Upon the following papers numbered 1 to 13 read on this motion of the defendant to dismiss, pursuant to CPL §30.30 Notice of Motion and supporting papers 1; Cross-Motion and supporting papers; Answering Affidavits and supporting papers 2; Replying Affidavits and supporting papers 3, 5; Filed papers 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; Other 4 it is, ORDERED, that the motion of the defendant to dismiss pursuant to CPL §30.30 is granted. After arraignment upon an information, the local criminal court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss such instrument or any count thereof upon the ground that the defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial. CPL §170.30(1)(e). A motion made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section §170.30 must be granted where the People are not ready for trial within ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and none of which is a felony. CPL §30.30(l)(b). Offenses under V&TL §§1192.2-a(a) and 1192.3, which are misdemeanors, are punishable, inter alia, by up to one year in jail. V&TL §1193(1)(b). Prior to January 1, 2020, the “ready for trial” requirement of CPL §30.30 had two distinct elements. First, there must have been “either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court…or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk”. People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). Secondly, the People must have in fact been ready to proceed at the time they declared readiness. People v. Chavis, 91 NY2d 500 (1998). The second requirement will be met unless there is “proof that the readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People’s position”. People v. Carter, 91 NY2d 795 (1998). In other words, there is a presumption that a statement of readiness is truthful and accurate. (See People v. Miller, 113 AD3d 885 (3rd Dept 2014); People v. Acosta, 249 AD2d 161 (1st Dept 1998)). The minutes from the defendant’s arraignment clearly indicate that the People announced that they were ready for trial on February 10, 2019. As there has been no persuasive proof submitted that this statement of readiness did not accurately reflect the People’s position, it is presumed truthful and accurate. Therefore, the Court will engage in an analysis of the minutes of the subsequent proceedings to determine if any post-readiness delay is attributable to the People. A review of subsequent transcripts fails to demonstrate any time chargeable to the People until August 29, 2019. On that date, the People were charged with a fourteen (14) day adjournment to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Omnibus relief. It is well settled that reasonable periods of delay occasioned by a defendant’s pretrial motion practice must be excluded from any speedy trial computations. People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523 (1985). Such periods of delay include a reasonable time for the People to serve their response to an omnibus motion. People v. Torres, 60 N.Y.2d 119 (1983). However, the fourteen (14)-day period from August 29, 2019 (a date two weeks later than the date by which the People were originally scheduled to respond) to September 12, 2019 (the date upon which they actually did respond) is properly charged to the People, since it constitutes a period of unreasonable delay in excess of the appropriate response deadline previously set by the Court. People v. Commack, 194 A.D.2d 619 (2nd Dept. 1993). The People subsequently announced their readiness for trial again upon the service of their opposition to Defendant’s motion. The delay between September 12, 2019 and January 1, 2020 is not charged to the People, as the adjournments during this period were for Defendant’s Reply, the Court’s Decision, and for Hearing control purposes. However, on January 1, the People reverted to a position of unreadiness. Pursuant to newly enacted CPL §245.50, “the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial” for CPL §30.30 purposes “until it has filed a proper certificate” of compliance certifying that it has “disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery” [see, CPL §245.50]. Therefore, the People were not ready for trial as of January 1, 2020, the effective date of CPL §245.50, and are charged with all delay from that date until their filing of the Certificate of Compliance. However, the issuance of New York State Executive Order 202.8, on March 20, 2020, tolled the running of CPL §30.30 time at that point. Nevertheless, the People are charged with a period of eighty (80) days for the delay between January 1, 2020 and March 20, 2020. Thus, the Court finds that the People are chargeable with a minimum of ninety-four (94) days of ready-trial time under this docket, an amount which exceeds the People’s allotment of ninety (90) days of such time [see, CPL §30.30(1)(b); V&TL §§1192(2-a)(a); 1192(3); 1193(1)(b)]. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion is granted, and the matter dismissed. Dated: July 21, 2020
