DECISION and ORDER Currently before the Court, in this copyright infringement action filed by Robert Miller (“Plaintiff”) against Haredim Consulting Inc., and unnamed defendants (“Defendants”), is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 14.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Generally, in his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two claims: (1) a claim of copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. §101 based on Defendants’ willful use of Plaintiff’s copyrighted photograph on their website for their own commercial benefit; and (2) a claim of falsification, removal, or alteration of copyright management information in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202 based on Defendants’ removal of a caption crediting Plaintiff for the copyrighted photograph when Defendant Haredim placed that photograph on its website. (Dkt. No. 1 [Pl.'s Compl.].) As relief, Plaintiff seeks statutory and/or actual damages, general and special damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and an injunction preventing Defendants from further infringement of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works. (Id.) B. Relevant Procedural History On November 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of service indicating that he had served Defendant Haredim on December 18, 2019. (Dkt. No. 6.) On January 15, 2019, Plaintiff requested that the Clerk enter Defendant Haredim’s default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and Local Rule 55.1 of the District’s Local Rules of Practice, which the Clerk did on January 16, 2019. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.) On February 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed the current motion for default judgment. (Dkt. No. 11.) C. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law and Defendant Haredim’s Failure to Respond In his memorandum of law, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to default judgment. (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 1 [Pl.'s Mem. of Law].) More specifically, Plaintiff argues as follows: (a) Defendant Haredim has not filed a timely answer or made any attempt to defend in this action; (b) Defendant Haredim’s default constitutes an admission of the allegations in the Complaint; (c) Plaintiff’s copyright on the relevant photograph is presumptively valid because it is registered with the United States Copyright Office; (d) Plaintiff adequately alleged in his Complaint that Defendant Haredim violated his copyright by reproducing and distributing his photograph without authorization by putting that photograph on its website; and (e) Plaintiff adequately alleged in his Complaint that Defendant Haredim violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) by removing the credit caption on the photograph when it placed the photograph on its website. (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiff also argues that, as to damages, he is entitled to recover statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§504(c) and 1203(c)(3) related to Defendant Haredim’s willful conduct, as well as litigation costs, attorneys’ fees, and a permanent injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §502(a). (Id.) As of the date of this Decision and Order, Defendant Haredim has not responded to either Plaintiff’s Complaint or Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. (See generally, Docket Sheet.) II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-step process that the Court must follow before it may enter a default judgment against a defendant.” Robertson v. Doe, 05-CV-7046, 2008 WL 2519894, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008). “First, under Rule 55(a), when a party fails to ‘plead or otherwise defend…the clerk must enter the party’s default.’” Robertson, 2008 WL 2519894, at *3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55[a]). “Second, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the party seeking default judgment is required to present its application for entry of judgment to the court.” Id. “Notice of the application must be sent to the defaulting party so that it has an opportunity to show cause why the court should not enter a default judgment.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55[b][2]). “When an action presents more than one claim for relief…, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties…if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Pursuant to Second Circuit law, when determining whether to grant a default judgment, the Court must consider three factors: (1) whether the defendant’s default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to the Government’s claims; and (3) the level of prejudice the non-defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the motion for default judgment. Pecarksy v. Galaxiworld.com, Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2001); Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). “An unexcused or unexplained failure to provide an answer to the Complaint will itself demonstrate willfulness,” as does failing to respond to both a complaint and a subsequent motion for default judgment. United States v. Silverman, 15-CV-0022, 2017 WL 745732, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2017) (citing S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738-39 [2d Cir. 1998]; Indymac Bank v. Nat’l Settlement Agency, Inc., 07-CV-6865, 2007 WL 4468652, at *1 [S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007]). When a court considers a motion for the entry of a default judgment, it must “accept[ ] as true all of the factual allegations of the complaint….” Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). “However, the court cannot construe the damages alleged in the complaint as true.” Eng’rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds v. Catone Constr. Co., Inc., 08-CV-1048, 2009 WL 4730700, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009) (Scullin, J.) (citing Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 [2d Cir. 1999] [citations omitted]). “Rather, the court must ‘conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.’” Eng’rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds, 2009 WL 4730700, at *2 (quoting Alcantara, 183 F.3d at 155 [citation omitted]). This inquiry “involves two tasks: [1] determining the proper rule for calculating damages on such a claim, and [2] assessing plaintiff’s evidence supporting the damages to be determined under this rule.” Alcantara, 183 F.3d at 155. Finally, in calculating damages, the court “need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action….” Au Bon Pain, 653 F.2d at 65 (citation omitted). Under N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a), when requesting an entry of default judgment from the Clerk of the Court, the moving party must submit (a) the Clerk’s certificate of entry of default, (b) a statement showing the principal amount due (not to exceed