This case is unique as it details a type of domestic violence which generally goes unnoticed in our judicial system and goes beyond the usual parameters of physical, emotional, or economic abuse occurring during the period of time that the parties reside together. This form of domestic violence is by proxy and it uses the very judicial system which is supposed to protect individuals from domestic violence, to continue the perpetrators’ need for control well after the parties’ separation and commencement of the divorce action. This case demonstrates the repercussions and consequences that await an individual who engages in this very insidious form of domestic violence committed through vexatious/abusive litigation. The parties were married on August 26, 1999 and have 2 children, J. (age 17) and C. (age 15). Their assets consist of the marital home and the Defendant’s landscaping business Woodstock Estate Maintenance, Ltd. (“Woodstock”). This divorce case was commenced in December of 2013. This case has a tortured history. Both parties are pro se having exhausted hundreds of thousands of dollars in counsel fees. At present, the Court has spent 62 days on trial in this matter consisting of 29 Hearing days to determine contempt and alleged parent alienation motions, 12 Trial days to determine permanent custody of the boys and visitation issues, and 21 days on this equitable distribution phase of the Trial wherein the parties introduced a total of 164 exhibits. This Court was assigned this matter June 8, 2017 as an M.S.R.P. case.1 On June 16, 2017 the Court conducted its first contempt hearing pursuant to the Plaintiff’s application to hold the Defendant in contempt for his failure to pay support. During the hearing, the Defendant and his attorney provided no defense to the Plaintiff’s allegations. Accordingly, on a Friday the Defendant was found in contempt and sentenced to incarceration for his failure to pay thousands of dollars in court-ordered child support and maintenance. The Defendant purged the contempt by Monday morning. The Court conducted a second contempt hearing, which should have only taken several days, but lasted 29 days because of the Defendant’s frivolous and false allegations that the Plaintiff had engaged in parent alienation. After hearing from numerous experts, the Plaintiff, the Defendant and J. (in-camera), the Court concluded that the Defendant’s allegations of parental alienation by the Plaintiff were totally false and without merit.2 The Court notes that the experts called during that proceeding by the Defendant had never spoken to J. or the Plaintiff so could not give an opinion on whether parent alienation had occurred. Nevertheless, to this date, the Defendant persists in his allegation of parental alienation by the Plaintiff. The Court next conducted a custody trial which lasted 12 days after which the Court granted full custody of both C. and J. to the Plaintiff and found that the Defendant was solely responsible for J.’s refusal to visit with him.3 Based on the conduct of the Defendant, the Court terminated all ongoing reunification therapy between J. and the Defendant and terminated all court-ordered visitation between J. and the Defendant. Finally, the Court has concluded the equitable distribution trial. With no assets other than the marital home and the Defendant’s landscaping business, and with no expert witnesses4, the matter has been unnecessarily prolonged by the Defendant for a total of 21 days of trial. The main reason this divorce action has moved so slowly is the Defendant’s efforts to delay, prolong and obfuscate the proceeding. Despite repeated directions by the Court to refrain from extended diatribes and cross-examination on immaterial and collateral matters, the Defendant has refused to obey the directions of the Court. The Court was therefore forced on numerous occasions to end the Defendant’s examination on irrelevant topics with witnesses in the hope of moving this case toward a final determination. The Defendant’s arguments, that his collateral inquiries bear relevance on this proceeding because they deal with credibility issues, are not genuine. The Defendant’s main desire seems to be to inflict some sort of harm upon the Plaintiff in any manner possible as displayed throughout the entirety of this case. Indeed, in the final stages of this equitable distribution Trial, the Defendant brought another motion to recuse the Court and another motion to hold the Plaintiff in contempt. The recusal motion was the Defendant’s second written motion for recusal. The Court found in its decision dated February 19, 2020 that it was frivolous, baseless and brought solely to delay and prolong this equitable distribution Trial. The application to hold the Plaintiff in contempt was made a year and a half after the alleged contumacious conduct, and was found by this Court in a decision dated February 19, 2020 to be totally baseless, frivolous and likewise made solely to delay and prolong this proceeding.5 From the inception of this divorce action, the Defendant has refused to timely pay court-ordered maintenance and support. The Defendant’s resentment toward