 as of January 31, 2019, as well as interest determined at the rate specified in their agreements, an additional award of the greater of interest or liquidated damages as established by the participation agreement, and unspecified amounts of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.) B. Relevant Procedural History On February 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) On July 11, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit of service, in which they indicated that they had served Defendant with the Summons and Complaint on July 3, 2019. (Dkt. No. 9.) On July 31, 2019, the Court found that the time for Defendant to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint had expired. (Dkt. No. 10.) On that same date, Plaintiffs requested that the Clerk enter Defendant’s default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and Local Rule 55.1 of the District’s Local Rules of Practice, which the Clerk did on August 1, 2019. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) On September 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their current motion for default judgment, in which they assert they are entitled to an entry of default judgment because they have provided evidence to show that they are entitled by both law and contract to the requested types and amount of damages. (Dkt. No. 14, Attach. 5, at 9-18 [Pls.' Mem. of Law].) As of the date of this Decision and Order, Defendant has not filed a response to either the Complaint or Plaintiffs’ motion. (See generally Docket Sheet.) II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-step process that the Court must follow before it may enter a default judgment against a defendant.” Robertson v. Doe, 05-CV 7046, 2008 WL 2519894, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008). “First, under Rule 55(a), when a party fails to ‘plead or otherwise defend…the clerk must enter the party’s default.’” Robertson, 2008 WL 2519894, at *3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55[a]). “Second, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the party seeking default judgment is required to present its application for entry of judgment to the court.” Id. “Notice of the application must be sent to the defaulting party so that it has an opportunity to show cause why the court should not enter a default judgment.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55[b][2]). “When an action presents more than one claim for relief…, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties…if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Pursuant to Second Circuit law, when determining whether to grant a default judgment, the Court must consider three factors: (1) whether the defendant’s default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to the Plaintiffs’ claims; and (3) the level of prejudice the non-defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the motion for default judgment. Pecarksy v. Galaxiworld.com, Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2001); Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). “An unexcused or unexplained failure to provide an answer to the Complaint will itself demonstrate willfulness,” as does failing to respond to both a complaint and a subsequent motion for default judgment. United States v. Silverman, 15-CV-0022, 2017 WL 745732, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2017) (citing S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738-39 [2d Cir. 1998]; Indymac Bank v. Nat’l Settlement Agency, Inc., 07-CV-6865, 2007 WL 4468652, at *1 [S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007]). When a court considers a motion for the entry of a default judgment, it must “accept[ ] as true all of the factual allegations of the complaint….” Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). “However, the court cannot construe the damages alleged in the complaint as true.” Eng’rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds v. Catone Constr. Co., Inc., 08-CV-1048, 2009 WL 4730700, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009) (Scullin, J.) (citing Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 [2d Cir. 1999] [citations omitted]). “Rather, the court must ‘conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.’” Eng’rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds, 2009 WL 4730700, at *2 (quoting Alcantara, 183 F.3d at 155 [citation omitted]). This inquiry “involves two tasks: [1] determining the proper rule for calculating damages on such a claim, and [2] assessing plaintiff’s evidence supporting the damages to be determined under this rule.” Alcantara, 183 F.3d at 155. Finally, in calculating damages, the court “need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action….” Au Bon Pain, 653 F.2d at 65 (citation omitted). Under N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a), when requesting an entry of default judgment from the Clerk of the Court, the moving party must submit (a) the Clerk’s certificate of entry of default, (b) a statement showing the principal amount due (not to exceed the amount demanded in the Complaint and giving credit for any payments with the dates of payments), (c) a computation of the interest to the day of judgment, (d) a per diem rate of interest, (e) the costs and taxable disbursements claimed, and (f) an affidavit of the moving party or the party’s attorney. N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a). The appended affidavit must show that (a) the party against whom judgment is sought is not an infant or incompetent person, (b) the party against whom judgment is sought is not in military service, (c) the party against whom judgment is sought has defaulted in appearance in the action, (d) service was properly effected under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, (e) the amount shown in the statement is justly due and owing and no part has been paid except as set forth in the party’s other statement, and (f) disbursements sought to be taxed have been made in the action or will necessarily be made or incurred. Id. Under N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(b), when moving for an entry of default judgment from the Court, the moving party must submit (a) the Clerk’s certificate of entry of default, (b) a proposed form of default judgment, (c) a copy of the pleading to which no response has been made, and (d) an affidavit of the moving party or its attorney setting forth the facts required by N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a). N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(b). III. ANALYSIS After carefully considering whether Plaintiffs are entitled to an entry of default judgment, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 14, Attach. 5, at 9-18 [Pls.' Mem. of Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis. As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that the Complaint, when taken as true, establishes liability. Section 1145 of Title 29 of the United States Code states that “[e]very employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.” 29 U.S.C. §1145. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the collective bargaining agreement and participation agreement between them and Defendant require Defendant to make employee benefit contributions to the Pension Fund Plan. (Dkt. No. 1, at