the amount demanded in the Complaint and giving credit for any payments with the dates of payments), (c) a computation of the interest to the day of judgment, (d) a per diem rate of interest, (e) the costs and taxable disbursements claimed, and (f) an affidavit of the moving party or the party’s attorney. N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a). The appended affidavit must show that (a) the party against whom judgment is sought is not an infant or incompetent person, (b) the party against whom judgment is sought is not in military service, (c) the party against whom judgment is sought has defaulted in appearance in the action, (d) service was properly effected under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, (e) the amount shown in the statement is justly due and owing and no part has been paid except as set forth in the party’s other statement, and (f) disbursements sought to be taxed have been made in the action or will necessarily be made or incurred. Id. Under N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(b), when moving for an entry of default judgment from the Court, the moving party must submit (a) the Clerk’s certificate of entry of default, (b) a proposed form of default judgment, (c) a copy of the pleading to which no response has been made, and (d) an affidavit of the moving party or its attorney setting forth the facts required by N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(a). N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2(b). III. ANALYSIS After carefully considering whether Plaintiff is entitled to an entry of default judgment, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Plaintiff’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 11 [Pl.'s Mem. of Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis. As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that the Complaint, when taken as true, establishes liability. As to Plaintiff’s claim of copyright infringement, “[i]n a copyright infringement case, the plaintiff must show: (i) ownership of a valid copyright; and (ii) unauthorized copying of the copyrighted work.” Sohm v. Scholastic, Inc., 950 F.3d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2020). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he registered the relevant photograph with the Copyright Office (registration number VA0002083407). (Dkt. No. 1, at 18 [Pl.'s Compl.].) Plaintiff is correct that “[a] certificate of registration from the United States Register of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the valid ownership of a copyright.” PaySys Int’l, Inc. v. Atos Se, Worldline SA, Atos IT Servs. Ltd., 226 F. Supp. 3d 206, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 98 [2d Cir. 1999]). Because there is no indication of any facts that would cast doubt on the validity of Plaintiff’s copyright, Plaintiff has alleged facts to plausibly suggest that he is the copyright owner of the relevant photograph. As to whether Defendant Haredim engaged in unauthorized copying of the photograph, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Haredim took the photograph from an online article in the New York Times and used it on its own website without authorization. (Dkt. No. 1.) Section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code affords to the owner of a copyright the exclusive rights to do and authorize the following: (a) reproduce the copyrighted work; (b) prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (c) distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (d) perform the work publicly; or (e) display the copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C. §106. Here, Defendant Haredim at the very least displayed the copyrighted photograph publicly by placing the photograph on its website for the public to see. See 17 U.S.C. §101 (stating that to display a work means “to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially”). Plaintiff alleges that he never authorized Defendant Haredim to use the copyrighted photograph in any manner. (Dkt. No. 1, at 24 [Pl.'s Compl.].) Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged that Defendant Haredim infringed on his valid copyright. As to Plaintiff’s claim under the DMCA, such a claim arises when “a party ‘without the authority of the copyright owner or the law, intentionally remove[s] or alter[s] any copyright management information.’” Jerstad v. New York Vintners LLC, 18-CV-10470, 2019 WL 6769431, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2019) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §1202[b]), report-recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 58237 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2020). “Copyright management information includes identifying information of the work, identifying information of the author, and identifying information of the copyright holder.” Jerstad, 2019 WL 6769431, at *4 (citing 17 U.S.C. §1202[c]). The identifying information need not be present on a photograph or in a photograph’s metadata to constitute copyright management information. See Mango v. BuzzFeed, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 3d 368, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that courts have found that “gutter credits” constitute copyright management information under the DMCA), aff’d, 2020 WL 4690071 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 2020). Because Plaintiff has alleged facts that Defendant Haredim removed the credit caption that was included with the original authorized use of the photograph when Defendant Haredim used the photograph on its own website, Plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim under the DMCA for the purposes of this motion. See Jerstad, 2019 WL 6769431, at *4 (finding that the plaintiff sufficiently pled a DMCA claim by alleging that the defendant reproduced plaintiff’s copyrighted photograph and removed the authorship credit that was initially listed with that photograph). The Court also finds that there is nothing to suggest that Defendant Haredim would have a meritorious defense to Plaintiff’s claims. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Buffalo Wing Joint & Pub, LLC, 431 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Where a defendant fails to answer the complaint, a court is unable to make a determination whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s claims, which circumstance weighs in favor of granting a default judgment.”). Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that Defendant Haredim’s failure to defend this action is anything but willful, particularly given Plaintiff’s allegations and Plaintiff’s counsel’s assertions that multiple attempts were made to get Defendant Haredim to remove the copyrighted image before suit was filed, and that counsel made further attempts to contact Defendant Haredim after service of the Complaint, but did not receive a response from Defendant Haredim. (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 2, at