the Plaintiff’s boyfriend, (who frequents the marital house but does not live there), is obsessive. The Defendant has allowed utilities to be shut off in the marital home resulting in a lack of heat in the winter in his deliberative effort to punish the Plaintiff for filing a divorce action and having a relationship with another man. The Defendant has totally lost his relationship with his older son J. by his conduct and actions, and he possibly would have lost his relationship with his younger son C. but for the Plaintiff’s concerted efforts to foster the relationship. The Defendant’s penchant for intimidation of the Plaintiff and J. has evolved into attempts to intimidate the court-appointed Attorney For the Children, the attorneys involved in the case (including his own), and the Court itself by filing a frivolous Federal lawsuit seeking billions of dollars from each of the defendants named therein, including this Jurist. The Defendant’s use of all aspects of both the State and Federal Judiciary to harass and annoy those whom he has set out to attack cannot be condoned or tolerated. Although this Court has handled thousands of domestic violence cases over the course of its 34 years on the bench, in both Family Court and as a Justice of the Supreme Court (assigned to the Integrated Domestic Violence Court, Guardianship, Matrimonial and Civil cases), this case stands out as one of the most insidious. Here, the harassment did not stop at the commencement of the action or with the parties’ separation, but accelerated exponentially and has continued for more than six years after the summons and notice were filed. The Defendant has used the very system that is supposed to provide justice and protection to victims of domestic violence to terrorize and emotionally abuse the Plaintiff and the parties’ oldest child, J.. What the Court did not realize during the many hours spent with J. and his attorney in the in-camera interviews trying to persuade J. to visit with his father, was the malignancy and magnitude of the Defendant’s vexatious/abusive litigation tactics6 perpetrated against this child and his mother. During the three separate proceedings held in this matter, the Defendant’s actions, statements and conduct have vacillated between the absurd and the delusional. This is fully observable in his summation in this matter wherein he requested $344,860.00 in support and maintenance, and $140,000.00 for attorneys fees from the unemployed, stay-at-home, non-monied Plaintiff. One thing remains clear, however, the Defendant’s conduct never waivers from the malicious which runs through the core of his concerted efforts. His compulsive lying, demonstrated throughout these proceedings, is insidious and is just one of the many things that J. dislikes in his father. In its attempt to provide fairness and due process to the Defendant and give him a full opportunity to prove his case, the Court has unwittingly permitted the Defendant to continue to harass the Plaintiff and their son J. by prolonging this matter. This decision can now provide some form of compensatory justice to the Plaintiff and call the Defendant to task for his malignant use of the judicial process. The parties purchased the marital home in 1999 for $245,000.00. The house fell into foreclosure due to the Defendant’s repeated delays in paying his court-ordered support to the Plaintiff, who is an unemployed, stay-at-home mother of their two boys. In the first contempt proceeding as well as in this proceeding, the Plaintiff has demonstrated beyond any question the Defendant’s ample ability to pay the court-ordered support and maintenance which, if timely paid, would have kept the house out of foreclosure. In an effort to save the marital home and prevent the displacement of the parties’ two sons after the Defendant refused to transfer the house to the Plaintiff, the Court directed that the marital home be placed in the Plaintiff’s name (with the understanding that the Defendant would retain his equity therein) so that she could obtain a loan modification7 using the collateral of her approximately $230,000.00 inheritance.8 The Defendant’s construction and landscaping business was purchased by the Defendant just before the marriage for $300,000.00. The purchase money was lent to the Defendant by a client with an agreement to repay the loan over a five year period at 12 percent interest per year. In the fourth year the loan was called and the Plaintiff borrowed $80,000.00 from her mother to pay off the loan. Marital funds were used to repay the Plaintiff’s mother. In fact, the evidence shows that entire loan was paid exclusively with marital funds. The Plaintiff’s exhibits numbers 5 through 8 establish that the Defendant’s gross income from the business was $338,231.00 in 2001, $412,512.00 in 2005, $446,371.00 in 2007 and $496,800.00 in 2008. During these years the Defendant paid himself a salary of $62,400.00. The credible evidence establishes that throughout the course of the marriage, the Defendant used his business account to pay personal expenses. During the period that he paid himself a salary, personal expenses were not paid from a personal bank account but rather were paid directly out of the business account. The credible evidence establishes that in 2011 the gross receipts for the business were $521,835.00. Defendant paid himself a salary of $62,400.00 but utilized another $185,209.00 of the business’ money for personal expenses, resulting in $247,609.00 in income that year. In 2012, the Defendant’s gross receipts were $535,597.00. Defendant paid himself a salary of $62,400.00 and spent $231,293.00 of the business’ money for personal expenses bringing his personal income up to $293,693.00. During this period of time the parties maintained a thirty-foot boat which was purchased for $86,400.00, a BMW and a Jeep Cherokee and their style of living was commensurate with their high income. In 2013, the year the action began, the Defendant’s gross receipts were $528,880.00. Defendant paid himself a salary of $62,400.00. He spent $237,912.00 from the business account for personal expenses, for a total of $300,312.00 in income. After the commencement of this action, the Defendant stopped paying himself a salary thereby preventing the Plaintiff from garnishing his wages when he outright refused to pay the court-ordered child support and maintenance even though he clearly had ample resources from which to draw. The credible evidence establishes that the Defendant’s average income for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 was about $280,000.00 per year. The Court’s pendente lite decision dated July 29, 2014 (Crecca, J.), however, was based on the evidence available at that time which imputed merely $30,000.00 of additional income from his use of the business account to pay his personal expenses, for a total income of $130,000.00 per year. Accordingly the Defendant was ordered to pay child support and maintenance in the amount of only approximately $5,000.00 per month. Nevertheless, the Defendant has refused to pay even this amount of support and maintenance. As a result, the Plaintiff presently holds three money judgments against the Defendant due to his failure to pay the court-ordered support, totaling $60,385.00. The Plaintiff asks this Court to order those judgments be lodged against the Defendant’s business account as the evidence clearly demonstrates that the Defendant uses his business account as his personal checking account and because he has chosen not to pay himself a salary, which has rendered himself judgment proof.9 In fact, the Defendant has not shown that he has any accounts in his own name and it is clear from the evidence that he is using his business’ corporate account to pay for all of his personal expenses and to shield his money from the Plaintiff’s judgments against him. The Court will not tolerate such conduct nor allow the Defendant’s abuse of the corporate form to shield him from paying personal judgments from his business account that is used as his personal account. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Defendant’s business account is not entitled to any of the protections from personal creditors normally afforded corporations and businesses and thus the Plaintiff is directed to attach her judgments against the Defendant to the Defendant’s business’ account.10 The Defendant has testified that he cannot earn the monies the Plaintiff alleges he is capable of earning and that his debt is so substantial that he cannot afford to pay the present pendente lite order of support and maintenance. Such argument is despite the proof of his prior business/personal earnings and expenditures as established through the Defendant’s business’ bank records. Moreover, in determining who to believe, the Court is allowed to consider whether either party has purposefully lied in this proceeding. In deciding to discount totally the Defendant’s testimony concerning his version of income from his business and his liabilities, the Court points to one clear instance (out of many) in which the Defendant has been found to have lied outright to the Court. The Defendant testified that he had no involvement at all with his accountant concerning the finances of the business. His own witness however, David Yatkowitz (the accountant for the business), when testifying for the Defendant during this trial stated that he dealt primarily with the Plaintiff (who was the bookkeeper) but that he also dealt on many occasions with the Defendant himself concerning business expenses and taxes. The witness further stated that it was not true, as the Defendant has testified under oath, that the Defendant had no contact with the business’ financial issues and taxes. This testimony brought forth by the Defendant from his own witness is just one of the many clear indications of his utter disregard and disdain for the truth. Accordingly, the Court finds the Defendant’s testimony uncredible in toto. The Defendant’s blatant disregard for the truth is further demonstrated by his tax returns from 2014 wherein he listed his income as $38,273.00 (see Plaintiff’s exhibit 49). The credible evidence, however, establishes that this could not be true as he spent $49,150.00 in attorneys fees that year, $5,000.00 for therapy, and $3,754.00 for child support for a total of $57,904.00. In 2015 he listed his total income as $21,106.00 and yet he paid $34,500.00 in legal fees that year and $34,173.00 in child support for a total of $68,673.00. Furthermore, the Plaintiff established on cross-examination of the Defendant that the Defendant has not paid any Federal taxes since 2014 even though able to do so. She also proved that the Defendant had sufficient monies in his business/personal account to pay his taxes. For example, in 2017, the Defendant did not pay his $3,600.00 in Federal taxes but he did pay over $13,000.00 to the Family Therapy Center and Monty Weinstein, advocates for his parent alienation claims. The evidence also established that in 2018 the Defendant had sufficient funds to pay his $3,300.00 in Federal tax liabilities and yet chose instead to pay $58,000.00 to his attorney. Moreover, it is absurd for the Defendant to argue that there is a viable worker’s compensation tax liability of $100,000.00 on his business when he has only one employee and has not challenged the accuracy of any determination. Also, there is no evidence that the Defendant has made any effort to negotiate with the government to reduce any tax liens or any worker’s compensation liability. The Defendant cannot now be heard to claim that he cannot afford to pay child support and maintenance as a result of liabilities that he has created by intentionally not paying his bills, when the evidence of the balance he keeps in his business account that he uses as his personal checking account demonstrates that he can more than afford to pay all of his bills. Instead, the Court will credit the Plaintiff’s testimony in toto with respect to the Defendant’s income from his business and finds the Defendant’s income in 2017 was $225,705.00 (see Plaintiff’s exhibits numbers 24 and 25). The Defendant was able to produce this income even though, according to his testimony, he has only one client (down from seven in 2013).11 This is the most recent income figure that the Court has and it is consistent with the lower end of his proven earning capacity over the years. Accordingly, it will be used for child support calculations and maintenance considerations. The main purpose of maintenance is to encourage the recipient to become self sufficient and maintenance is appropriate where the marriage is of sufficient duration, the recipient spouse has been out of the work force for a number of years, has sacrificed her or his own career development or has made substantial noneconomic contributions to the household or to the career of the payor (McCaffrey v. McCaffrey, 107 AD3d 1106 [3rd Dept 2013]). As this case was filed before the 2016 post-divorce maintenance statutory revision, the amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of this Court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts (see Carroll v. Carroll, 125 AD3d 710, 711 [2d Dept 2015]). The determination of an appropriate maintenance award requires, among other things, a delicate balance of each party’s needs and means (McCaffrey v. McCaffrey, 107 AD3d at 1107). The factors to be considered in a maintenance award in this case are, among others factors, the parties’ standard of living, the parties’ income and property, the distribution of property, the duration of the marriage, the parties’ health, the present and future earning capacity of the parties, the ability of the recipient to be self-supporting, the recipient’s reduced or lost earning capacity, and the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the parties” (Carroll v. Carroll, 125 AD3d at 711). The parties were married for approximately 14 years, thus they did not have a short-term marriage. The Plaintiff presently is an unemployed mother of the parties’ two teenage boys. She has sacrificed her own career and made substantial noneconomic contributions to the marital household and to the Defendant’s career during the marriage as she has not worked outside of the home or Defendant’s landscaping business since J. was born, approximately 17 years ago. During this time, as can be seen from the income generated as noted above, the Defendant was able to establish a very successful landscaping business. The Plaintiff has also not been able to seek meaningful employment, partially due to the age of the children but mainly based upon the enormous amount of time she has spent on this proceeding which has been unduly burdensome, delayed and extended by the Defendant’s conduct. Just to reach trial in an otherwise simple case, the Plaintiff has been forced to bring numerous contempt applications against the Defendant due to his refusal to pay court-ordered support, respond and address a constant barrage of the Defendant’s baseless and frivolous motions, and respond also to two Federal lawsuits as well as numerous frivolous appeals. The Plaintiff will need maintenance in the future in order to pay for her expenses while seeking job training and employment as she was not available to seek such training and employment before now. Moreover, due to the Defendant’s conduct and the resulting refinance of the marital home, the Plaintiff now has a monthly mortgage payment of $2,238.99 for 30 years, a significantly longer period of time than she would have had if the marital home did not fall into foreclosure. While the Plaintiff is clearly intelligent and capable, it is unlikely based upon her age, lack of experience and lack of higher education, that she will be able to enjoy a way of life similar to that of her pre-divorce lifestyle as it is unlikely she will ever be able to earn hundreds of thousands of dollars per year. Furthermore, there are no valuable assets or retirement accounts to distribute in this case to make up for her lost lifestyle. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Plaintiff will have enough time and opportunity in whatever future employment she obtains to amass enough funds to secure retirement income and live as she would have been able to had she not sacrificed her career during the marriage. Thus, it appears her future prospects of living a lifestyle similar to that which she had enjoyed while married will become even less likely in retirement years to come. By contrast, the Defendant has an established, successful business and is able to earn significant sums of money even though he allegedly has less workers and only a seventh the clientele he had when married. Clearly he has a bright economic future ahead of him and his income now and in his future retirement is largely under his control. In addition, contrary to the Defendant’s contentions, the credible evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff’s boyfriend has no intention (or legal obligation) to support the Plaintiff financially, nor can the Plaintiff’s inheritance of $230,000.00 from her mother’s estate be considered as a reliable source of income as it is limited, non recurring and the credible testimony establishes that the Plaintiff will be using this inheritance to pay for the daily needs of the children, the household expenses and repairs, college tuition as well as extra curricular activities, as the Plaintiff has already expended $25,000.00 of her inheritance on her sons’ expenses and maintenance of the house. The Defendant’s continuous willful failure to pay his support and maintenance in a timely manner makes it almost certain that the Plaintiff will have to utilize these funds to pay expenses during the long periods of nonpayment while she pursues future contempt motions. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this Court awards the Plaintiff maintenance in the sum of $40,000.00 per year to be paid through Suffolk County’s Support Collection Unit payable in monthly payments of $3,333.00 on the first of each month starting on July 1, 2020.12 In considering the duration of the maintenance payments, the Court notes at present this Court referred to this trial the Plaintiff’s ninth contempt motion against the Defendant. There appears to be no likelihood that the Defendant will pay any amount of support and maintenance directed by the Court in a timely manner, if at all (certainly not on his own volition). Accordingly, the Plaintiff will undoubtedly have to spend at least the next 6 years until C. reaches majority chasing the Defendant to collect the support and maintenance ordered by the Court. In addition, the Plaintiff will certainly need maintenance for a long enough time to allow her to get some sort of vocational training or education for a job and to become established in that career so that it will provide enough income to pay her bills and sustain her. The Plaintiff must be given a meaningful opportunity to build a profession or career to secure her financial future. Her lack of any real employment experience outside of the home (not tied to helping her husband’s business) for all of those years has caused significant harm to her employability. In addition, the Court cannot ignore the role the Defendant has played in wasting precious time these last several years that the Plaintiff could have utilized for training, education or building her resume. His bullying tactics enumerated above were born out of spite and ill will. He perverted the judicial process to exact some sort of revenge upon the Plaintiff and alienated his own son as a result of his actions. This Court must redress the Defendant’s misbehavior in a way not to penalize the Defendant, as such would require various due process procedures such as notice absent here.13 This Court however, must compensate the Plaintiff for the Defendant’s frivolous conduct and abuse of her through the legal system. Federal courts have “inherent powers,” not conferred by rule or statute, “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” (Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 US 626, 630-631, 82 SCt 1386, 8 LEd2d 734 [1962]). That authority includes “the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process” (Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 US 32, 44-45, 111 SCt 2123, 115 LEd2d 27 [1991]). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that such a sanction, when imposed pursuant to civil procedures, must be compensatory rather than punitive in nature (see Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 US 821, 826-830, 114 SCt 2552, 129 LEd2d 642 [1994]). Similarly, this Court has the discretion to impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a]; see Rhodes v. Rhodes, 169 A.D.3d 841, 844, 94 N.Y.S.3d 123, 127 [2d Dept 2019]). Conduct is frivolous and sanctions may be awarded if “it is completely without merit in law” or fact and “cannot be support by a[ny] reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]). Furthermore, if conduct “is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [2]) or if such conduct “asserts material factual statements that are false” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [3]) sanctions may be warranted (see Weissman v. Weissman, 116 A.D.3d 848, 849, 985 N.Y.S.2d 93 [2d Dept 2014]). In light of the fact that the Defendant has abused the Plaintiff throughout the litigation with his manipulation of the court process by his blatant disregard of the truth, pressing frivolous claims, wasting court time with witnesses that had at best merely uninformed opinions, causing drawn out conferences and examinations of witnesses that were not probative, making specious arguments and accusations including parent alienation, refusing to pay timely support payments until threatened with incarceration, refusing to help save the marital home from foreclosure, harassing and annoying the Plaintiff and J., refusing to pay his share of the court-ordered business evaluation which precluded the Plaintiff from demonstrating any potential increase in business’ value during the marriage, and by prolonging this case by creating unnecessary litigation, the court will award financial compensation to the Plaintiff (see id. at 850).14 Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s above consideration of the factors necessary to award an amount and duration of maintenance, and in order to do justice in this case and compensate the Plaintiff for some of the injuries that the Plaintiff has suffered as a result of the Defendant’s malicious, vexatious/abusive litigation, and as a sanction for the Defendant’s completely frivolous conduct throughout this case and certainly during this trial, the Court will award the Plaintiff ten years of maintenance payments. Furthermore, while normally the years and amounts paid during the pendente lite period are accounted for in formulating post-divorce maintenance, here, because of the Defendant’s own actions and vexatious litigation which purposefully attenuated this proceeding, and the need to compensate the Plaintiff, the Defendant will receive no credit for the approximately last 6 years of pendente lite payments.15 There is simply no other way to accomplish justice in this case as the Defendant’s malicious, egregious and conscience-shocking conduct toward the Plaintiff and the parties’ son J. needs to be addressed. While the Court could under these egregious circumstances equitably distribute all of the assets to the Plaintiff as a penalty (see Howard S. v. Lillian S., 14 NY3d 431, 436, 928 NE2d 399, 402, 902 NYS2d 17, 20 [2010]), it is necessary for future payment purposes to award the Defendant his business (which is addressed below). Turning to child support, DRL §240(1-b) sets forth the calculations to be used up to the income cap of $154,000.00 and above, to determine the amount of child support that must be awarded the custodial parent, which in this case is the Plaintiff. The applicable child support percentage is 25 percent given that there are two minors involved (DRL §240[1-b][b][3][ii]). The combined parental income is $225,705.00, consisting of the Plaintiff’s maintenance income of $40,000.00 and the Defendant’s income of $185,705.00 (adjusted for maintenance pursuant to DRL §240[1-b][b][5][vii][C]).16 The basic child support amount is $38,500.00 ($154,000.00 x 25 percent). The custodial Plaintiff’s prorated share of basic child support is 18 percent and the non-custodial Defendant’s prorated share of basic child support is 82 percent which makes his basic child support obligation $31,570.00 per year (DRL §240[1-b][c][2]). That leaves $71,705.00 of combined parental income above the cap of $154,000.00. Twenty-five percent of that amount, or $17,926.00, is the total amount of child support above the cap. Applying the Defendant’s child support percentage of 82 percent equals an additional $14,700.00 per year of child support obligation that the Court may order the Defendant to pay in its discretion considering the factors of DRL §240(1-b)(f) (see DRL §240[1-b][c][3]). Pursuant to DRL §240(1-b)(f), to determine whether to direct the Defendant to pay more than his basic child support obligation (up to $14,700.00, his share of child support above the cap), the court shall consider the following factors to decide whether the Defendant’s pro rata share of basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate: (1) The financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent, and those of the child; (2) The physical and emotional health of the child and his/her special needs and aptitudes; (3) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage or household not been dissolved; (4) The tax consequences to the parties; (5) The non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child; (6) The educational needs of either parent; (7) A determination that the gross income of one parent is substantially less than the other parent’s gross income; (8) The needs of the children of the non-custodial parent for whom the non-custodial parent is providing support who are not subject to the instant action and whose support has not been deducted from income pursuant to subclause (D) of clause (vii) of subparagraph five of paragraph (b) of this subdivision, and the financial resources of any person obligated to support such children, provided, however, that this factor may apply only if the resources available to support such children are less than the resources available to support the children who are subject to the instant action; (9) Provided that the child is not on public assistance (I) extraordinary expenses incurred by the non-custodial parent in exercising visitation, or (ii) expenses incurred by the non-custodial parent in extended visitation provided that the custodial parent’s expenses are substantially reduced as a result thereof; and (10) Any other factors the court determines are relevant in each case, the court shall order the non-custodial parent to pay his or her pro rata share of the basic child support obligation, and may order the non-custodial parent to pay an amount pursuant to paragraph (e) of this subdivision[;] (DRL §240[1-b][f]). The Defendant’s income is far greater than that of the Plaintiff. Indeed, it is approximately four times that of the Plaintiff and will be until the Plaintiff can obtain meaningful employment. The disparity between the parties’ income is therefore substantial. The parties’ children had enjoyed a grander lifestyle with all that an income of several hundred thousand dollars a year brought including several cars, a 30-foot boat and a full time stay-at-home parent devoted to their needs. Now the Plaintiff will have to work and even though the children are older, that does not fully negate the loss of the benefit to them of having their mother stay at home as she always was able to do for them. For these reasons, the Court finds that the basic child support obligation is inappropriate and orders the Defendant to pay additional child support in the amount of $14,700.00 per year for the boys. Thus, the Defendant’s child support obligation is $46,270.00 a year, payable through Suffolk County’s Support Collection Unit in monthly payments of $3,855.00 on the first of every month commencing July 1, 2020. In addition, the Defendant was ordered by the Court (Budd, J.) to pay 70 percent of the appraisal costs of the business and marital residence but he once again refused to obey the Court’s order. Therefore at present time the marital house has no appraised value and the Court is thus compelled by Defendant’s conduct to rely totally on the Plaintiff’s credible testimony that the marital residence has a present value of $400,000.00. The Court finds that the present value of $400,000.00 is reasonable after crediting the Plaintiff’s testimony that there are no Certificates of Occupancy for many of the improvements, and that there are holes in the walls and cracks in the foundation. The evidence establishes that the marital home has a current mortgage of $274,512.00. Subtracting that amount from its current value of $400,000.00 leaves the present equity in the house fixed at $125,488.00.17 The Court awards the marital residence to the Plaintiff as she has residential custody of the boys and less ability to re-establish a home for the three of them, and fixes the Defendant’s 50 percent share of the equity at $62,744.00. Pursuant to DRL §237(a), in an action for divorce this Court may direct the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s counsel fees as she is the less monied spouse, and such application may be made at any time prior to final judgment. This provision of the Domestic Relations Law has deep statutory roots, and is designed to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse such as in this case. Recognizing that the financial strength of divorcing couples is often unequal, Trial Judges are vested with the discretion to make the more affluent spouse pay for legal expenses of the needier one, and “are to see to it that the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant’s wallet” (O’Shea v. O’Shea, 93 NY2d 187, 190, 711 N.E.2d 193, 195 [1999]). Here, the Plaintiff’s outstanding legal fees are $75,000.00. Accordingly, in consideration of the fact that the Defendant is the monied spouse, the Defendant will be solely responsible to pay these fees to Thomas Campagna, Esq. within 6 months of this decision, unless already paid by the Plaintiff in which case the Defendant shall pay this amount to the Plaintiff within six months. The Plaintiff asks this Court to award her a share of the value of the landscaping business as she helped pay for it but the evidence shows that it was purchased prior to the marriage for $300,000.00 and thus the Court awards the business to the Defendant as his separate property. Additionally, there is no reliable and legally acceptable valuation for the business for this Court to use to award the Plaintiff any appreciation in the value of the business during the marriage because the Defendant, even though under a court order (Budd, J.), has refused to pay the majority of the cost for an evaluation of it. It is undisputed, however, that the $300,000.00 purchase price of the business was paid back entirely from marital funds, thus, half of that money used to buy the business was from the Plaintiff. As the Plaintiff was not buying any part of the business with her $150,000.00 that was put towards the purchase price of his separate business property, the Court finds her $150,000.00 outlay to be a loan to the Defendant to purchase his separate property. Accordingly, the Defendant is directed to pay back the Plaintiff $150,000.00 minus the $62,744.00 which the Plaintiff owes the Defendant for his share of the equity in the house, for a total of $87,256.00 over the next five years by paying the Plaintiff an additional $1,454.00 per month. The Court accordingly awards Woodstock landscaping business to the Defendant as his separate property and awards the marital home as well as the sum of $87,256.00 representing the Plaintiff’s share of the marital funds used to pay for the purchase price of the business after applying the Defendant’s equity credit, to the Plaintiff. As the Plaintiff is awarded the house, she will receive all of its valueless contents.18 Moreover, in determining the Plaintiff’s two contempt motions referred to trial,19 the credible evidence establishes that at the conclusion of the trial that the Defendant owes $3,466.00 in child support arrears and maintenance arrears, and $20,232.00 for his share of the children’s extra-curricular activities, the plaintiff’s car expenses, unreimbursed medical expenses and for a previous award of attorney’s fees, that was not paid, for a total of $23,698.00. The Plaintiff’s motions for contempt regarding these unpaid amounts were referred to this trial. Accordingly, as the Plaintiff has proven the amounts owed to her and the Defendant’s contempt in violating the Court’s pendente lite support order, as well as this Court’s oral decision on the record on July 6, 2017 awarding the Plaintiff legal fees from the foreclosure action, the Plaintiff’s motions (#027 and #032) are granted. The Defendant is hereby sentenced to 3 months incarceration and shall surrender to the Suffolk County Sheriff on August 1, 2020 unless the purge amount of $23,698.00 is paid by that date. Furthermore, pursuant to this Court’s September 21, 2018 order, the Defendant is 100 percent responsible to provide health insurance for both of his sons. Finally, the Court leaves the issue of paying for their children’s college to each party’s conscience in the hopes that each parent, especially the affluent Defendant, will provide for the boys’ future education so that they may start their adult life loan free. Accordingly, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Plaintiff is given permission to lodge outstanding Judgments she holds against the Defendant against the Defendant’s present and future business accounts; it is further ORDERED that the Defendant is directed to pay the sum of $3,333.00 per month for spousal maintenance to the Plaintiff for ten years starting July 1, 2020; it is further ORDERED that the Defendant is to pay the sum of $3,856.00 per month for child support to the Plaintiff starting July 1, 2020; it is further ORDERED that the maintenance and child support payments are to be paid through Suffolk County’s Support Collection Unit; it is further ORDERED that the Plaintiff is awarded the marital residence and all of its contents in equitable distribution; it is further ORDERED that the Defendant is awarded the landscaping business “Woodstock” as his separate property; ORDERED that the Defendant is awarded a credit of $62,744.00 for his share of equity in the marital residence while the Plaintiff is awarded $150,000.00 credit for her loan to the Defendant to purchase his separate business, for a total balance of $87,256.00 that the Defendant owes to the Plaintiff and the Defendant is accordingly directed to pay the sum of $87,256.00 by paying $1,454.26 per month for five years in equitable distribution payments; it is further ORDERED that the Defendant is directed to pay the Plaintiff’s legal fees in the amount of $75,000.00 to the Plaintiff’s former attorney Thomas Campagna, or to the Plaintiff if said fees have been paid as reimbursement, within six months of the date below; it is further ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s motions (#027 and #032) to hold the Defendant in contempt are granted and the Defendant is sentenced to three months incarceration and shall surrender to the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department on August 1, 2020 unless the Defendant pays the sum of $23,698.00 to the Plaintiff by August 1, 2020; and it is further ORDERED that the Defendant is 100 percent responsible to provide and pay for the cost of health insurance for the parties two sons. Dated: June 12, 2020
